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TilE VIETNAM WAR ON TRIAL: 
TilE COURT-MARTIAL OF 
DR. HOWARD B. LEVY 
ROBERT N. STRASSFELD• 
This Article examines the history of a Vietnam War-era case: the court-martial 
of Dr. Howard B. Levy. The U.S. Army court-martialled Dr. Levy for refusing to 
teach medicine to Green Beret soldiers and for criticizing both the Green Berets and 
American involvement in Vietnam. Although the Supreme Court eventually upheld 
Levy's conviction in Parker v. Levy, ill decision obscures the political content of Levy's 
court-martial and its relationship to the war. At the court-martial Levy sought to defend 
himself by showing that his disparaging remarks about the Green Berets, identifying 
them as "killers of peasants and murderers of women and children," were true and that 
his refusal to teach medicine to Green Beret soldiers was dictated by medical ethics, 
given the ways in which the soldiers would misuse their medical knowledge. Ultimately, 
Levy put the war itself on trial by arguing that had he trained the soldiers he would have 
abetted their war crimes. 
This Article seeks to recapture the history of the Levy case as a case about the 
Vietnam War. Yet the case was also about much more. The Article shows how 
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imagery evoking beliefs about race and racial difference, war, frontier violence, and 
medicine and healing all came into play in the Levy case. It also explores the manner 
in which the court-martial became a forum in which the Vietnam War and aspects of 
U.S. Anny policy and conduct were debated, and in which that debate was eventually 
suppressed. Ultimately, thia Article begins the exploration of how American legal 
institutions coped with the crisis of political and moral legitimacy that they confronted 
in the late 1960s. 
On June 19, 1974, the United States Supreme Court upheld the 
court-martial conviction of Dr. Howard B.  Levy,• and with it, the 
constitutional validity of Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") 
Articles 1332 and 134.3 The Court's announcement of its decision in 
Parker v. Levy4 prompted an unusual display of ire; Justice Potter 
Stewart angrily read his dissenting opinion from the bench. One visiting 
Senator who witnessed this remarked: "My God, we don't treat each 
other that way at the Senate. "5 Despite the contentiousness of that 
moment, the Court's decision masked a far greater contentiousness that 
lay at the core of the case, for in his defense at the court-martial Dr. 
Levy had attempted to put the Vietnam War on trial. 
This masking does not mean that the opinions in Parker v. Levy 
conceal the Vietnam War context of the case. Even the most superficial 
reading of the opinions unmistakably identifies the case as a product of 
the war. The court-martial had found Dr. Levy guilty of "willfully 
disobeying a lawful command of his superior officer" in violation of 
1. Dr. Levy's rank was Captain (0-3). Reflecting what I assume would be his 
preference, I have chosen to refer to him as Dr. Levy (or just Levy) rather than Capt. 
Levy in the text, except where I am quoting material that refers to him as Capt. Levy. 
2. Article 133 of the UCMJ provides: "Any commissioned officer, cadet, or 
midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be 
punished as a court-martial may direct." 1 0  U.S.C. § 933 (1993). 
3. Article 134 of the UCMJ provides in part: 
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and 
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all 
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces ... of which 
persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by 
a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and 
degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court. 
10 u.s.c. § 934 (1993). 
4. 417 u.s. 733 (1974). 
5. Interview with Judge Robert H. Bork, at the American Enterp<se Institute, 
in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 28, 1993). Judge Bork notes that "there was a lot of ... frre 
in [Justice Stewart's] voice," and that the Justices seldom read anything from the bench 
unless one of them "was very exercised and Stewart was very exercised .... " Judge 
Bork is uncertain of his �llection, but believes that the Senator was William Proxmire. 
/d. ; see also Warren Weaver, Jr., Justices Uphold Levy Conviction, N.Y. TIMES, June 
20, 1974, at At (describing a "relatively emotional exchange"). 
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UCMJ Article 90, of engaging in "conduct unbecoming an officer and a 
gentleman" in violation of UCMJ Article 133, and of publicly uttering 
various statements "with design to promote disloyalty and disaffection 
among the troops . . . . to the prejudice of good order and discipline in 
the armed forces" in violation of UCMJ Article 134.6 The Article 133 
and 134 charges rested solely on statements that Levy made about the 
war, 7 about whether black soldiers ought to serve in it, 8 and about the 
conduct of United States Special Forces (the "Green Berets") in the war.9 
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion reproduces these statements.10 But 
while Parker v. Levy identifies the case's origins in the war, it also alters 
the relationship between the case and the war by shifting the war from the 
center to the periphery of the case. No longer a case that put the war in 
issue, Parker v. Levy had become, instead, a case that merely happened 
to arise against the backdrop of the war. 11 
The case came to the Supreme Court on appeal from the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which had ruled for Levy 
in a habeas proceeding, declaring that Articles 133 and 134 were 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.12 In reversing the Third 
6. For an exposition of the court-martial's findings, see generally Record at 
2617. The court-martial record consists of 18 volumes. The court-martial transcript 
comprises volumes 3-9 of the record and its pages are numbered consecutively. I have 
adopted the citation form "Record at __ " for citations to the transcript. When citing 
to other parts of the court-martial record, I identify the record volume number (and where 
applicable a page number), the name of the cited document, and any other identifying 
information (e.g., "Prosecution Exhibit no. 5"). Two other charges brought against Dr. 
Levy relating to a letter he had written to a soldier in Vietnam were dismissed at the end 
of the court-martial. ld. at 2618. These charges based on the letter are discussed below. 
7. "The United States is wrong in being involved in the VietNam War. I would 
refuse to go to VietNam if ordered to do so." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 738 n.5 
(quoting Specification to Charge II under Article 134). 
8. For instance: "I don't see why any colored soldier would go to VietNam; 
they should refuse to go to Viet Nam and if sent should refuse to fight because they are 
discriminated against and denied their freedom in the United States, and they are 
sacrificed and discriminated against in Viet Nam by being given all the hazardous duty 
and they are suffering the majority of casualties." ld. at 738-39 n.5 (quoting Specification 
to Charge II under Article 34). 
9. For instance: "Special Forces personnel are ... killers of peasants and 
murderers of women and children." /d. at 739 n.5. 
10. 417 U.S. at 736-40. 
11. As with Tinker v. Des Moines Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
(upholding the right of students to wear black armbands to school to protest the war), Levy 
had become a case of, but not about, the war. 
12. Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772, 793-96 (3d Cir. 1973). Shortly before the 
Third Circuit decided Levy, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia struck down portions of Article 134 on vagueness grounds in Avrech v. 
Secretary of the Navy, 477 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court heard 
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Circuit, the Court focused on the applicability of the vagueness and 
overbreadth doctrines in a military justice setting. It framed the case as 
one about the proper standard of review for challenges to the UCMJ 
under the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. More specifically, the 
Court asked whether Levy was entitled to challenge the Articles as vague 
on their face and whether he had standing to challenge them as overbroad 
even if his own speech was unprotected. The Court answered in the 
negative to both questions.13 Only at the edges of Justice Rehnquist's 
opinion, which obliquely mentions "medical ethics"14 and "participation 
in a war crime, " 15 can one see hints of issues of conscience relating to 
the war and of alternative constructions of the Levy case. 
During Dr. Levy's court-martial seven years earlier, however, the 
case looked very different. To be sure, questions of statutory vagueness 
and overbreadth were always important. Moreover, there was never a 
single authoritative construction of the case. At issue in the court-martial 
was the question of how to frame the case. Although many facts were not 
in dispute, there was no single version of events. More important, there 
was no single version of what was at issue, what legal categories for 
interpreting events were appropriate for understanding the case, and what 
significance to ascribe to events.16 The court-martial was, in other 
words, a contest over these issues. The silencing of one construction of 
the case, which ultimately resulted in the sterility of the Supreme Court's 
opinion, began at the court-martial.17 
argument in the two cases together. 
13. 417 U.S. at 752-61. 
14. Jd. at 736. 
15. Jd. at 761. 
16. Cf. Kimber)e Crenshaw& Gary Peller, Reel Time/Real Justice, 70 DENY. U. 
L. REv. 283, 283 (1993) ("At stake at each axis of conflict is a contest over which 
narrative structure will prevail in the interpretation of events in the social world. "). 
17. My understanding of the ways that legal disputes become contests over the 
naming and interpreting of events is informed by Sally Engle Merry's writings. See 
SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETIING JUSTICE AND GETIINO EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990); Sally Engle Merry, The Discourses of 
Mediation and the Power of Naming, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1990). As Merry 
argues, naming and interpreting events are exercises of power and domination that direct 
legal outcomes and silence competing accounts. MERRY, supra, at 111, 130-33. Merry 
states: 
One aspect of the power of law is its ability to establish a dominant way of 
construing events and to silence others, thus channeling and determining the 
outcome of legal proceedings. Legal processes can be seen as performances 
in which problems are named and solutions determined . . . .  The ability to 
structure this talk and to determine the relevant discourse within which an 
issue is framed-in other words, in which the reigning account of events is 
established-is an important facet of the power exercised by law. 
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The prosecution attempted to focus on Levy's conduct, statements, 
and character, and to push the war into the background. It assumed the 
war to be a just cause and relevant only to the extent that the war 
heightened the dangerousness of Levy's words and deeds. For the 
defense, and for many observers of the court-martial, however, aspects 
of America's war in Vietnam were on trial. Charged with making 
disloyal statements, Levy sought to defend himself by proving the 
truthfulness of his statements that Special Forces were "killers of 
peasants" and "murderers of women and children. "18 He attempted to 
defend the charge of willful disobedience of an order to teach medicine 
to Special Forces aidmen (or medics) by arguing that given the-ways in 
which the aidmen would misuse the training, the order demanded a breach 
of medical ethics. 19 And for a brief moment in the history of the case 
he raised a Nuremberg defense, the first ever heard in a U.S.  court, 
charging that had he trained the aidmen he would have been compl icitous 
in war crimes committed by Special Forces.20 Rather remarkably, while 
civilian courts were routinely precluding similar defenses, the claim that 
the war was not merely wrong but unlawful was entertained, albeit in a 
limited manner, in the unexpected forum of a military court-martial. Yet, 
given the forum, the ultimate disposition of the questions relating to the 
war may have been preordained. 
The defense's vision of the case did not prevail, at least at the 
Supreme Court. Levy lost. Nevertheless, the case's construction was 
ultimately the result of an ongoing contest between the Army and the 
defense to define it within legal rules and process constraints, as well as 
within other important exogenous constraints, such as time and resource 
limitations and government secrecy. Neither side was able to frame the 
case without reference to the other's construction, or without reference to 
the expectations, and sometimes the intervention, of various audiences for 
the stories that the two sides told. Consequent} y, to say that the Supreme 
Court opinion is authoritative, in any but the most formal sense, is to take 
Merry, supra, at 2. Merry focuses on the contest in lower courts and in mediation 
sessions to select the "discourse" that will apply to the problems plaintiffs present. She 
identifies the tendency in these fora to transform legal problems into moral or therapeutic 
issues by the substitution of moral or therapeutic discourse for legal discourse. MERRY, 
supra, at 110-33; Merry, supra, at 3-9, 34-36. While Merry is particularly interested in 
the redefinition of problems as non-legal, her vision of the contest to name and interpret 
events is also applicable to legal discourse, which is the focus of this Article. Law's 
power to silence has been explored by a number of feminist legal theorists. See, e.g., 
Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered 
Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886 (1987). 
18 .  See infra notes 236-42 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 350-459 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 243-349 and accompanying text. 
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an ahistorical, static approach to the Levy case. The authority that we 
give to the Supreme Court's construction of a case tends to silence other 
understandings of that case including, quite often, the understandings of 
parties and other participants. To focus on the Court's construction alone 
also cabins our understanding of the case too narrowly by ignoring 
extralegal responses to it. It obscures the possibility that many people 
may reject the authoritativeness of the Court's construction, and that the 
case's greater significance may lie in the contrarian readings it 
spawned.21 
Levy's court-martial was a cultural, as well as a political, event. 
The advocates drew on popularly held myths, symbols, and beliefs, as 
well as on legal doctrines, in an effort to persuade the decisionmak:ers. 
Tacitly, these myths and beliefs were reaffirmed or refashioned as the 
court-martial incorporated them into its understanding of the case. Yet 
the trial was not merely a venue for the consumption of culture. More 
than one hundred journalists crammed into the small courtroom to cover 
the case. As they used familiar myths and symbols, the participants were 
also engaged in the production of new ones. 
This Article attempts to unmask the politics of the Levy case. It 
seeks to recapture Levy's context and to rehabilitate its multiple meanings 
that are submerged below the surface of the Supreme Court's decision. 
To do so, it focuses on one part of Levy's history: the court-martial and 
the events preceding it. 22 This Article begins by setting a context of 
time, place, and military culture. Because of their importance to the Levy 
case, this Article examines the Green Berets and the counterinsurgency 
doctrine with which they were so closely associated. An Army 
intelligence investigation played a critical role in prompting Levy's court­
martial and in fashioning the manner in which the court-martial unfolded 
and was understood. Consequently, this Article closely examines Army 
Intelligence's role in the Levy case. It reveals the prevalence of reflexive 
anticommunism within the Army in the mid-1960s. It also shows how 
anticommunism, often coupled with racial bigotry, produced fear and 
intolerance of political dissidence and movements for social change. 
In turning to the court-martial, this Article analyzes the way in which 
the prosecution and the defense framed the case. It focuses on the 
21. See Symposium, Legal Histories from Belew, 1985 WIS. L. RBv. 759. 
22. In another article I intend to examine the idea of the military as a "separate 
society" that was the foundation for the majority's opinion in Parker v. Levy. I plan to 
identify the origins of the separate society idea, trace the myths of the professional soldier 
that it spawned, and examine the ways in which the Levy majority drew on those myths 
in the service of a vision of the military and its relationship to society, a relationship that 
was collapsing as it became more "civilianized" and civilian society became more 
militaristic. 
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competing stories that the prosecution and defense attempted to tell and 
on the myths, symbols, and ideas that they drew upon. This Article 
shows how imagery evocative of beliefs about race and racial difference, 
about war, frontier violence, and the civilizing force of law, and about 
medicine and healing, all came into play in the Levy case. And it 
explores the manner in which the court-martial became a forum for 
debating the Vietnam War and aspects of United States military policy 
and conduct, a debate that was ultimately suppressed. 
I. PRELUDE TO THE COURT-MARTIAL 
A. The Army and Howard Levy 
Dr. Howard Levy staunchly opposed U.S. involvement in the 
Vietnam War when he arrived at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, on July 
13, 1965, to begin two years of active military duty. Subject to an 
expansive doctors' draft, Levy chose in 1962 to avail himself of the 
"Berry Plan. "23 Under the Berry Plan, the Army deferred induction 
until a doctor had completed his medical specialty training and guaranteed 
him assignment within his medical specialty. Consequently, Levy was 
able to delay inevitable military service. His commitment, made without 
thought to Vietnam, did not come due until he completed his residency in 
1965, during the escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Like many 
other draftees, Levy confronted what he saw as three dreary choices: 
flight to Canada, prison for refusing induction, or military service. Levy 
would subsequently say that he never considered going to Canada to be 
a palatable option and feared prison too much to refuse induction.24 
Instead, he entered the Army hoping that the time would pass as 
23. The Berry Plan was established in the 1955 draft amendments. 1955 
Amendments to the Universal Military Training and Service Act, Pub. L. No. 84-118, 69 
Stat. 223 (codified as amended at scattered sections of37 & 50 U.S.C.). For a discussion 
of the "doctor's draftK and of the Berry Plan, see GEORGE Q. FLYNN, THE DRAPT, 1940-
1973, at 153-60 (1993). Because of the Berry Plan's success, by 1962 many medical 
students were taking their chances on the draft. 
24. William Short & Willa Seidenberg, A Matter of Conscience: Resistance 
Within the U.S. Military During the Vietnam War 32-33 (Jan. 15, 1989) (transcript of 
unpublished interview with Howard Levy, on file with author) [hereinafter Short & 
Seidenberg). Short and Seidenberg have published a condensed version of the interview, 
along with condensed interviews with other GI dissenters. See WILLIAM SHORT & WILLA 
SEIDP..NBERO, A MATTER OP CONSCIENCE: Gl RESISTANCE DURING THE VIETNAM WAR 
1 8  (1992). 
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painlessly as possible, but recognizing that his beliefs might eventually 
come into conflict with Army command. 25 
In the years between medical school and active duty, Levy's political 
views had evolved significantly. Once very much a part of the generation 
of the 1950s,26 Levy had come to describe himself politically as "liberal 
left. "27 In interviews Levy has suggested various cultural influences 
from the fifties and early sixties that may have played a role in this 
evolution, most notably the writings of C. Wright Mills, the beats, new 
wave cinema, and absurdist or avant-garde theater.28 More important 
were the images and ideas of the civil rights movement, coupled with the 
25. Short & Seidenberg, supra note 24, at 33; Interview with Dr. Howard B. 
Levy, in New York, N.Y. (July 19, 1993) (discussing entering the Anny with the belief 
that at some point he might be asked to cross a line that he would be unwilling to cross). 
Shortly after his arrival at Fort Jackson, Levy stated in an interview with an Anny 
Intelligence Agent that he "question[ed} the present US foreign policy in Vietnam as well 
as other areas," and that he could envision unusual circumstances where he might refuse 
to obey an order because it was immoral or unethical. Statement of Howard Levy, DA 
Form 19-24 (Oct. 7, 1965), in U.S. Anny Intelligence Dossier No. 079300840, at 214, 
216 (on flle with author) [hereinafter Levy Army Intelligence File). Donald Duncan, 
writing about the case in the publication Ramparts, notes that the doctor whom Levy was 
to replace at Fort Jackson wrote a letter to Levy that allayed Levy's concerns about 
working conditions there. However, the doctor subsequently told Levy that he had been 
ordered to write the letter. Donald Duncan & J. A.C. Dunn, Notes Toward a Definition 
of the Unijonn Code of Military Justice, as Particularly Applied to the Person of Captain 
Howard Levy, RAMPARTS, July 1967, at 50, 52. 
26. His father testified that Levy was interested in basketball and school, rather 
than politics, and that he had voted for Eisenhower in 1956. Record at 847-48. He was 
probably partly mistaken in his testimony, since Levy was only nineteen at the time, and 
the voting age was then twenty-one. Nevertheless, Levy also described himself as 
instinctively politically conservative at that time. See, e.g., Homer Bigart, Captain 
Adamant Against War Duty, N.Y. TIMEs, May 10, 1967, at A22. 
27. Statement of Howard Levy, DA Form 19-24, in Levy Army Intelligence File, 
supra note 25, at 215; see also Memorandum from Laughlin McDonald to File of Capt. 
Howard B. Levy 5 (Dec. 27, 1965), in Howard Levy Litigation Files (on flle with ACLU 
Southern Regional Office, Atlanta, Ga.) [hereinafter Levy Litigation Files] (noting that 
Levy describes himself as "left liberal"). Levy's political evolution raises interesting 
questions about the relationship between the politics of sixties activism and the supposedly 
conformist culture of the 1950s that are beyond the scope of this Article. For explorations 
of this subject see WIN! BREINES, YOUNG, WHITE, AND MISERABLE: GROWING UP 
FEMALE IN THE FIFTIES (1992); TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF 
RAOE 11-77 (1987). 
28. Short & Seidenberg, supra note 24, at 13; Bigart, supra note 26, at 22. For 
a discussion of C. Wright Mills' impact on Levy's generation and American culture, see 
MORRIS DICKSTEIN, GATES OF EDEN: AMERICAN CULTURE IN THE SIXTIES 58-61 (1977); 
JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, THE PROUD DECADES: AMERICA IN WAR AND IN PEACE, 1941-
1960, at 249-50 (1988). On the impact of the beats, and of new wave cinema, see 
DICKSTEIN, supra, at 3-24, 88; GITLIN, supra note 27, at 28-29, 45-56. 
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reality of poor people's medicine encountered by Levy during his 
residency. 29 At Bellevue Hospital in particular, Levy saw the medical 
treatment available to the poor. He noted that his patient population was 
largely black or Puerto Rican and drew connections between what was 
occurring in the South and the experiences of poor nonwhites in the 
North.30 
As Levy's politics gravitated leftward, the U.S .  widened its 
involvement in Vietnam. In August 1964, Congress provided President 
Johnson with what would prove to be a blank check for escalation, in the 
Tonkin Gulf Resolutions.31 As the time for Levy's military service 
approached, U.S. troop levels in Vietnam increased dramatically. By 
May 1965, U.S. combat strength in South Vietnam was more than 
46,500. On July 28 of that year, Johnson publicly announced that he 
would immediately increase troop strength from 75,000 to 125,000, and 
secretly agreed to deploy an additional 50,000 troops.32 
In the meantime, stirrings of opposition to U.S. policy in Southeast 
Asia were beginning to occur. The first nationwide demonstration against 
the war, organized by Students for a Democratic Society, drew 25,000 
protesters to Washington, D.C., on April 17, 1 965.33 Antiwar teach-ins, 
beginning at the University of Michigan and spreading to other campuses, 
also marked that spring.34 By late 1964, Levy, having read sporadically 
but apparently widely about the war, concluded that the U.S.  should 
immediately withdraw. 35 
Opposition to U.S. Vietnam policy was but one reason that the match 
of Howard Levy and the Army was unpromising from the start. Levy 
29. James F inn, Personal Test imony: Howard Levy, M.D., in CONSCIENCE AND 
COMMAND 161, 163-64 (James Finn ed., 1971) (1969 interv iew of Levy conducted by 
Finn); Short & Seidenberg, supra note 24, at 22-23; Andrew Kopkind, Captain Levy 
/.:_Doctor's Plot, in TRIALS OF THE REsiSTANCE 14, 16 {1970). 
30. Short & Seidenberg, supra note 24, at 24. 
31. See Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964), 
repealed by Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672, 84 Stat. 2053, 2054; see also 
GEORGE C. HERRING, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM, 
1950-1975, at 119-24 (2d ed. 1986); GUENTER LEWY, AMERICA IN VIETNAM 32-36 
{paperbacked. 1978); MARILYN B. YOUNG, THE VIETNAM WARS 1945-1990, at 117-23 
(1991). 
32. HERRING, supra note 31, at 139; YOUNG, supra note 31, at 160. 
33. GITLIN, supra note 27, at 177-86; YoUNG, supra note 31, at 152; NANCY 
ZAROULIS & GERALD SULLIVAN, WHO SPOKE Up? AMERICAN PROTEST AGAINST THE 
WAR IN VIETNAM 1963-1975, at 38-42 (1984). 
34. YOUNG, supra note 31, at 152; ZAROULIS & SULLIVAN, supra note 33, at 38, 
43-44. 
35. Finn, supra note 29, at 164. 
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was in important ways an atypical soldier, often to the Army's 
irritation. 36 
Nonetheless, some of the tension between Levy and the Army was 
unexceptional within the medical corps. Levy was by his own admission 
lacking in matters of military dress and deportment.37 Among military 
doctors, however, Levy's failings in these areas were hardly remarkable, 
if slightly more pronounced than average. The military, in desperate need 
of doctors, and perhaps regarding them as different, tolerated in its 
doctors a high degree of deviation from accepted standards of military 
dress and manner. 38 Yet a separate standard in these matters, along with 
such benefits as conferral of rank and more rapid promotion, did little to 
36. In his closing argument to the court-martial, Levy's civilian defense counsel, 
Charles Morgan, Jr., stated: "I think, looking back on it, that each of you knows that Dr. 
Levy should never have been in the United States Army .. .. " Record at 2569. Levy 
would certainly have agreed. In response to William Short and Willa Seidenberg's 
question concerning whether he had received orientation as to "who you should salute or 
shouldn't salute or that sort of thing," Levy explained: 
No, they sort of expected that you pick that up automatically. And the 
fu·st time someone [saluted) me I just sort of laughed at them. I just thought 
it was the funniest goddamn thing I'd ever seen. I said Jesus, why ... I 
mean it wasn't that I was discourteous. I just sort of wave[d) to them. And 
I didn't salute, of course, people superior to me, but then again I didn't know 
who was superior to me. Nor did it interest me to know. So it was sort of 
like Woody Allen arriving all of a sudden at Guadalcanal. 
Short & Seidenberg, supra note 24, at 36-37. 
37. Finn, supra note 29, at 167 ("I was a bit sloppier than even the average 
doctor, in truth."); Short & Seidenberg, supra note 24, at 36-37. Donald Duncan wrote 
of Levy: 
Howard Levy gives the impression of a person who witnessed militarism 
close up, became horrified and consciously did everything possible to remain 
a civilian. His shoes appear never to have been contaminated by polish. His 
belt buckle seems in an advanced stage of gangrene. He invariably forgets to 
button at least one pocket. The day he had to stand before the ten field grade 
line of officers of his court-martial and hear himself pronounced guilty, he 
strolled forward with his right hand in his pocket. 
Duncan & Dunn, supra note 25, at 52. 
38. Record at 613 (testimony of Capt. Ivan Mauer); Jon Betwee, Military 
Medicine: An Exercise in Conflict of Allegiance, NEW PHYsiCIAN, July 1974, at 14, 15; 
Peter G. Bourne, The Hippocratic RevolJ: The Anny Physician and Vietnam, RAMPARTS, 
July 1967, at 57, 58; see also ROBERT SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS 
MILITARY MUSIC Is TO MUSIC 108-09, 128 (1970). Ironically, Levy had much in 
common in this regard with the Special Forces soldiers whom he would eventually refuse 
to train. In an article published in 1961 criticizing the Army for failing to recognize the 
need to recruit and retain "unconventional guys" to fight unconventional wars, George 
Goodman noted that Special Forces soldiers "were always in mild trouble on garrison 
duty. Their belt buckles went unshined and they hated parades." GeorgeJ.W. Goodman, 
The Unconventional Warriors, EsQUIRE, Nov. 1961, at 128, 131, 132. 
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offset the resentment felt by drafted physicians. At Levy's court-martial, 
Lieutenant Colonel Richard Coppedge, Center Surgeon of the John F. 
Kennedy Center for Special Warfare from 1962 to 1966, testified that 
drafted physicians often resented the military. He noted that those doctors 
he spoke to at Fort Jackson about training Special Forces aidmen were 
apathetic, and he characterized their apathy as a "passive-aggressive 
reaction. "39 The military retained few doctors once they fulfilled their 
obligated tour of duty. 40 In addition to the usual. inconveniences of 
military service and the reduced earnings endured by drafted physicians, 
the low morale of military doctors undoubtedly stemmed from the military 
medical bureaucracy's cramping of physician autonomy. The conflict 
between military medicine's stated goals of "preserv[ing] the fighting 
strength, "41 and providing "the greatest good for the greatest 
number, "42 and the doctors' allegiance to individual patients also 
contributed to morale problems. Yet another cause of low morale must 
have been the doctors' awareness that others of similar social and 
educational background had successfully avoided military service.43 
39. Record at 2232. 
40. Betwee, supra note 38, at 15-16. Indeed, with the escalation of the war, the 
Army found it difficult to retain even those physicians who had intended to make a career 
of military medicine. Many of these doctors sought to resign from the service, sometimes 
specifically to stave off service in Vietnam. Peter G. Bourne, supra note 38, at 57. In 
letters to his lawyers written while confined at Fort Jackson (upon conviction Levy was 
held at Fort Jackson until December 1967, when he was transferred to the United States 
Disciplinary Barracks at Leavenworth), Levy urged them to publicize two Fort Jackson 
doctors' decisions to resign their commissions to avoid a tour of duty in Vietnam. He 
further urged his attorneys to enlist help from within the peace movement to investigate 
the f�uency of doctors resigning their commissions to avoid Vietnam service. See Letter 
from Dr. Howard Levy to Charles Morgan, Jr. (Aug. 15, 1967), in Levy Litigation Files, 
supra note 27; Letters from Dr. Howard Levy to Charles Morgan, Jr. (Aug. 31, 1967), 
in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27. 
41. Betwee, supra note 38, at 15-16. 
42. Edwin T. Cooke et al., Attitudes of Physicians Entering Military Service, 14 
ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 271, 273, 274-75, 277-78 (1967); see Record at 611 
(testimony of Capt. Ivan Mauer). 
43. Peter Bourne writes: 
The doctor-draftee enters the service feeling that he has been 
discriminated against, a feeling which is not without some justification. 
Physicians are still drafted up to age 35, although few other Americans are 
drafted after age 26. Doctors are the only group drafted even if they have 
children. They are drafted with physical handicaps which would make anyone 
else 4F. At the present time, the "Selective Service" is selecting virtually 100 
per cent of the country's eligible physicians. This was not the case until the 
recent military buildup, with its resulting increased demands for physicians. 
It has meant that many 33- and 34-year-old physicians, who have established 
practices, are suddenly being drafted into the service. 
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However typical Levy's casual approach to such military formalities 
as saluting and proper display of his insignia was among military doctors, 
his situation was distinctive in other important ways. At his trial, defense 
counsel offered evidence in mitigation to show that the Army sent Levy 
to Fort Jackson without his having undergone the normal course of basic 
training for doctors at Fort Sam Houston in Texas.44 Levy thus missed 
the normal socialization process that would have alerted him to military 
customs and helped him to internalize military norms. This gap in his 
training may have contributed to Levy's tin ear for military customs and 
practices. 45 
Whether because of a tin ear, or simply indifference, Levy was not 
a typical officer. Soon after his arrival at Fort Jackson, Levy refused to 
join the Officers' Club, an apparently unprecedented act that caused 
considerable upset before the matter was resolved in Levy's favor.46 He 
Bourne, supra note 38, at 57. On the class nature of military service and combat service 
in the Vietnam War era, see generally CHRISTIAN G. APPY, WORKINO CLASS WAR: 
AMERICAN COMBAT SOLDIERS AND VIETNAM (1993), especially chapters 1 and 2; 
LAWRENCE M. BASKIR & WILLIAM A. STRAUSS, CHANCE AND CIRCUMSTANCE: THE 
DRAFr, THE WAR, AND THE VIETNAM GENERATION 3-28, 39, 47-49 (1978); FLYNN, 
supra note 23, at 193-95; James Fallows, What Did You Do in the Class War, Daddy?, 
WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 1975, at 5. 
44. Record at 609-10 (testimony of Capt. Ivan Mauer); id. at 2413-16 (testimony 
of SFC George B. Curry); see also id. at 2127, 2228-31 (testimony of Lt. Col. Richard 
L. Coppedge) (describing importance of basic training for doctors). 
45. Telephone Interview with Col. Earl V. Brown, Law Officer in Levy Court-
martial (Sept. 24, 1993) (speculating on whether standard indoctrination would have 
alerted Levy to military norms and expectations). I am rather skeptical that this training 
would have altered events significantly. Certainly, it would not have changed Levy's 
opposition to the war or his beliefs regarding the ethics of training Special Forces aidmen. 
Nor would it have dampened Levy's commitment to civil rights or curbed his prickly 
individualism. On the other hand, it might have sensitized him to the limits of tolerance 
within the military to the effect of averting the charges relating to his statements to Special 
Forces trainees and other soldiers. Levy apparently tempered his statements after his first 
hospital commander, Col. Grossman, told him to do so, and insisted that had he been 
forewarned of the consequences, he would not have made the statements that led to the 
charges under Articles 133 and 134. Letter from Dr. Howard Levy to Charles Morgan, 
Jr. (July 27, 1967), in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27 (abstract of conversation 
between Howard Levy and Col. Fancy during Levy's confinement after sentencing at Fort 
Jackson). 
46. CHARLES MOROAN, JR., ONE MAN, ONE VOICE 115-16 (1979); Finn, supra 
note 29, at 168-71; Interview with Howard Levy by KFPA. 's Denny Smithson (San 
Francisco radio broadcast, Nov. 16, 1969) (audio tape on file with author) [hereinafter 
Smithson]. According to Levy, after he pointed out to his commanding officer, Col. 
Grossman, that the club's by-laws made membership voluntary, Grossman replied: "Well 
there are certain customs here in the Army, and one of the customs is that officers join 
the officers club." /d. This theme of the military's unwritten, but widely recognized and 
strictly observed rules, and of Levy's breach of those rules, recurs throughout the history 
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seemed indifferent to rank and did not differentiate between what he said 
to enlisted men and what he said to officers. His willingness to cross the 
boundaries of rank was remarked upon too many times in the court­
martial testimony to have produced mere indifference among many of his 
fellow officers. 47 
Levy also crossed racial boundaries. On a Saturday morning in July 
shortly after Levy had arrived at Fort Jackson, he noticed a newspaper 
article that mentioned a campaign to register black voters in nearby 
Newberry County, South Carolina. Levy drove to Newberry, found the 
offices of the Summer Community Organization and Political Education 
("SCOPE") project of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
("SCLC"), and volunteered. That summer Levy spent his off-duty hours 
working in the Newberry County voter registration drive. After that 
project ended, Levy continued his civil rights activity as a volunteer with 
the South Carolina Voter Education Project ("VEP"). He also wrote for 
and assisted in the publication of Carolina Contrast, a newspaper 
pubJished by the Voter Education Project.48 Moreover, in his day-to-day 
of the Levy case. Indeed, in rejecting Levy's vagueness challenge, the Supreme Court 
partly relied on its conclusion that military "customs and usages" gave meaning to 
otherwise imprecise standards set forth in U.C.M.J. §§ 133 and 134. Parker v.  Levy, 
417 U.S. at 746-49, 754. One popular unofficial handbook for officers indicates the 
importance of the officers' club and hence the gravity of Levy's breach of military 
custom: 
The officers' club . . .  is the center of social activities for officers and their 
families. . . . An officer with permanent station at a post having a club 
should become a member at once. To fail to do so will cause the officer and 
the adult members of his family to miss the very heart of post social activity 
and, if he is married, deny his wife normal social contacts with other Army 
wives. 
THE MILITARY SERVICE PuBLISHING COMPANY, THE OFFICER'S GUIDE 221 (23d ed. 
1957). 
47. See infra notes 220-24 and accompanying text. 
48. For a discussion of Levy's civil rights activity, see generally the affidavits 
contained in Exhibit C to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Levy v. Parker, 316 
F. Supp. 473 (M.D. Penn. 1970) (No. 1057), rev'd, 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 
417 U.S. 733 (1974); see also Kopkind, supra note 29, at 17-18; Short & Seidenberg, 
supra note 24,· at 41-42. Por a discussion of SCOPE, see ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, To 
REDEEM THE SOUL OF AMERICA: THE SO!ITHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 
AND MARTIN LUTHER KINO, JR. 258-65 (1987); DAVID J .  GARROW, BEARING THE 
CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KINO, JR. AND THE SO!ITHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP 
CONFERENCE 415-20, 440-42 (1986). Por a discussion of the VEP, see STEVEN F. 
LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIOIITS IN THE SO!ITH, 1944-1969, at 250-87 (1976); 
PAT WATTERS & REEsE CLEGHORN, CLIMBING JACOB'S LADDER: THE ARRIVAL OF 
NEGROES IN SO!ITHERN POLITICS 44-67 (1967); Charles D. Lowery, Voter Education 
Project, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN AMERICAN CIVIL RIOIITS 557, 557-58 (Charles 
D. Lowery & John F. Marszalek eds. ,  1992). 
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dealings with black soldiers at Fort Jackson, Levy paid no heed to racial 
boundaries. A point of controversy in his court-martial was Levy's 
assertion that the court-martial was set in motion to punish him for his 
civil rights activities. The relationship among Levy's racial views, his 
civil rights activities, and the court-martial is controversial and will be 
explored below. 49 Suffice it to say that at the very least this was another 
way in which Levy was out of step with the norms of Fort Jackson. 
Finally, Levy was not reticent about his opposition to the Vietnam 
War.50 Having discovered that Army regulations, which would 
sometimes have required medical discharges if strictly adhered to, were 
being overlooked or deliberately ignored, he took advantage of such 
regulations to provide discharges for soldiers seeking a way out of the 
war.51 He also shared his views about the war with those willing (or 
perhaps, at times, obliged) to listen, without regard for the listeners' rank. 
B. The Green Berets 
As head of the dermatology clinic at the U.S. Army Hospital in Fort 
Jackson, Levy treated soldiers and their dependents for dermatological 
problems and venereal disease. A few months after his arrival, he was 
also given the task of providing dermatology instruction to Special Forces 
aidmen trainees. While Levy initially gave the required training, he 
ultimately concluded that he would not teach aidmen trainees . That 
decision eventually led to Levy's refusing an order to train the aidmen 
and later, his court-martial. 
The Army created Special Forces in 1952 for a Cold .War European 
mission. Special Forces members were intended to be specialists who 
would both engage in guerilla activities and train indigenous guerrilla 
bands well behind communist lines as partisan auxiliaries in a 
conventional war between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. 52 
Of course, the anticipated war in Europe never occurred, but because 
of decolonization in Africa and Asia, U.S.  defense planners soon 
49. See infra notes 68-97 and accompanying text. 
50. E.g. , Record at 2038 (testimony of Capt. (Chaplain) Joseph H. Feinstein); id. 
at 2346 (testimony of Capt. David J.  Travis); Kopkind, supra note 29, at 19; Short & 
Seidenberg, supra note 24, at 41; Smithson, supra note 46. 
51. CLAUDlA DREIFUS, RADICAL LIFESTYLES 37 (1971); Short & Seidenberg, 
supra note 24, at 3 8-39. 
52. LARRY E. CABLE, CONFLICf OF MYTHS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN 
COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCilUNE AND THE VIETNAM WAR 1 42-43 (1986); CHARLES M. 
SIMPSON III, INSIDE THE GREEN BERETS: THE FIRST THIRTY YEARS 35-36, 53 (1983); 
Donald Duncan, "The Whole Thing Was a Lie!n, RAMPARTS, Feb. 1966, at 12, 14. For 
a discussion of the antecedents and early history of Special Forces, see ALFRED H.  
PADDOCK, JR., U S  ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE: ITS ORIGINS (1982). 
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perceived a new threat, and with it a new use for Special Forces. In 
response to Soviet Premier Khrushchev's expression of support for 
national liberation movements in the colonial world, President Kennedy 
told the 1962 graduating class at West Point that the United States faced 
another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its 
origins-war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; 
war by ambush instead of combat; by infiltration, instead of 
aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the 
enemy instead of engaging him. It requires . . . a whole new 
kind of strategy, a ... who II y different kind of force. 53 
As Richard Slotkin writes, the American response to presumed 
communist-sponsored wars of national liberation was "to create a mirror­
image of the enemy, an American guerrilla fighter, a Green Beret. "54 
The Kennedy administration quickly became captivated by the military 
doctrine of counterinsurgency. It revitalized Special Forces and, over the 
objection of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, restored to them the right to wear 
the green beret. ss Proponents of counterinsurgency drew on America's 
53. William P. Yaroorough, Foreword to SIMPSON, supra note 52, at x (quoting 
John F. Kennedy, Address to the Graduating Class at West Point (1962)); see also 
YOUNG, supra note 3 1 ,  at 76-77. 
54. Richard Slotkin, Gunfighters and Green Berets: The Magnificent Seven and 
the Myth of Counter-Insurgency, 44 RADICAL HlST. REv. 65, 74 (1989). 
55. LoREN BARITZ, BACKFIRE.: A HISTORY OF HOW AME.RJCAN CULTURE. LBD 
Us INTO VIETNAM AND MADE. Us FIGHT THE WAY WE. DID 107-12 (1985); SIMPSON, 
supra note 52, at 65-69; RICHARD SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION: THE MYTH OF THE 
FRONTIER IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 489-504 (1992); YOUNG, supra note 3 1 ,  
at 75-78. For a description o f  the history o f  the green beret, see SIMPSON, supra note 52, 
at 29-33. 
The Green Berets, in tum, became popularly associated with Kennedy, "as the 
military expression of the President's heroic style." Slotkin, supra note 54, at 74. Both 
the Green Berets and the Peace Corps were seen as expressions of the youthful, heroic, 
activist Kennedy foreign policy of meeting the challenge of communist aggression in the 
third world by means of a tough-minded but not self-interested counteroffensive. Both 
were seen as symbols of Kennedy's proclaimed "New Frontier." As Slotkin notes: 
The Peace Corps and the Green Berets were two sides of this coin, mirror­
images of Kennedy-style heroism. Both would pride themselves on their 
volunteer spirit, and their radical pragmatism-their ability to improvise 
techniques on the ground, and to overcome the hidebound regimes of red tape 
and bureaucratic restraint. Both would begin by achieving mastery of the 
local rules, mirroring the wiles of the native enemy to defeat that enemy on 
his own ground. For the Peace Corps, this meant a style of work that 
required the volunteer to "get his/her hands dirty . "  In the case of the CIA 
and Green Berets, "fighting dirty, "  fighting "like the Indians," was part of the 
original charter. 
854 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
frontier myths about Indian wars,56 the experiences of the Greek Civil 
War, the successful campaign against the Hukbalahap insurgency in the 
Philippines, a misunderstanding of Mao's writings, and Kennedy's 
fascination with tough-minded heroism, technocratic problem solving, and 
elite, expert military troops. The proponents advocated an approach to 
warfare that emphasized improvisation, ruthlessness, the organization of 
indigenous paramilitary forces, and an ability to learn from the techniques 
of the enemy.57 Just as James Fenimore Cooper's frontier hero, the 
"White man who knows Indians,"  knew them well enough to fight by 
their methods and with their level of "savagery," and thereby became 
Jd. at 75; see also SLOTKIN, supra, at 503-04. Others, including Special Forces and its 
advocates, have noted this connection between the Peace Corps and Special Forces, as was 
exemplified by the Levy court-martial. See Record at 969 (testimony of Robin Moore 
describing the Green Berets as an "armed and mature peace corps"). 
56. As Richard Slotkin cautions, one must "keep in mind the distinction between 
the myth [of Indian war] and the real-world situations and practices to which it refers. "  
RICHARD SLOTKIN, THE FATAL ENVIRONMENT: THE MYTH OF THE FRONTIER IN THE 
AGE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION 1800-1890, at 61 (1985). The literary and film myths of 
Indian warfare that fed the doctrine of counterinsurgency and led to the Special Forces' 
self-image as modern-day Indian fighters distort reality in many ways. Most notably, 
these myths "flatten" the diversity of North America's Indians. See PATRICIA NELSON 
LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE UNBROKEN PAST OF THE AMERICAN WEST 
214-18 (1987) (discussing the traps for the historian writing Indian history). They also 
oversimplify by ignoring variations in time and historical development. ld. at 216. Don 
Higginbotham cautions against such an oversimplified view of colonial warfare. He writes 
that "neither Europeans nor Indians had an original commitment to total war and . . . 
whites, with such tactics as burning crops and villages better understood initially some of 
the psychological dimensions of warfare than did their opponents, who . . .  were 
accustomed to an intertribal form of violence that usually took few lives and was seasonal 
and sporadic. "  Don Higginbotham, The Early American Way of War: Reconnaissance and 
Appraisal, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 230, 234 (1987). Higginbotham describes a more 
complex process "of cautious feeling out of each party by the other . . . .  " ld. at 233 
(quoting Wilcomb Washburn, SeventeenJh-Century Indian Wars, in NORTHEAST 89 (Bruce 
G. Trigger ed. ,  1978)). For a discussion of Indian and U.S. methods of warfare that 
takes into account the mid-nineteenth century laws of war and cultural differences between 
Indians and other Americans, see Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: 
A Study in Military Injustice, 43 STAN. L. REv. 13,  86-88 (1990). As Chomsky shows, 
nineteenth-century noncombatants occupied a more ambiguous and less protected status 
than their Vietnam War era counterparts. Chomsky also shows that the U.S. Army was 
as likely to attack noncombatants as were its Indian foes. ld. For a discussion of the role 
of projection in American characterization of the enemy, see infra note 333 and 
accompanying text. For a discussion, drawing on psychoanalytic theory, of the myths of 
frontier warfare and of Indian savagery, see MICHAEL PAUL ROGIN, RONALD REAGAN, 
THE MOVIE AND OTHER EPISODES IN POLITICAL DEMONOLOGY 134-51 (1987). 
57. DAVID BURNER & THOMAS R. WEST, THE TORCH IS PASSED: THE KENNEDY 
BROTHERS AND AMERICAN LIBERALISM 98-102 (1984); CABLE, supra note 52, at 113-55; 
JOHN HELLMANN, AMERICAN MYTH AND THE LEGACY OF VIETNAM 35-53 (1986); 
SLOTKIN, supra note 55, at 441-504; Slotkin, supra note 54. 
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"civilization's most effective instrument against savagery," the military 
planners assumed that the key to counterinsurgency was "the man who 
knows communists. "s8 As Slotkin notes, counterinsurgency advocates 
concluded that "following the doctrine of Indian fighting . . .  you need 
'White savages' to combat 'Red.'"S9 For counterinsurgency warfare 
theorists, Vietnam was to be the "laboratory for counterinsurgency 
techniques and weapons. "60 
Fitfully and at times halfheartedly, U.S. military planners understood 
counterinsurgency not simply in military terms, but as a kind of political, 
social, and economic warfare. Again drawing on such examples as 
Ramon Magsaysay's (and Colonel Edward Lansdale's) success in the 
Phillipines, they theorized that "civic action" was a necessary part of 
counterinsurgency warfare.61 According to this doctrine, civic action 
served the direct military ends of helping to isolate guerrilla forces from 
the popular base of support necessary for their operations, 62 and of 
helping to recruit indigenous paramilitary forces (the Civilian Indigenous 
Defense Groups, "CIDG," or "strike force"). Civic action was also a 
political measure intended to alleviate those conditions that undermined 
support for the ruling government. 
The basic Special Forces unit was the twelve-man A-team, which 
included two aidmen. 63 The aidmen, like the other A-team members, 
were highly trained in unconventional warfare, and were cross-trained in 
at least one other military specialty in addition to their medical specialty. 
They were primarily combatants, who went on combat missions as often 
as their teammates and did not wear a red cross brassard. 64 The aidmen 
were expected to provide medical care for the A-team members, for the 
58. SLOTKIN, supra note 55, at 15-16, 446-47, 459. 
59. ld. at 453. 
60. YOUNG, supra note 3 1 ,  at 82. The nature of the war changed with time as 
Gen. William Westmoreland adopted a "war of attrition" strategy, marked by search and 
destroy missions. ld. at 160-66; see also APPY, supra note 43, at 153-57; HERRING, 
supra note 3 1 ,  at 150-56. While escalation and the change of strategy had some effect 
on the Special Forces, they continued primarily to fight a counterinsurgency war. SHELBY 
L. STANTON, GREEN BE.RRTS AT WAR: U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES IN SOtrrHE.AST ASIA 
1956-1975, at 109-29 (1985). 
61 .  See CADLE., supra note 52, at 148-55; SIMPSON, supra note 52, at 53-63, 159-
63; YoUNG, supra note 3 1 ,  at 82-84, 144-46. 
62. Counterinsurgency theorists were greatly impressed with Mao's maxim: 
"Guerrillas are fish, and the people are the water in which they swim. If the temperature 
of the water is right, the fish will thrive and multiply. "  BARITZ, supra note 55, at 108 
(citing ROOE.R HILSMAN, To MOVE. A NATION 413 (1967) (invoking Mao)). This same 
principle of counterinsurgency underlay the barbaric and disastrous strategic hamlet 
program. See YOUNG, supra note 3 1 ,  at 82-86, 144-49. 
63. See STANTON, supra note 60, at 322 (Charts 1 & 2). 
64. SlMPSON, supra note 52, at 36-39. 
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South Vietnamese Special Forces (the Luc-Luong Dac-Biet or "LLDB") 
with whom they fought, and for the CIDG. They also had a critical civic 
action mission, to provide medical care in the villages and hamlets of the 
contested countryside, both in an effort to gain entree for the A-team so 
that the effort of recruiting a strike force could begin, and in the interest 
of the political struggle for the loyalty of the Vietnamese people.6S To 
its friends, the medical care provided by the Special Forces aidmen was 
perhaps the single most important Special Forces civic action program; 
to Levy it was a "prostitution of medicine. "66 
C. Army Intelligence: Counterinsurgency at Home61 
Shortly after Levy's arrival at Fort Jackson, he became the subject 
of an Army Intelligence investigation. The investigation eventually 
prompted the Hospital Commander, Colonel Henry F. Fancy, to order 
65. Record at 2023-25 (testimony of Col. Roger A. Juel); id. at 963 (testimony 
of Robin Moore); id. at 2321-22 (testimony of Capt. Peter Bourne); see also SIMPSON, 
supra note 52, at 36-39. The phrase "Vietnamese people" is a necessary but misleading 
shorthand that masks the presence of numerous ethnic groups within the physical 
boundaries of Vietnam who were not ethnic Vietnamese. For lack of any better way of 
referring to the indigenous peoples living in Vietnam, I will refer to them collectively as 
the Vietnamese. 
66. Record at 963 ("[A]ll over the world . . .  our medical patrols, special forces, 
and others . . .  have been one of the greatest weapons we have had against communist 
subversion and this is particularly true to Vietnam.") (testimony of Robin Moore); ROBIN 
MooRE, THE GRBBN BBRBTS 312-13 (1965); Roy Reed, Anny Doctor Refuses to Train 
Guerrillas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1966, at A1,  A6 (quoting Levy). 
67. During the Detroit riots in the summer of 1967, Maj. Gen. William P. 
Yarborough, the Army's Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, and the former 
Commander of the JFK Special Warfare School, told his staff: "Men, get out your 
counterinsurgency manuals. We have an insurgency on our hands." JoAN M. JBNSBN, 
ARMY SURVE.ILI.ANCB IN AMERICA, 1775-1980, at 241 (1991). Christopher Pyle 
attributes the same statement to Gen. Yarborough, but places it temporally during the 
April 1968 riots resulting from the assassination of Rev. Martin Luther King . 
. CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE, MILITARY SURVEILLANCE OF CIVILtAN POLITICS, 1967-1970, at 
328 (1986). General Yarborough states that he has been misinterpreted and that he did 
not believe that an insurrection was in the offmg. Senior Officers Debriefmg Program: 
Conversation Between Lt. Gen. William P. Yarborough, Ret.,  Col. John R. Neese, and 
LTC Houston P. Houser III 34-35 (June 2, 1975) (transcript on file at U.S. Anny Military 
Institute Archives, Carlisle Barracks) [hereinafter Gen. Yarborough Interview]. As early 
as 1961, J.P. Stone predicted that America's newfound fascination with Special Forces 
and counterinsurgency warfare would lead to the implementation of counterinsurgency 
techniques against domestic dissent. I. F. STONE, Anti-Guerilla War-The Dazzling New 
Military Toothpaste for Social Decay, in IN A TIME OF TORMENT 173, 173-75 (1967); I.F. 
STONE, Men Brass Hats Begin to Read Mao Tse-Tung, Beware!, in IN A TIME OF 
TORMENT, supra, at 170, 170-73 . 
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Levy to train the Special Forces aidmen. It also profoundly affected the 
way the defense and some observers framed the case. 
According to the defense, the investigation was politically and 
racially motivated. The investigation was, they argued, triggered by 
Levy's civil rights work, and nurtured by the bigotry of James B. West, 
an Army Intelligence agent, who appears ubiquitously through much of 
the Intelligence investigation. 68 
Suggestive evidence supports the defense's interpretation. Army 
Intelligence had long harbored an unhealthy fascination with domestic 
civil rights activities, or what it called "Negro Subversion. "69 The 
Army was certainly not free of racism, and James West looms darkly in 
the investigation. There are curious coincidences of time and place. Two 
days after Levy began his civil rights work in Newberry County, Agent 
West's home,70 someone made the first notation in Levy's personnel file 
suggesting the need for a security investigation.71 While testifying at the 
preliminary hearing that preceded the court-martial ,72 Agent West 
68. For the defense's fullest articulation of these events, see Brief of Petitioner 
at 29-158, Levy (No. 1057) [hereinafter District Court Habeas Brief]. For further 
explanation of this theory, see SHERRlLL, supra note 38, at 100-19; see also MORGAN, 
supra note 46, at 120-25; Finn, supra note 29, at 172-73; Short & Seidenberg, supra note 
24, at 41-44; Smithson, supra note 46. 
69. JENSEN, supra note 67, at 239-41 ;  ROY TALBERT, JR., NEGATIVE 
INTELLIGENCE: THE ARMY AND THE AMERICAN LEFT, 1917-194 1 ,  at 1 1 3-34, 243-44, 
267-73 (1991); Stephen G. Tompkins, Army Feared King, Secretly Watched Him, MEM. 
COM. APPEAL, Mar. 21,  1993, at A 1 ,  AS; Stephen G. Tompkins, In 1917, Spy Target 
Was Black America, MEM. CoM. APPEAL, Mar. 2 1 ,  1993, at A7. "Negro Subversion" 
was the name of a ftle opened by Military Intelligence in the summer of 1917. Its first 
entry identified "'several incidents of where colored men had attempted to make 
appointments with white women,'" which it took to be a barometer of "'general unrest 
among the colored people."' TALBERT, supra, at 1 13.  
70. West lived in the town of Prosperity (pop. 757), the third largest community 
in Newberry County, and a town in which Levy did civil rights work. See District Court 
Habeas Brief, supra note 68, at 37-38. Levy, who spent weekends and most evenings in 
Newberry County that summer, used his car, readily identifiable by its New York license 
plates and Fort Jackson officer stickers, to drive prospective registrants to the court house 
and for other related work. See Affidavit of Howard Brett Levy, Exhibit C to the Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 142, 143-44, Levy (No. 1057). The governing wisdom 
among civil rights workers in the South at this time was that an identifiable car, and most 
notably one with "foreign" license plates, put one in grave peril. See CHARLES W. 
EAGLES, OIITSIDE AGITATOR: JON DANIELS AND THE CIVlL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN 
ALABAMA 68, 73 (1993); WrLLIAM BRADFORD HUIE, THREE LIVES FOR MISSISSIPPI 1 19, 
135 (1965). 
7 1 .  The entry on a sheet of paper in Levy's 201 file read: "Determine whetver 
[sic] loyalty investigation should be made 19 July, 1965." Record, vol. 15, at 314-15. 
72. This was the Article 32 investigation. For a brief explanation of the Article 
32 investigation, see infra note 1 1 8  and accompanying text. 
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elusively suggested that Levy's civil rights work had been investigated by 
someone within Army Intelligence.73 Further, while the defense never 
did establish that West was a Klan member (something they assumed), 
there can be l ittle doubt that he was a bigot who was fixated on Levy's 
racial views and interactions with blacks.74 West played a major role in 
73. At the Article 32 investigation, during the examination of Agent West by 
Levy's lawyer, Charles Morgan, Jr., the following exchange occurred: 
Q: "Did you make any investigation of Capt. Levy relating to his 
activities on affairs around South Carolina?" 
Col. Severin (the officer presiding over the Article 32 investigation): "Do 
you mean in the city as opposed to out here in the military?" 
Q: (By Mr. Morgan) "Non-military, yes." 
A: "I did not myself. " 
Q: "Do you know whether or not someone else did?" 
A: "I cannot answer that. I had better delay answering that until I 
can see, because this possibly could be a security matter. I do not 
have that. I do not know that." 
Q: "Well, now, I am not asking you whether or not someone else did 
at this point. I am asking you whether or not you know whether 
or not someone else did?" 
A: "Well, I will have to decline to answer that." 
Record, vol. 13, at 520-21 (emphasis added). 
74. See Affidavit of Jack Chatfield, Exhibit C to the Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus at 21, 24, Levy (No. 1057) (quoting an informant who, on the basis of 
conversations with West, concluded that "West is 'one of the worst bigots' he has ever 
known."); Letter from Howard Levy to Charles Morgan, Jr. 1 (Dec. 4, 1969), in Levy 
Litigation Files, supra note 27 (recounting conversation in which Joe Cole heard West say 
of blacks: "They live like animals. Its [sic] unbelievable!"); Letter from Howard Levy 
to Charles Morgan, Jr. (Oct. 10, 1969), in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27 
(indicating Steve Klein [sic] had heard West refer to blacks as "niggers," and that Joe 
Cole would testify that West told him "every civil rights organization is a commie front" 
and that "[blacks] live like pigs. The way they live they deserve it."). Private Joe Cole 
was one of the Fort Jackson 8. For material on the Fort Jackson 8, see FRED HALSTEAD, 
GIS SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE WAR: THE CASE OF THE Fr. JACKSON 8 (1970); MICHAEL 
STEVEN SMITH, NOTE.BOOK OF A SIXTIES LAWYER: AN UNREPENTANT MEMOIR AND 
SELECfED WRITINGS 57-84 (1992). Steve "Klein" may have been Pvt. Steve Kline, one 
of the participants in an attempted pray-in for peace at the Ft. Jackson Chapel. See 
SMITH, supra, at 8 1 ;  Douglas Robinson, Two at Fort Jackson Face Court-Martial Over 
War Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1968, at A10. 
In investigating Levy, West conducted interviews seeking information about Levy's 
racial views and associations. Most striking of the witness statements taken by West was 
that of Sgt. Debenvion Landing. Landing not only recounted that Levy had on various 
occasions (dates and names of individuals had been forgotten) discussed Vietnam behind 
closed doors with black patients for extensive periods, but also raised the spectre of 
interracial sex. According to Landing's statement: "I have heard Levy express a desire 
to 'date' Negro female patients after treating attractive Negro patients in his office, but 
I never knew him to date one." Statement of Debenvion Landing, DA Form 19-24 (Oct. 
12, 1966), in Levy Army Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 73-74; see also Agent 
1994:839 Court-Martial of Dr. Howard B. Levy 859 
the Levy investigation. He set in motion Colonel Fancy's decision to give 
Levy the order to train and alerted Fancy to a G-2 dossier on Levy. At 
times West's testimony was evasive to the point of obstruction.75 At 
other times, it was utterly incredible.76 The Army's decision to withhold 
most of the G-2 dossier from Levy's civilian defense counsel fueled 
speculation that it must be concealing embarrassing secrets. 
Report, DA Form 341 (Oct. 26, 1966), in Levy Army Intelligence File, supra note 25, 
at 70-71 (West's report elaborating on Landing's statement by identifying a Sp«:(lific 
incident and raising smutty implications by placing quotation marks around the word 
"date"). At the Article 32 hearing preceding the court-martial, Landing testified that 
West had "asked a lot of questions" relating to race and Levy's racial attitudes and had 
asked something along the lines of whether Levy had expressed an interest in black 
women. Record, vol. 14, at 635. West was not the only agent to focus on race and to 
elicit statements that described Levy's racial views in negative terms. See, e.g., Statement 
of Sgt. William Cain, DA Form 19-24 (Feb. 18, 1966), in Levy Army Intelligence File, 
supra note 25, at 1 84-85 (Statement of Sgt. Landing's predecessor in the dermatology 
clinic, taken by Agent Lawrence Gysin, but witnessed by Agent West, stating among other 
things: "Levy was quite pro-Negro, too [sic) the side of the Negroes when discussing 
Civil Rights matters, and appeared to think more of the Negroid [sic) race than the White 
race, "  and incorrectly describing Levy's conversations with a black soldier who was 
brought to the dermatology clinic from the stockade by stating that "[h)e often visited a 
young Negro Private who was confined in the Post Stockade . . .  although I am unaware 
just what their association together was."); Agent Report, DA Form 341 (Feb. 18, 1966), 
in Levy Army Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 1 86-87 (Report of Agent Henry L. 
Durant on interview with David Cooper, Jr., a University of South Carolina law student, 
who depicted Levy as a civil rights militant, well connected with the movement in South 
Carolina. Cooper related an argument he had with Levy when Cooper referred to non­
Southerners involved in the civil rights movement as "maggots" and Levy identified 
himself as "one of those 'maggots."'). 
· 
On the unsuccessful defense efforts to connect West to the Klan, see generally 
Memorandum by Jack Chatfield: Newberry County (undated), in Levy Litigation Files, 
supra note 27; Memorandum by Laughlin McDonald: A Summary of Trip to Whitmire, 
Newberry, Prosperity, etc. (March 21-24, 1969), in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27. 
75. In addition to the testimony quoted supra note 73, see Record, vol. 13 ,  at 516 
("Q: Who is your immediate superior in the Columbia office? A: Mr. David Delevergne. 
Q: Is he an Army officer? A: Sir, I cannot answer that. I am not at liberty myself to 
answer that."). 
76. West testified that he was unaware of the summer of 1965 voter registration 
drive in Newberry County. Record at 2534-35. Others attested to the improbability of 
that assertion. See Affidavit of Franklin B. Ashley, Exhibit C to the Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus at 19, 20, Levy (No. 1057) ("Suring [sic) the entire summer of 1965, the 
main, almost only, topic of conversation among the white citizenry, were these racial 
incidents. Everyone who had an J.Q. above a moron's level was aware that Newberry 
was having its hottest summer. "); Affidavit of Jack Chatfield, Exhibit C to the Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 21,  25, Levy (No. 1057); Affidavit of Marvin D. Wall, 
Exhibit C to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 51,  57-58, 60-61,  Levy (No. 
1057). 
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While it is conceivable that Army Intelligence initiated the 
investigation because of Levy's civil rights work, a more mundane 
explanation seems likely. Withholding the majority of the intelligence 
dossier from Levy's civilian counsel probably reflected the Army's banal 
bureaucratic mindset and the FBI's resolution in enforcing the rule against 
third-agency release of its documents, rather than indicating a cover­
up. n The withheld pages of Levy's intelligence dossier do not describe 
his civil rights work, or otherwise indicate a scheme to punish him for his 
77. See Memorandum from Col. Dmitri J. Tadich, Chief, Personnel Security 
Division, to Cmdr. Gen., Port Jackson (Jan. 21, 1967), in Levy Anny Intelligence Pile, 
supra note 25, at 575; Memo for Record from LTC C.R. Smithson (Feb. 6, 1967), in 
Levy Anny Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 389 ("Dossier contains an FBI report and 
considerable info relative to complaint investigation of LEVY. In view of '3rd Agency 
Rule,' need to protect sources and methods, and the fact that this material has no bearing 
on the GCM charges, this material should not be released."); Appellate Exhibit 6, Letter 
to Capt. Sanders (Mar. 17, 1967), in Record, vol. 12 (regarding release of Intelligence 
Dossier); Appellate Exhibit 6, Letter from Charles Morgan, Jr. to the Comm. Gen. (Apr. 
4, 1967), in Record, vol. 12 (requesting the entire dossier); Appellate Exhibit 6, Letter 
from Comm. Gen. to Charles Morgan, Jr. (Apr. 1 1 ,  1967), in Record, vol. 12 
(responding to request for ftles). 
The issue of releasing the G2 dossier's remaining pages reemerged in the Levy v. 
Parker federal habeas proceeding. Again, Anny Intelligence resisted releasing much of 
the material, as did the FBI. See Memorandum from LTC Arnold I. Melnick, Litigation 
Div., OTJAG, to Director, Counterintelligence & Security, ACSI (Mar. 20, 1970), in 
Levy Anny Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 253-54 (requesting review of dossier to 
determine releasability of documents, noting government's opposition at a Mar: 16, 1970, 
hearing before U.S. District Court Judge Michael H. Sheridan, and indicating that initial 
step would probably be in camera review of the contested materials by Judge Sheridan); 
Letter from ACSI to TJAG Litigation Division (Mar. 25, 1970) in Levy Army Intelligence 
File, supra note 25, at 264-65 (responding to Mar. 20 request and describing procedure 
for obtaining permission for release of FBI generated documents); Memorandum to 
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (Mar. 27, 1970), in U.S. Army Judge Advocate 
General Corps, Litigation Division Files [hereinafter JAG Files] (JAG request to FBI for 
review of FBI generated documents in the dossier); Notes of Conversation with Kevin 
Maroney, Internal Security Division, Dep't of Justice (June 30, 1970), in JAG Files, 
supra (probably transcribed by Capt. Michael Katz) ("Spoke to Mr. Maroney . . . .  He 
received a memo from the FBI in which that agency takes the position that they do not 
want to release the ftles even to the judge for in camera inspection. They are 'mad at the 
Anny' for allowing those documents to come into play in the court-martial proceedings 
to begin with. "); Letter from J. Walter Yeagley, Ass't Att'y. Gen., Internal Security 
Division, to Lt. Col. Charles W. Bethany, Jr., Acting Chief, Litigation Division, JAG 3 
(July 6, 1970), in JAG Files, supra (stating opposition to release of documents, even to 
judge in camera, to avoid establishing any precedent "for unnecessarily involving the FBI 
and FBI information in the military prosecutive process in general"). Judge Sheridan 
ultimately denied Levy's motion for disclosure of the G2 dossier. Levy v. Parker, 316 
F. Supp. 473, 477-80 (M.D. Pa. 1970). 
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racial views and civil rights activities.78 Apparently, West did not begin 
78. On February 1 1 ,  1993, the Freedom of Information/Privacy Office of the 
United States Army Intelligence and Security Command produced 526 pages of its 578-
page intelligence file on Dr. Levy. The fLie, which was produced redacted, contains both 
the G-2 dossier and other materials relating to Levy, mostly generated after the preferral 
of charges and court-martial. Portions of the G-2 me that were given to the civilian 
defense counsel are an unredacted part of the court-martial record, see, e.g. , Appellate 
Exhibit 2, Agent Reports of James B. West, in Record, vol. 12, and for those pages I 
consulted both the court-martial record and the Army Intelligence FOIA production. All 
but one of the pages that were withheld from the FOIA production (which has been 
produced by Army JAG) are FBI documents, including 24 pages of documents in the G-2 
me relating to Monthly Review Associates, Studies on the Left, The National Guardian, 
New World Review (a journal to which Levy did not subscribe), and the Militant Labor 
Forum. My FOIA request to the FBI for those documents, and for all other documents 
relating to Dr. Levy, is pending. 
For the reasons described supra note 69 and accompanying text, I believe it is 
highly probable that Army Intelligence did spy on one or more of the civil rights 
organizations Levy worked for in South Carolina, and that the documents produced in that 
operation may refer to Levy. Unfortunately, as a result of Senator Ervin's early 1970s 
investigation regarding Army surveillance of civilians, the Army Intelligence files from 
post World War II were largely destroyed or broken up in a manner that made them 
unsearchable. TALBERT, supra note 69, at 273-74, 290. Indeed, the Army Intelligence 
files on Levy may have survived that period only because the G2 dossier was at issue in 
the Levy case. Not surprisingly, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command 
determined that they could find nothing responsive to my FOIA requests for documents 
relating to South Carolina YEP and SCLC-SCOPE, the civil rights organizations with 
which Levy worked, and Carolina Contrast, YEP's publication. Letter from Jane B. 
Sealock, Chief, Freedom of Information/Privacy Office, U.S. Army Intelligence and 
Security Command, to Author (Apr. 28, 1993) (on file with author). 
Hoping that Army Intelligence might have shared the fruits of its surveillance with 
either the FBI or the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division ("SLED"), I filed FOIA 
requests for documents relating to Dr. Levy or to South Carolina YEP, SCOPE-5CLC, 
or Carolina Contrast with the FBI and its Columbia, South Carolina, Charlotte, North 
Carolina, Atlanta, Georgia, and New York City field offices. I also filed similar requests 
under the South CaroJina Freedom of Information Act with SLED. To date, the FBI has 
identified approximately 1360 pages of material that is responsive to my request. See 
Letter from J.  Kevin O'Brien, Chief, Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts Section, FBI, 
to Author (Oct. 27, 1993) (on file with author); Letter from J. Kevin O'Brien to Author 
(Nov. 10, 1993) (on file with author); Letter from Joseph P. Schulte, Jr., Special Agent 
in Charge, Charlotte, N.C., FBI Field Office, to Author (Nov. 2, 1993) (on file with 
author). The FBI has also indicated that certain documents pertaining to SCOPE were 
destroyed. Letter from Mollie Johnson Halle, Principal Legal Advisor, Atlanta Field 
Office, to Author (June 29, 1993) (on file with author). To date, the Charlotte Field 
Office has produced seven redacted pages of documents and withheld two documents in 
their entirety. These relate to Levy's antiwar activities after his release from prison. The 
remaining documents are still being processed. SLED responded to my FOIA requests 
by stating that it found no information in its files relating to Levy or to the civil rights 
organizations he aided. Letters from Lt. Michael J.  Brown, S.C. Law Enforcement 
Division, to Author (June 28, 1993) (on file with author). I have described SLED's 
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work at Army Intelligence until after the investigation had been 
initiated.79 The documentary evidence does not link West to the 
investigation any earlier than February 1 1 ,  1966, long after the 
investigation had begun.M 
Also, the investigation originated from within the G-2 section of Fort 
Jackson, not from the Columbia, South Carolina, field office of Army 
Intelligence (a separate command). At its inception, the investigation was 
both modest in its goals and consistent with governing Army regulations. 
The investigation appears to have initially been the product of the nation's 
cold war mentality and the Army's lumbering bureaucracy. Once set in 
motion, a combination of chance, obsessive anticommunism, and perhaps 
the zeal of the local Army Intelligence agents propelled it forward until 
it culminated in Levy's court-martial . 
By the Army's own rules, Howard Levy did not belong there. On 
January 28, 1965, Levy filled out the Armed Forces Security 
Questionnaire ("DD Form 98"), required of all prospective members of 
the Army.81 In a costly act of scrupulousness he noted in the remarks 
secti.on to Part IV that he had attended meetings of the Militant Labor 
Forum ("MLF"). He had also contributed to the MLF, and received its 
publications. While the Militant Labor Forum was not on the Attorney 
response to my request to a number of South Carolina attorneys familiar with SLED's 
history of hostility toward civil rights organizations and student and antiwar groups. The 
attorneys reacted with amused skepticism, especially to the assertion that SLED had no 
records relating to the civil rights organizations. 
79. As described below, the investigation began in August 1965. According to 
West's testimony at the Article 32 hearing, he began work as a civilian employee of Anny 
Intelligence on November 1 ,  1965, and initially had limited duties until he received his 
badge and credentials. Record, vol. 13, at 516, 552-53. To be sure, West's testimony 
is less than perfectly reliable, and his testimony as to when he became involved in the 
Levy investigation is, at best, confused. Asked when he first heard of Levy, West 
responded: "I do not know exactly. I would say December of 1966." ld. at 517. That 
date is obviously wrong; perhaps he meant to say December of 1965. Asked later when 
he began work on the investigation, West said: "[W]ell, it would have been the summer 
of 1965. You see, I was not assigned to this until November of 1965." ld. at 552. 
While West's rather bizarre statement might be understood to mean that he had begun a 
freelance investigation of Levy before coming to Anny Intelligence, it is a thin reed on 
which to hang a conspiracy theory. It probably signifies nothing more than confusion. 
80. Statement of Sgt. William Cain, DA Porm 19-24 (Peb. 1 1 ,  1966), in Levy 
Army Intelligence Pile, supra note 25, at 184-85. Special Agent Gysin took the 
statement, but West witnessed it. ld. at 185. The statement reveals the flavor of the 
Columbia Field Office's role in the investigation. In addition to attributing disloyal 
stances on Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam, to Levy, Cain states: "Levy was 
quite pro-Negro, too [sic] the side of the Negroes when discussing Civil Rights matters, 
and appeared to think more of the Negroid [sic] race than the White race." ld. at 184. 
8 1 .  See Armed Forces Security Questionnaire, DD Porm 98 (Jan. 28, 1965), in 
Levy Anny Intelligence Pile, supra note 25, at 197-99. 
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General's list of subversive organizations, and therefore need not have 
been mentioned by Levy, Levy noted his involvement because the group 
was obviously related to the Socialist Workers Party.82 Army 
regulations prohibited the appointment of any applicant who had 
"qualified" his DD Form 98, until his case had been investigated and 
resolved.83 Levy nevertheless slipped through the cracks,M and the 
investigation that should have occurred before he entered the Army began 
instead in the summer of 1965. 
The earliest inquiries regarding Levy appear to have come from 
within the G-2 section at Fort Jackson. Their stated purpose was to 
clarify his security status. 8.5 U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Command 
("USAINTC") replied that Levy had undergone a national agency check 
in 1962 with favorable results. 86 In the meantime new questions arose: 
Levy's January DD Form 98 had turned up, and it was inconsistent with 
a second form that he had completed shortly after his arrival at Fort 
Jackson. 87 On the second form Levy failed to mention his connection 
to the Militant Labor Forum. G-2 noticed that the earlier form was 
qualified and that there was a disparity between the two versions. They 
directed the Columbia Field Office of the 1 1 1  th Army Intelligence Group 
to obtain a statement from Levy regarding his DD Form 98s. 88 
82. ld. at 198. 
83. AR 604-10 Personnel Security Clearance 1 16(c) (Nov. 4, 1959). 
84. "Slipping through the cracks" may not be the most appropriate metaphor, as 
the "cracks" may have been quite large. Selective Service had not yet demonstrated its 
disregard of First Amendment values by adopting the policy of removing deferments from 
anti-war protesters and reclassifying them as 1-A. See FLYNN, supra note 23, at 183-87, 
215-19. 
85. See Request for and Results of Personnel Security Action, DA Form 2748 
(Aug. 6, 1965), in Levy Army Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 225-26. The request 
was directed by G-2 at Fort Jackson to the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Command 
(USAINTC), at Fort Holabird, Maryland. It requested a records check, rather than an 
investigation, for the purpose of granting security clearance, and it explained that Levy's 
records were devoid of any evidence of clearance or a national agency check. Shortly 
after his arrival at Fort Jackson, Levy was asked to complete another DO Form 98, 
because, he recalls being told, the fmt one was missing. Laughlin McDonald, 
Memorandum to File of Capt. Howard B. Levy (Dec. 27. 1966), in Levy Litigation Files, 
supra note 27. That recollection was consistent with G-2's remarks to USAINTC, and 
suggests a benign interpretation of the cryptic July 19 notation in Levy's personnel file. 
See supra note 71.  
86. Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27, at 226. 
87. Armed Forces Security Questionnaire, DO Form 98 (July 15, 1965), in Levy 
Army Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 202-04. 
88. Record, vol. 15, at 3 1 1  (memorializing Capt. Russell of G-2 and Maj. Gipson 
of Personnel Division's discussion regarding discrepancy between the two forms); Request 
for Interview (Aug. 18, 1965), in Levy Army Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 122. 
The request for an interview was consistent with Army regulations. AR 604-10 1 26. 
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In a series of conversations in early October 1965, Levy explained 
to an Army Intelligence agent that in late 1964 and early 1965 he had 
attended approximately eight public lectures sponsored by the Militant 
Labor Forum, where a variety of speakers, most notably Malcolm X, 89 
addressed such topics as foreign policy and civil rights.90 The 
intelligence agent asked about more than Levy's involvement with the 
MLF. He pressed Levy on his political beliefs and learned of the journals 
to which Levy subscribed. Levy stated that he was not a pacifist, 
although he had pacifistic leanings, and that he questioned U.S.  policy in 
Vietnam. Foreshadowing future events, Levy also stated that he could 
"envision situations in which I could conceivably refuse to obey a military 
order given me by a commander. This would be in such a situation in 
which I felt that the order was ethically or morally incorrect. "91 He 
added that under such unusual circumstances, disobedience would be an 
act of greater loyalty than obedience. 92 
Fort Jackson G-2 was apparently uncertain about how to proceed 
after receiving the agent's report on his interview with Levy. It 
recommended against giving Levy security clearance, but rejected the idea 
of initiating a "flagging action," a more serious step that would 
accompany the beginning of a "complaint type investigation. "93 At 
some point, the issue was forwarded to the Intelligence Command of the 
89. Levy undoubtedly heard Malcolm X distance black Americans from the 
Vietnam War in his response to a question: "Address myself to Vietnam for two minutes? 
It's a shame-that's one second . . . .  But they're trapped, they can't get out. You notice 
I said 'they.'  They are trapped, they can't get out." He also compared U.S. policy in 
Vietnam to that in the Congo. Malcolm X, Two Minutes on Vietnam, in VIETNAM AND 
BlACK AMERICA: AN ANTHOLOGY OF PROTEST AND REsiSTANCE 59 (Clyde Taylor ed., 
1973) (responding to question at meeting of Militant Labor Forum, Jan. 7, 1965). The 
idea that black Americans had a questionable stake in U.S. involvement in Vietnam would 
become critical in the Levy court-martial. See infra text accompanying notes 197-231 .  
90. Statement of Howard B. Levy, DA Form 19-24 (Oct. 7, 1965), in Levy Army 
Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 214-15. He stated that failing to qualify his second 
Form 98 was an oversight on his part. 
91.  ld. at 216. 
92. ld. at 214-16. 
93. Record, vol. 15, at 312-13 (memorializing phone conversation between the 
Chief of Personnel Division and Capt. Russell, G-2); id. at 309-10 (Memorandum from 
Personnel Division (Nov. 19, 1965)); AR 604-1 0  11 25(c), 26(c); AR 600-31 ,  Flag 
Control Procedures for Military Personnel in National Security Cases and Other 
Investigations or Procedures (May 1969). Paragraph 26(c) of Army Regulation 604-10 
says no flagging can occur until there is  "sufficient credible derogatory information to 
warrant its classification as a complaint type investigation . "  AR 604-10 , 26(c). Levy's 
file was eventually flagged on May 17, 1966. 
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Third U.S. Army.94 The Third Army, in turn, requested that USAINTC 
initiate a "limited investigation to determine if a loyalty investiga­
tion . . .  is warranted. "95 
That the defense may have mistaken the Army's usual response to 
Vietnam War dissent and unorthodox political beliefs and activity for 
aberrant behavior with conspiratorial origins is understandable, given the 
secrecy in which the Army cloaked its investigation, the reality of virulent 
racism, both within and without the Army, and evidence suggestive of a 
'nefarious scheme as described above. The defense had fallen prey to 
what David Fischer calls the "fallacy of identity, "  the belief that causes 
must resemble their effects. 96 Thus, they assumed that events that in 
their culmination seemed pathological must have had pathological roots 
as well. In assuming that the Army set the court-martial in motion in 
Newberry County on the first morning that Levy sought out the SCOPE 
office, the defense underestimated both the power and depth of paranoid 
anticommunism within the Army (especially within the Intelligence 
command) and the Army's perception that Levy's words and deeds posed 
a serious threat. 
Although the court-martial was probably not instigated by a scheme 
to punish Levy for his civil rights work, this should not be understood to 
diminish the importance of racism in Levy's story. In the hands of Army 
Intelligence, the investigation repeatedly circled back to questions of race 
in a way that shaped the accusers' perception of Levy and framed the 
Army's characterization of Levy at trial. Moreover, racial animus may 
explain why the Columbia field office continued to investigate Levy after 
USAINTC had completed its investigation in May 1 966, with the effect 
of producing hostile witness statements that may have been necessary to · 
revivify the investigation.97 In other words, racism helped to frame the 
investigation, and may have helped to sustain it, even if it was not the 
initial cause. Finally, there can be little doubt that Levy's violating Fort 
Jackson's racial norms and otherwise breaching military etiquette reduced 
the possibility that his accusers would seek an alternative short of court­
martial or would consider compromise. 
94. Here, too, G-2 seems to have adhered to Army Regulations. AR-604-10 1 
25(b). Fort Jackson was within the command of the Third U.S. Army. 
95. Request for and Results of Personnel Security Action, DA Form 2748 (Nov. 
22, 1965), in Levy Army Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 1 17-18 (investigation 
completed May 5, 1966). 
96. DAVID HACKEIT FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF 
HISTORICAL THOUGHT 177-78 (1970). 
97. See infra note 103. For hostile witness statements, see generally Levy Army 
Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 98-1 15. 
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D. The Refusal to Train 
On May 5, 1966, USAINTC had completed its investigation of Levy, 
which it forwarded to headquarters of the Third Army. Its Report of 
Investigation noted somewhat inconclusive results.98 The investigation 
had unearthed both favorable and unfavorable character references. The 
Report of Investigation also noted Levy's attendance at lectures sponsored 
by the Militant Labor Forum, his subscription to "several Communist-line 
or Socialist publications," and his failure to identify these associations in 
his DD Form 98.99 These acts and associations might, the report stated·, 
fall within the criteria for eliminating Levy from military service or for 
taking other action under the Army regulation for personnel security 
clearance. 100 
Matters might have stopped there. The Commanding General of the 
Third Army, perhaps disinclined to a hysterical reaction to the material 
contained in the Report, or mindful of the potential need to replace Levy 
with another doctor, concluded that the investigation had not shown that · 
Levy "embraces subversive ideology, "  and provided "insufficient basis 
for elimination from the service. "101 He recommended retaining Levy 
on active duty provided that Levy be ineligible for security clearance, and 
apparently the U.S.  Army Industrial and Personnel Security Group 
("USAPSG") agreed.102 The Personnel Security Division disagreed, 
recommending that the case be reprocessed by the USAPSG with a view 
toward Levy's elimination from the military.103 The Personnel Security 
98. See Request for and Results of Personnel Security Action, DA Fonn 2748 
(Nov. 22, 1965), in Levy Anny Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 1 17-18; Report of 
Investigation, DA Fonn 342 (May 4, 1966), in Levy Anny Intelligence File, supra note 
25, at 1 19-20. 
99. ld. at 1 19. 
100. ld. at 1 1 9-20; see AR 604-1 0  Personnel Security Clearance 1 14 (Nov. 4, 
1959). The report specifically characterized Levy's conduct and associations as possibly 
falling within the Regulation's Criterion 4, paragraph 14(b) ("Membership in, or 
affiliation or sympathetic association with" any "subversive" organization), and within 
Criterion 3,  paragraph 14(c) ("Any deliberate misrepresentation, falsification, or omission 
of material fact"). 
101 .  Letter from Capt. T.M. Ballew, Ass't Adj. Gen., Headquarters, Third United 
States Anny, to Chief, U.S. Anny Personnel Security Group (May 23, 1966), in Levy 
Anny Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 578. 
102. See id.; see also Disposition Fonn, DA Fonn 2496 (Aug. 1 ,  1966), in Levy 
Anny Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 386 (discussing Letter from Headquarters, Third 
Anny (May 23, 1966), and the recommendation of the USAPSG). The USAPSG 
document is not contained in the Levy Anny Intelligence File. The USAPSG's role as 
the next actor beyond the "Major Commander" is described at AR 604-10 1 27. 
103. See Deposition Fonn, DA Fonn 2496 (Aug. 1 ,  1966), in Levy Anny 
Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 386. In addition to the materials o f  the investigation 
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Division prevailed in its position, and the Adjutant General of the Army 
directed the Commanding General of the Third Army to reconsider his 
recommendation. 104 The Third Army reopened the investigation. tos 
The information subsequently obtained would lead to Levy's court­
martial . 
By early October, Army Intelligence resumed its investigation, now 
focusing on aidman training and Levy's statements about politics and the 
war. 106 Sometime during the week of October 2, Army Intelligence 
Agent James West interviewed Colonel Henry F. Fancy, Levy's Hospital 
Commander, regarding Levy's performance of duties. His questioning 
alerted Fancy to the possibility that Levy was not training Special Forces 
aidmen. 107 Upon investigation, which included, at Agent West's 
suggestion, a trip to the G-2 Office at Fort Jackson on October 7, Colonel 
Fancy decided to give Levy a direct verbal and written order to train the 
aidmen. 108 On October 1 1 ,  Fancy gave the order, and Levy refused it, 
explaining that he objected on ethical grounds.109 
completed in May, 1966, the Personnel Security Division had in its possession a 
supplemental report prepared by the Columbia Field Office of the l l lth Intelligence 
Group, which contained the first indication of Levy's refusal to train Special Forces 
aidmen. Id. (referring to Levy's statements about Vietnam and U.S. policy in the 
Caribbean and to Levy's refusal to train the aidmen); Letter from LTC Andrew J. Nolte, 
Acting Commander, Headquarters, l l l th Intelligence Corps Group, Fort McPherson, 
Georgia, to Comdr. Gen . ,  U.S.  Army Intelligence Command (June 27, 1966}, in Levy 
Army Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 93; Summary of Information, DA Form 568 
(June 23, 1966}, in Levy Army Intelligence File, supra note 24, at 94-97. There is no 
indication as to why and on what authority the Columbia Field Office continued its 
investigation after it had been completed by USAINTC. 
104. Letter from the Adj. Gen. to Comdr. Gen., Third U.S. Army (Aug. 22, 
1966}, in Levy Army Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 92 (written "BY ORDER OF 
THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY"). 
105. Letter from Headquarters, Third U.S. Army to Comdr. Gen., U.S. Army 
Training Center, Fort Jackson (Dec. 13,  1966), in Levy Army Intelligence File, supra 
note 25, at 576. 
106. The shift in focus was doubtless prompted by the Columbia Field Office's 
supplemental report. DA Form 341 is the earliest indication that the investigation had 
resumed. Appellate Exhibit 2, Agent Report of Interview with LTC Jackie Jacob (Oct. 
4, 1966}, in Record, vol. 12, at 40. For an indication of the focus of the investigation, 
see Record, vol. 13,  at 513-70 (Article 32 Hearing Testimony of Agent James B. West). 
107. Record at 252 (testimony of Col. Henry F. Fancy). According to Col. 
Fancy's testimony, his first meeting with Agent West occurred on October 6. Col. Fancy 
stated that he had already heard something about problems with Levy's training the 
aidmen but had not bothered to investigate. West's visit generated a new-found sense of 
urgency on Col. Fancy's part. Record at 252-53. 
108. Col. Fancy testified that he decided to take "strong corrective action" on 
October 7, based on his own investigations and trip to G-2. Record at 252, 255. 
109. See Prosecution Exhibit 2, Letter Order from Col. Fancy and Enclosure (Oct. 
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E. The Decision to Court-Martial 
The then-current rotation of aidmen trainees was scheduled to last 
until late November. Colonel Fancy informed Levy that he would have 
training critiques prepared at the middle and end of the rotation.110 In 
late November, Fancy concluded that Levy had defied his order to train 
the aidmen. He then initiated the process for imposing the mildest 
available sanction, non-judicial punishment under Article 1 5  of the 
UCMJ.111 On December 14, 1966, Fancy submitted the paperwork for 
an Article 15 punishment to the Staff Judge Advocate at Fort Jackson.112 
Fancy was then contacted by G-2 at Fort Jackson and invited to look at 
the completed Intelligence dossier.113 Fancy found the dossier to be 
alarming. After reading it, and consulting with the Staff Judge Advocate 
and the Commanding General of Fort Jackson, Fancy withdrew the 
Article 15 paperwork and upgraded the charges to the level of a general 
court-martial. 114 
Colonel Fancy set the court-martial process in motion when he 
preferred two charges on December 23, 1966, and forwarded them to the 
Commanding General of Fort Jackson on December 28.115 The initial 
charges stated violations of Article 90 of the UCMJ, for Levy's refusal 
to train, 116 and Article 134, for his various statements. 117 Upon 
completion of an Article 32 investigation, the military's rough equivalent 
11 , 1966), in Record, vol. 10; Record at 232-33 (testimony of Col. Henry F. Fancy). 
110. See Prosecution Exhibit 4, Memorandum from Col. Fancy to C apt. Levy 
(Nov. 4, 1966) (entitled Mid-Term Critique, Special Forces Aidmen), in Record, vol. 10. 
111. U .C.M.J. art. 15, 10 U .S.C. § 815 (1988). Col. Fancy describes his 
decision to institute an Article 15 sanction in the Record at 257-59. 
112. Record, vol. 14, at 90-91 (Article 32 testimony of Col. Ches ter Davis). 
113. Record at 259-60; Memorandum from Col. Dmitri J. Tadich, Chief, 
Personnel Security Division, to Comdr. Gen., Fort Jackson (Jan. 21, 1967), in Levy 
Anny Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 575. 
114. Record at 259-61 (testimony of Col. Henry F. Fancy). 
115. Appellate Exhibit 4, Charge Sheet, in Record, vol. 1 1. The Charge Sheet 
is the rough equivalent of an indictment or information. Among other things, it identifies 
the accused and contains the charges, specifications, and formal preferral, the sworn 
s ignature of the accuser that he or she believes the charges to be true based on knowledge 
of the facts or inves tigation. The charge identifies the allegedly violated code section. 
The specification is a statement of facts constituting the violation. See 1 FRANCIS A. 
GILLIGAN & FREDERIC I. LEDERER, COURT-MARTIAL PROCEDURE §§ 6-10.00 to 20.00 
(1991). Colonel Fancy forwarded the charges to M aj .  Gen. Gines Perez, the Comander 
General of the U nited States Anny Training Center, Fort J ackson, who had the statutory 
power to convene a general court-martial. See U.C.M .J. art. 22(a), 10 U.S.C. § 822(a). 
116. See Appellate Exhibit 4, Charge Sheet, in Record, vol. 11. The specification 
under this charge is reproduced in Appendix I, infra. 
117. /d. The specification under this charge is reproduced in Appendix I, infra. 
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of a preliminary hearing, 118 Colonel Fancy preferred an additional 
charge under Article 133 ("Additional Charge I"). This charge was 
recommended by the investigating officer, and stemmed from Levy's 
statements, which were alleged to constitute. conduct unbecoming an 
officer and a gentleman. 119 
Colonel Fancy preferred two final charges ("Additional Charge II" 
and "Additional Charge III" or, collectively, "the letter charges") under 
Articles 133 and 134, on February 8.120 These charges related to a 
letter, critical of U.S. policy in Vietnam and elsewhere, that Levy sent in 
September 1965 to Army Sergeant Geoffrey Hancock, Jr. , who was 
stationed in Vietnam. 121 
In addition to his appointed military counsel , Levy sought civilian 
counsel . At the suggestion of the South Carol ina Voter Education Project 
field director, Levy contacted Charles Morgan, Jr., director of the 
American Civil Liberties Union's Southern Regional Office. Morgan was 
initially skeptical. He asked his associate, Laughlin McDonald, who was 
heading home to nearby Winnsboro, South Carolina, for Christmas, to 
interview Levy. On McDonald's recommendation, Morgan agreed to take 
the case. 122 
Fort Jackson authorities rebuffed the defense's initial efforts to find 
a compromise that would avert a court-martial. 123 The handful of 
1 18. See U.C.M.J. art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832. The analogy to a preliminary 
hearing is quite rough. One of the important functions of the Article 32 hearing is to 
afford the defense an opportunity to engage in pretrial discovery. For a discussion of 
Article 32 investigations, see GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 1 15, at 325-56. 
1 19. Appellate Exhibit 5, Charge Sheet, in Record, vol. 12. The specification 
under this charge is reproduced in Appendix I,  infra. The Article 32 investigating 
officer's recommendation is found at Appellate Exhibit 4, Investigating Officer's Report, 
(Feb. 1 ,  1967) in Record, vol. 1 1 .  
120. Appellate Exhibit 5 ,  Charge Sheet, in Record, vol. 12. The specification for 
Additional Charges II and JJJ are reproduced in Appendix I, infra. 
121 . The Hancock Jetter is discussed in the Record at 755-81 (testimony of SFC 
Geoffrey Hancock, Jr.), and at 1058-68 (testimony of William Treanor). The Jetter is 
found in Prosecution Exhibits 5 and 5A, in Record, vol. 1 1 ,  and is reproduced in 
Appendix II, infra. 
122. MORGAN, supra note 46, at 122-23; Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, 
supra note 25; Memorandum from Laughlin McDonald to File of Capt. Howard B. Levy 
(Dec. 27, 1965), in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27. 
123. Finn, supra note 29, at 178; Short & Seidenberg, supra note 24, at 49; 
Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25. The Army would subsequently turn 
down Levy's application for conscientious objector status. That application was doomed 
to be denied, because Levy claimed his status as a selective conscientious objector. See 
Request for Conscientious Objection, DA Form 1049 (Jan. 8, 1967), in Levy Litigation 
Files, supra note 27; Letter from the Adj. Gen. to Capt. Howard Levy (May 2, 1967), 
in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27 (denying request). While the Supreme Court had 
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previous court-martials of GI dissenters had garnered little media 
attention. Thus, neither the local authorities nor the Pentagon had yet 
recognized how much using the bludgeon of a court-martial would cost 
in adverse publicity and further stimulation of GI dissent.124 Levy's 
final effort to avert court-martial failed.  Levy had brought a class action 
suit, seeking both to enjoin the court-martial and to have a special three­
judge court declare Articles 133 and 1 34 unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad, and prosecution under either Article or under Article 90 to 
not yet foreclosed the possibility of exemption from military service on the basis of 
selective objection to war, draft boards and courts widely assumed that selective c.o. 's 
were not entitled to exemption. See FLYNN, supra note 23, at 179. In 1971, the Supreme 
Court declared that there was no statutory or constitutional exemption for selective 
conscientious objectors. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 463 (1971), reh'g 
denied, 402 U.S. 934 (1971). 
124. Second Lieutenant Henry Howe, in all likelihood the first GI dissenter 
prosecuted by the military, participated in an antiwar rally in November 1965. While off 
duty and out of uniform, he carried a sign stating on one side, "End Johnson's Facist [sic] 
Aggression in Viet-Nam," and on the other, "Let's Have More Than a Choice Between 
Petty, Ignorant Facists [sic] in 1968." He was convicted of violating UCMJ Articles 133 
and 88 (the latter of which prohibits the use of contemptuous words by a commissioned 
officer against the President and various other public officials). See United States v. 
Howe, 17 C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429, 431-32 (1967). Howe's case received minimal 
press coverage. See Terry H. Anderson, The GI Movement and the Response from the 
Brass, in GIVE PEACE A CHANCE: EXPLORING THB VIETNAM ANTIWAR MOVEMENT 93 
(Melvin Small & William D. Hoover eds. ,  1992); Officer Is Found Guilty in Protest, 
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 23, 1965, at A22 (short piece reporting Howe's conviction); see also 
Franklin Whitehouse, A . C.L.U. Will Aid Anny War Critic, N.Y. TIMBs, Jan. 17, 1966, 
at AS; Army Critic of Johnson Free, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1966, at A47; Anny Reduces 
Sentence of Officer in War Protest, N.Y. TIMBs, Jan. 29, 1966, at A3 (other brief 
discussions of the case). The Fort Hood 3, Pvts. Dennis Mora, James Johnson, and 
David Samas, the first soldiers to refuse orders to Vietnam, received more press coverage 
than Howe. They announced their refusal at a press conference arranged by the Fifth 
Avenue Peace Parade Committee. See Martin Arnold, 3 Soldiers Hold News Conference 
to Announce They Won 't Go to Vietnam, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,  1966, at A13. However, 
while their news conference and arrest received substantial media coverage, their courts­
martial were only passingly mentioned, despite efforts to raise the question of the war's 
legality in their defense. See, e.g., Ronald Sullivan, Anny Opens Trial for Vietnam Foe, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1966, at A4; Convictions of 3 Soldiers Approved by First Anny, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1966, at A32. For a discussion of the Fort Hood 3 news conference 
and the group's impact on the antiwar movement, see CHARLES DEBENBDBTTI, AN 
AMERICAN ORDEAL: THE ANTIWAR MOVEMENT OF THE VIETNAM ERA, 155 (1990); 
ZAROULIS & SULLIVAN, supra note 33, at 86-88. The defendants' and government's 
briefs on the illegality or legality of the war are on flle with the author. The cases of 
Howard Petrick and Andy Stapp, occurring about the same time as the Levy court-martial, 
also received scant attention in the New York T1mes. 
For a discussion of changes in the military's approach to Gl dissent over the course 
of the war, see Anderson, supra note 124, at 98-102, 112-115; Short & Seidenberg, supra 
note 24, at 52. 
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punish political affiliation or private expression of political opm10n 
similarly unconstitutional.125 On the eve of the court-martial, a split 
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, persuaded that Levy had not shown irreparable injury, denied 
Levy's application for a stay of the court-martial proceedings and petition 
for a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to convene a three­
judge court. 126 
II. THE COURT-MARTIAL 
A. The Participants 
The court-martial began on May 10, 1967, in a small, crowded 
frame building at Fort Jackson. Prosecuting the case were two outsiders 
to Fort Jackson, Captain Richard M. Shusterman and his Assistant Trial 
Counsel, Captain Blair Shick.127 Shusterman, nearing the end of his 
125. See Complaint of Capt. Howard Brett Levy at 19-21 ,  Levy v.  McNamara, 
Civ. No. 953-67 (D.D.C. May 3, 1967), petition for writ of mandamus and application 
for stay denied sub nom. Levy v. Corcoran, 389 F.2d 929, 930 (D.C. Cir.), application 
for stay denied, 387 U.S. 915, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 960 (1967). 
126. Corcoran, 389 P.2d at 930-3 1.  There is some indication that the panel, 
which heard argument on the morning of May 9, 1967, may have initially decided in 
Levy's favor, and then changed its vote later in the day. See Handwritten Notes of LTC 
Robinson (May 9, 1967), in JAG Files, supra note 77 (noting original message that 
mandamus had been granted and subsequent notation cancelling original message). Of the 
three panel members, Judge Harold Leventhal expressed the greatest doubt about the 
position he was adopting, and almost certainly would have been the swing judge. 
Corcoran, 389 F.2d at 930-3 1 .  Levy may have been the victim of poor timing. The 
decision reflected the historic reluctance of courts to interfere in the business of the 
military, a reluctance that would erode somewhat by decade's end. See Interview with 
Judge Royce Lamberth, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 29, 1993). In 1972, Judge Lamberth, 
then Capt. Lamberth of the Litigation Division of the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General 
Corps, argued the Levy case on behalf of the United States Army before the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. But just as Levy's case may have arisen too early 
for a different outcome, it may have arisen too late. In concluding that Levy was not 
facing irreparable constitutional harm because the military justice system had shown its 
inclination "to apply to men in the military service the protection of pertinent Supreme 
Court decisions based on constitutional grounds," Corcoran, 389 F.2d at 93 1 ,  both Judge 
Tamm and Judge Levanthal relied on the United States Court of Military Appeals' then 
two-week-old decision in United States v. Tempia, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967) (holding 
Miranda principles applicable to court-martial proceedings). 
127. The military refers to the prosecutor as Trial Counsel, to the military defense 
lawyer as Appointed Counsel, and to any civilian defense lawyer as Individual Counsel. 
Shusterman asked for the authority to pick his Assistant Trial Counsel and selected Shick, 
whom he knew from University of Pennsylvania School of Law where Shick had been a 
class ahead of him. Shick was stationed at Port Gordon, but w�s teaching in the Military 
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stint in the Army JAG Corps, had earned a reputation as a talented trial 
lawyer that went beyond the boundaries of Fort Gordon, Georgia, where 
he was stationed. 128 Seizing upon the fact that Shusterman, like Levy, 
was Jewish, many journalists and others who discussed the case concluded 
that the Army must have picked Shusterman to be Trial Counsel in an 
effort to deflect comparisons with the Dreyfus affair. That view, 
however, ascribes to the local commander (or to whoever made the 
decision not to staff the case from within Fort Jackson) greater prescience 
about the symbolic value of the case than was likely at so early a stage. 129 
Police School, and was not in the JAG Corps. So far as Shusterman knew, Shick had no 
previous trial experience. Telephone Interview with Richard Shusterman (Aug. 23, 1993). 
128. See U.S. Army Officer Efficiency Report, DA Form 67-5 (Sept. 22, 1966) 
(on file with author) (glowing efficiency rating of Richard Shusterman); Letter from Judge 
George W. Latimer to Maj.  Gen. Walter B .  Richardson, U.S. Army School Training 
Center, Fort Gordon, Ga. (Aug. 5, 1966) (on file with author) (commending Shusterman's 
prosecution of Capt. Stephen J. Borys); Interview with Judge Royce Lamberth, supra note 
126 (stating recollection that Shusterman had a good reputation); Telephone Interview with 
Col. Earl V. Brown, supra note 45 (describing Shusterman as one of the best prosecutors 
that he had seen). The Borys court-martial was the retrial of a fairly notorious case 
involving charges of rape, sodomy! larceny, and robbery and raising Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Amendment issues. It ended in a successful conviction of Borys the summer before 
Shusterman was sent to Fort Jackson for Levy's court-martial. See United States v. 
Borys, 39 C.M.R. 608 (1968). 
129. At any rate, if that was the goal, they failed. See JOSEPH DI MONA, GREAT 
COURT-MARTIAL CASES 224 (1972); MORGAN, supra note 46, at 1 14; SHERRILL, supra 
note 38, at 98-99; Duncan & Dunn, supra note 25, at 50, 52; Kopkind, supra note 29, 
at 22; Elinor Langer, The Court-Martial of Captain Levy: Medical Ethics v. Military Law, 
156 SCIENCE 1346, 1347 (1967); Nicholas von Hoffman, The Conviction of Captain Levy, 
NEW REPUBLIC, June 17, 1967, at 9, 10; Nicholas von Hoffman, The Troubled World of 
Captain Levy, WASH. PosT, May 2 1 ,  1967, at A3 (all drawing on the Dreyfus image, and 
some accusing the Army of appointing Shusterman as Trial Counsel to defuse that image). 
If the Army did deliberately seek out a Jewish prosecutor, it did so at the risk of trading 
the imagery of the Dreyfus affair for the imagery of the Rosenberg case, where many 
believed that the Rosenbergs, as Jews, received especially harsh treatment from a Jewish 
judge and a Jewish prosecutor. See RONALD RADOSH & JOYCE MILTON, THE 
ROSENBERG FILE: A SEARCH FOR THE TRUTH 288 {1983) (quoting Vincent Lebonitte,jury 
foreman, saying: "I felt good that this was strictly a Jewish show. It was Jew against 
Jew. It wasn't the Christians hanging the Jews.").  
Although I doubt that Shusterman was appointed Trial Counsel because he was 
Jewish, the decision to reach beyond Fort Jackson to appoint Trial Counsel was an 
uncommon occurrence, beyond the power of the local commander without either the 
consent of the commanding general of Fort Gordon or the authority of so .eone up the 
chain of command. It indicates that even at this early stage, both the local commander 
and others were treating the case as an unusual one. Conversation with Professor Paul 
Giannelli, Case Western Reserve University School of law (undated). But see Telephone 
Interview with Col. Robert H. Ivey (ret.), Former Staff Judge Advocate, Fort Gordon 
(July 27, 1993) (stating that he had loaned JAG officers to another command on other 
occasions). Neither Col. Ivey nor his executive officer at Fort Gordon, Col. B.J.  
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The Staff Judge Advocate of Fort Jackson appointed Captain Charles 
M. Sanders, Jr., as defense counsel and Captain Walter H .  Jones, Jr., as 
assistant defense counsel. 130 The principal role in Levy's defense, 
however, was played by his lead civilian counsel, Charles Morgan, Jr. 
Morgan, who has been described by Samuel Walker as "the only other 
charismatic figure in ACLU history besides Roger Baldwin," had returned 
to his native South in 1964 to open the ACLU's Southern Regional Office 
in Atlanta.131 Coming to the ACLU after working briefly at the 
American Association of University Professors and then at the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund, Morgan already had achieved a historic Supreme 
Court victory in Reynolds v. Sims,132 and brought with him a docket of 
civil rights cases from his private practice. While his efforts at the 
Atlanta office focused most notably on voting rights and jury 
discrimination, Morgan had already taken on one Vietnam War-related 
case: representing Julian Bond in his effort to be seated in the Georgia 
state legislature. In addition, he would soon mount a challenge to the 
induction of blacks by the virtually all-white draft boards of South 
Carolina and Georgia. 133 Morgan was assisted by Laughlin McDonald 
Shuman, recalls why Shusterman was appointed Trial Counsel. ld. ; Telephone Interview 
with Col. B.J.  Shuman (July 22, 1993). I have found no documents relating to the 
appointment, and I have been unable to trace either the Fort Jackson Staff Judge Advocate 
serving at the time of the Levy case, or his executive officer. Shusterman insisted on 
using Blair Shick, whom he knew from law school, rather than a lawyer from the Fort 
Jackson Staff Judge Advocate's Office, as Assistant Trial Counsel. See Telephone 
Interview with Richard Shusterman, supra note 127. 
130. See Court-Martial Appointing Order No. 6, in Record, vol. 2; Court-Martial 
Appointing Order No. 1 1  (May 2, 1967), in Record, vol. 2. On defense attorney Charles 
Sanders, se.e Kopkind, supra note 29, at 27-28. 
1 3 1 .  SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF 
THE ACLU 268 (1990); cf Nicholas von Hoffman, Court-martial Can Be Very Trying for 
Civilian Lawyers, WASH. POST, May 29, 1967, at A3 ("Morgan works for the American 
Civil Liberties Union, a very restrained, constitutional and Brooks Brothers-ish outfit, but 
he's colorful all the same."). Morgan had been driven out of Birmingham, Alabama, 
after giving a speech to the Young Men's Business Club condemning the previous day's 
bombing of Birmingham's Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, in which four children died, 
and arguing that the community as a whole was responsible for the killings. See CHARLES 
MORGAN, JR., A TIME TO SPPAK (1964) (describing Birmingham and these events); see 
also HOWELL RAINES, MY SOUL IS RESTED: MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP SOUTH 
REMEMBERED 179-85 (Penguin ed. 1983) (interviews of Charles Morgan and Chris 
McNair). 
132. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). For Morgan's discussion of Reynolds and the 
reapportionment cases, see MORGAN, supra note 46, at 60-70. 
133. WALKER, supra note 1 3 1 ,  at 268-71 ;  see generally MORGAN, supra note 46. 
Morgan discusses the events leading up to Bond v.  Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1967). See 
MORGAN, supra note 46, at 150-61.  The challenge to the racially discriminatory draft 
boards arose in Sellers v. McNamara, 398 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub 
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from the Atlanta office, and, for part of the trial, by Alan Levine, 
Eleanor Holmes Norton, and two non-lawyer New York Civil Liberties 
Union staff members, Ira Glasser and Ramona Ripston.134 
The members of a military court-martial, the panel of court members 
that hears and decides the case, have certain powers that most civilian 
juries lack. Most notably, the court-martial, not the military judge, has 
the power to sentence the defendant upon conviction.m Nevertheless, 
at the time of Levy's court-martial, the UCMJ provided for a "law 
officer, "  who served many functions analogous to those of a civil ian court 
judge.136 The law officer presiding over Levy's court-martial was 
Colonel Earl V. Brown. Brown, a 1941 West Point graduate, returned 
to school after World War D to obtain a law degree. He entered the JAG 
Corps in 1953 and was sent to Korea as legal adviser to the prisoner 
exchange. There, he also served as defense counsel for two soldiers 
accused of collaborating with the enemy. Brown, who was nearing the 
end of his military career, was the executive officer of the United States 
Army Judiciary, and it was widely assumed that Brown had been chosen 
to ensure against any Army misstep .137 
Levy faced a court-martial that was as mil itary as he was not, and it 
is only with a touch of irony that one would suggest that this was a jury 
of Levy's peers. Levy's court-martial consisted of ten officers of superior 
nom. Sellers v. Laird, 395 U.S. 950 (1969). For Morgan's discussion of Sellers, see 
MORGAN, supra note 46, at 163-66. 
134. WALKER, supra note 1 3 1 ,  at 272. 
135. See 1 GIT..LIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 1 15,  at 516. Under the current 
rules, a court-martial defendant may request a trial by judge alone, in which case 
sentencing power resides in the military judge. R.C.M. § 903(a)(2); see Uniform Code 
of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 804, 815, 817. 
136. The 1968 amendments to the UCMJ changed the title and some of the 
functions of the law officer, who became the "military judge." Military Justice Act of 
1968, art. 16, § 816, Pub. L. No. 90-632. For a discussion of the role of the military 
judge, see 1 GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 1 15.  
137.  As the officer with administrative control over the Army's law officers, 
Brown exercised his authority to appoint himself to the case. Telephone Interview with 
Col. Earl V. Brown, supra note 45; Nicholas von Hoffman, The Troubled World of 
Captain Levy, WASH. POST, May 2 1 ,  1967, at A31; Levy 'Judge Ran a Relaxed Court ', 
N.Y. TiMES, June 4, 1967, at A12; Court Martial (undated), in Levy Litigation Files, 
supra note 27. Colonel Brown's rank as Executive Officer, U.S. Army Judiciary, is 
noted on the court papers in Levy's action in the D . C .  District Court action. See, e.g., 
Complaint of Captain Howard Breu Levy, McNamara (No. 953-67). News accounts of 
the court-martial generally referred to Brown as the Army's "senior" or "top" law officer. 
E.g. , Duncan & Dunn, supra note 25, at 54; Kopkind, supra note 29, at 22; Levy 'Judge 
Ran a Relaxed Court, ' supra; see also MORGAN, supra note 46, at 1 3 1 .  
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rank: two colonels, four lieutenant colonels, and four majors.138 All ten 
were dependent on the convening authority, Major General Gines Perez, 
for advancement in their careers. 139 Presiding over the court-martial 
was Colonel John S .  Baskin, a South Carolinian whose wife presided over 
the Fort Jackson Officers' Wives Club.140 Eight members were white. 
The one black and one Japanese-American on the court-martial were both 
majors. Eight were Southerners, including five South Carolinians.141 
Two were West Point graduates, and one had graduated from the Citadel. 
Two had attended the counterinsurgency course at the U . S .  Army Special 
Warfare School. The panel members had served an average of 19.3 
years. Major Nishimoto, the court member with the least service, was 
soon to mark the ninth anniversary of his commission. Four members 
had served in Vietnam, and one had lost an eye there while rescuing two 
Gls from a friendly minefield. None were doctors, nurses, or other 
health workers. None were draftees, enlisted personnel, or non-career 
officers. And none were Jews.142 
138. UCMJ Article 25(d)(1) states: "When it can be avoided, no member of an 
armed force may be tried by a court-martial any member of which is junior to him in rank 
or grade." 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(1); see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL , 4<: (1951) 
[hereinafter M.C.M.] ("An officer may be tried only by a court-martial composed of 
officers.").  
139. For a discussion of the command influence problem in the military justice 
system, see Luther C. West, Command Influence, in CONSCIENCEAND COMMAND 73, 73-
135 (James Finn ed. ,  1971); Luther C. West, A History of Command Influence on the 
Military Judicial System, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1970). Reforms of the military justice 
system have mitigated the problem of command influence, but they have not completely 
eliminated it as an issue. For a recent decision of the Supreme Court rejecting a 
challenge to the military justice system grounded in the issue of command influence, see 
Weiss v. United States, 1 1 4  S. Ct. 752 (1994). More recently, unlawful command 
influence by the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Frank B. Kelso II, was a basis for 
dismissing the last remaining charges against Navy personnel arising out of the 1991 
Tailhook Symposium. See 140 CONO. REC. H460-63, H474-75 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1 994) 
(statement of Rep. Schroeder, putting into the record Capt. Vest's decision in United 
States v. Miller). 
· 
140. Mrs. Baskin Leads Slate of Jackson OWC, ARMY TIMES, May 10, 1967, at 
W3. TheManualfor Courts-Martial provided that the senior member of the court-martial 
serve as its President. M.C.M . ,  supra note 138, , 40. 
141.  The other two panel members were from California and West Virginia. 
142. Record at 1 5 ;  MORGAN, supra note 46, at 130; Kopkind, supra note 29, at 
22; . Court Martial (undated), in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27. Nicholas von 
Hoffman, covering the case for the Washington Post, wrote, "There are a Negro and an 
Oriental on the court-martial, but every officer still looks the same, mouths turned down 
at the corners like tragic masks, upside-down suspension bridges, grim arches. • A row 
of ten Toby mugs,' Homer Bigart of the New York Times called them." Nicholas von 
Hoffman, The Troubled World of Captain Levy, WASH. POST, May 2 1 ,  1967, at A3 .  
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After voir dire of the court-martial panel, the court-martial was 
recessed for a one-and-one-half day hearing on defense motions. The law 
officer denied all defense motions, including objections to the composition 
of the court-martial;143 challenges on due process and other grounds to 
various court-martial procedures;144 attempts to gain access to various 
documents thought necessary for the defense; 145 motions to dismiss the 
charges on various grounds; 146 and challenges to the constitutionality of 
the court-martial system and of UCMJ Articles 133 and 134.147 
B. 1he Prosecution Case: Levy on Trial 
A prosecutor's story, the interpretation of events that she attempts to 
persuade the decisionmaker to adopt, is grounded in the legal elements of 
the offenses with which the accused is charged. In the ideal-type 
unambiguous case, it might have something of a connect-the-dots feel to 
it, as the prosecutor takes the decisionmaker step by step through the 
143. Record at 36-38 (objection to exclusion of doctors and soldiers of the same 
or lower rank from court-martial panel); id. at 38-41 (objection to composition of court­
martial on grounds of command influence); id. at 42-44 (objection to procedure for 
challenges for cause to court-martial); id. at 1 3 8-44 (motion to dismiss on grounds of 
exclusion of women from court-martial); id. at 144-45 (motion to dismiss court-martial 
on grounds that commanding general selected the court-martial). 
144. ld. at 38-41 (objection to oath administered by Trial Counsel to court-martial 
members and to Trial Counsel's role in administering the oath); id. at 45-47 (objection 
to Staff Judge Advocate's role because of command influence problems); id. at 47-51 
(objection to exclusion of the press at the Article 32 hearing); id. at 51-56 (objection to 
method of obtaining defense witnesses giving Trial Counsel control over the subpoenaing 
of defense witnesses); id. at 102-04 (motion for severance of the charges). 
145. ld. at 81-89, 125 (motion for access to G-2 dossier); id. at 201-02 (motion 
to produce questionnaires sent by Trial Counsel to various Levy patients). 
146. In addition to the other motions described above, and the constitutional 
challenges noted infra note 147, see Record at 69-81 (motion to dismiss on grounds that 
prosecution was politically motivated); id. at 89-94 (motion to dismiss Additional Charges 
II & III or to reopen Article 32 hearing with regard to those charges because of 
evidentiary deficiencies at the original Article 32 hearing); id. at 94-102 (motion to 
dismiss Additional Charges II & III as cumulative); id. at 104-12 (motion to dismiss 
Article 134 charges for failure to show elements of offense); id. at 1 12-15 (motion to 
dismiss Charge II as preempted by 1 8  U .S.C. § 2387); id. at 1 15-22 (motion to dismiss 
Additional Charge lii as grounded in an asserted violation of 18 U .S.C. § 2387, which 
is inapplicable to military personnel); id. at 1 30-36 (motion to dismiss on grounds of 
failure to disclose portions of Levy's G-2 dossier). 
147. ld. at 136-37 (motion for trial by jury on Sixth Amendment grounds); id. at 
145-79, 208 (motion to dismiss Articles 133 and 134 charges on vagueness and 
overbreadth grounds). 
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elements of the offense and, using an internally consistent story, connects 
the accused with each element. 148 
The Army did not have an ideal-type unambiguous case against 
Levy. Most notably, Levy's intentions, conduct, and statements were 
subject to conflicting interpretations. How one interpreted Levy's intent, 
statements, and acts reflected, in turn, one's characterization of Levy 
himself. The prosecution attempted to tell a story that removed any 
ambiguities regarding Levy, his intent, and the harmful character of his 
conduct. 
According to the prosecution and its witnesses, Levy was immature 
and unable to conform to the Army's norms. Consequently, he was given 
to defiance for defiance's sake, but a more important cause of his conduct 
was his excessively passionate and extreme politics. Succumbing to his 
antiwar zealousness, he sought to undermine the war effort by defiantly 
disregarding his own duty and by subverting the performance of others. 
In so doing, he endangered the Army and its soldiers and betrayed his 
obligations to and the trust of each . 
The prosecution's case regarding the Article 90 or order charge was 
relatively straightforward . To make out a violation of Article 90, the 
prosecution had to show that Levy received a command from his superior 
officer, and that knowing of the command and that it emanated from his 
superior officer, Levy willfully disobeyed it. 149 Most facts underlying 
this part of the prosecution's case were not in dispute. Levy did not 
dispute that Colonel Fancy had given the order to train, that he told 
Colonel Fancy that he would not obey it, and that he had, in fact, 
continued to refuse to train Special Forces soldiers.150 Not surprisingly, 
the prosecution focused first on the order charge. Its presentation of that 
case was a thorough, careful, and rather mechanical recitation of the 
events leading to the order and Levy's refusal to obey it. Anticipating a 
defense that the order was given with the expectation of its refusal for the 
sole purpose of enhancing punishment, 151 the prosecution elicited 
148. See W. LANCE BENNBTI & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING 
REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 94-98 
(1981). Given a trial's rules of the road, the storytelling is never likely to be so linear 
as the "connect the dots" metaphor suggests. 
149. M.C.M.,  supra note 138, , 169b; Record at 2590 (instructions to court-
martial). 
150. The defense, nonetheless, did insist on instructing the court-martial as to the 
Article 90 charge for the Jesser included offense of dereliction of duty, an offense that 
would not require a finding of willful disobedience of the order. Record at 2514-15. 
151 .  The 1951 Manual for Courts-Martial states: "Disobedience of an order which 
has for its sole object the attainment of some private end, or which is given for the sole 
purpose of increasing the penalty for an offense which it is expected the accused may 
commit, is not punishable under this article. "  M.C.M., supra note 138, , 169b. 
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Colonel Fancy's testimony that "[i]t was [his] personal feeling and hope" 
that Levy would comply.152 
The prosecution faced a more ambiguous case with regard to the 
General Articles charges. The law officer instructed that to find Levy 
guilty of violating Article 134 the court-martial must find first that he 
publicly made the statements in question and that the statements were 
disloyal. In addition, the court-martial had to find that Levy made the 
charged statements with the "design to promote disloyalty and disaffection 
among the troops"; and that the statements had the "clear and reasonable 
tendency" to promote disloyalty and disaffection "to the prejudice of good 
order and discipline in the armed forces. "153 Additional Charge n, the 
Article 133 charge involving the Hancock letter, similarly required a 
finding of intent to impair or interfere with Hancock's performance of his 
duty, as well as the probability that the letter would have the intended 
harmful result. 154 
The prosecution would have little difficulty showing that Levy had 
said more or less what he was accused of saying. Their challenge, aside 
from the legal issues regarding the extent of First Amendment protection 
of Levy's statements and the statutory vagueness of the General Articles, 
would be to show bad intent, and the statements' dangerousness or 
probability of causing harm. The prosecution had reason to doubt that it 
could demonstrate intent and the harmful tendency of the statements, and 
Shusterman privately held grave doubts as to whether Levy had ever 
intended to make anyone disloyal.155 Most of the statements fell into 
152. Record at 244-45. 
153. Record at 2593-94. The law officer's instruction regarding Additional Charge 
III similarly required a finding that Levy had sent Hancock a letter with the intent to 
impair his loyalty, morale, and discipline, and with the likely effect of so impairing 
Hancock's loyalty. /d. at 2601-02. The instruction was confusing as to whether it 
required determination of wa clear and present danger," the then-prevailing standard in 
prosecutions involving speech. Despite first defining the standard as "a clear and 
reasonable tendency to promote disloyalty and disaffection," seemingly a less demanding 
standard, Colonel Brown subsequently instructed the court-martial that the statements' 
prejudicial nature was an essential element of the offense, and that to find this they had 
to find "that these statements presented a clear and present danger of creating disloyalty, 
disaffection, insubordination, refusal of orders, or mutiny among the troops. "  ld. at 2595. 
154. Record at 2599-600. The instruction on Additional Charge I, the Article 133 
charge relating to the oral statements made by Levy to Special Forces soldiers and others, 
did not include a finding of specific intent. It did require a fmding that the statements 
were "intemperate, contemptuous, defamatory, provoking, and/or disloyal. "  /d. at 2598. 
It also required a finding that the conduct was "unbecoming an officer and gentleman." 
I d. 
155. Telephone Interview with Richard M .  Shusterman, supra note 127. 
Shusterman also had strong reservations on First Amendment grounds about the General 
Articles charges. He had no similar reservations regarding the Article 90 charge. 
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one of three categories: hostile or insulting statements directed at Special 
Forces soldiers;156 criticism of U.S.  foreign policy or involvement in 
Vietnam; 157 and statements that blacks, as victims of discrimination, 
should not fight in Vietnam. 158 As Levy's lawyers would argue, 
throwing Special Forces soldiers out of his clinic while calling them 
"liars," "thieves," and "murderers" hardly seemed like a plausible 
strategy for persuading them to disaffect and become disloyal. 159 While 
Levy's other statements were susceptible to a variety of interpretations, 
ranging from counsel to disobey orders, to vigorous debate with no 
expectation that it would alter anyone's behavior, the circumstances 
militated against the view that Levy had a design to undermine the war 
effort by counseling mutiny. As the defense would repeatedly point out, 
out of the thousands of soldiers and patients Levy had encountered, the 
prosecution succeeded in finding only a handful of soldiers who had heard 
Levy make statements against the war or regarding black soldiers serving 
in Vietnam, and none had become disloyal.100 
The prosecution sought to resolve the ambiguities of Levy's behavior 
by emphasizing those statements that indicated a motive, political passion, 
and anti-American extremism, and hence suggested intent. The 
prosecution built its case partially on the testimony of various Green 
Berets who recalled the invective that Levy directed at them. 161 Perhaps 
most helpful to its effort to supply intent by constructing Levy as a radical 
extremist was Levy's letter to Sergeant Geoffrey Hancock, Jr.162 
156. For example, "I hope when you get to Vietnam something happens to you and 
you are injured. "  Additional Charge I, quoted in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 739 n.6; 
see also supra note 9 (from Charge In. 
157. See, e.g., supra note 7; Additional Charge lll, (paraphrasing Letter from 
Howard Levy to Sgt. Geoffrey Hancock, Jr., 2, 5 (Sept. 10, 1965) (hereinafter Hancock 
Letter]: "The only question that remains, is essentially 1)  were we merely naive and 
therefore did we make unintentional mistakes or 2) does the U.S. foreign policy represent 
a diabolical evil. As you would guess, I opt for the second proposition. . . . Are the 
North Viet Namese worse off than the South Viet Namese? I doubt it . . . .  "). The 
Hancock Letter is found at Prosecution Exhibits 5 & 5A, in Record, vol. 10. It has been 
reproduced in Appendix II, infra. 
158. See, e.g. , supra note 8. The one statement included in the specifications that 
does not fit any of these categories is: "The Hospital Commander has given me an order 
to train special forces personnel, which order I have refused and will not obey." 
Additional Charge I.  For the full text of the specifications, see Appendix I,  infra. 
159. Record at 2568. 
160. ld. at 2567-68. 
161.  E.g. , id. at 643 (testimony of Sp5c Wayne M. Barrows); id. at 676 
(testimony of Sp4c Clifton H. Davis); id. at 712-13 (testimony of Richard W. Gillum). 
162. The Hancock letter was the basis for the letter charges, Additional Charge 
II and Additional Charge lll. 
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Levy wrote to Hancock at the behest of his friend and civil rights co­
worker, William Treanor. Treanor met and befriended Hancock in the 
Army, where they served in the same Intelligence unit. Their friendship 
continued after Treanor left the Army, and they maintained a 
correspondence. In the summer of 1965, Hancock, who was then 
stationed in Vietnam, wrote to Treanor complaining of antiwar protests 
· in the U.S.  and the lack of domestic support for the U.S.  war effort. 
Treanor showed Hancock's letter to Levy and suggested that he write a 
reply, which Treanor enclosed with a short letter of his own. 163 
The letter charges, arguably duplicative of the other Article 133 and 
Article 134 charges, were a particularly problematic part of the 
prosecution's case. The letter nowhere invited Hancock to disobey orders 
or otherwise neglect his duty, although it was critical of U.S. involvement 
in Vietnam, and by explicit extension, critical of Hancock's personal role. 
Instead, it invited further dialogue. 164 It was sent in the context of a 
friendly correspondence between Treanor and Hancock after Hancock had 
raised the subject of antiwar protests. Treanor expected that it might 
generate a dialogue that would bring Levy and Hancock to a greater 
understanding of each other's position. 16s The letter made Hancock 
angry, but not disloyal. He in turn showed the letter to several other 
soldiers with whom he was stationed. Most importantly, at least for the 
"conduct unbecoming" charge, it did not clearly indicate that Levy was 
an Army officer and left Hancock with the misimpression that Levy was 
a civilian doctor in the Army's employ. 166 
The letter charges were sufficiently fraught with difficulty for the 
prosecution that the court-martial found that Levy did not have the 
specific intent to impair or interfere with Hancock's performance of 
163. Record at 1058-61 (testimony of William Treanor). Treanor testified that "I 
thought . . .  it is [sic] important that people with different points of view discuss it with 
each other. " ld. at 1065. In response to the question whether he was trying to create a 
situation where Levy and Hancock could express their disagreements with one another, 
he answered: "Their disagreements and their agreements. If they developed their ideas 
on the war to each other, I thought it would be to a better understanding between two 
people I know to be very concerned about world affairs." ld. 
164. Levy closed the letter by writing: "I would appreciate your views on some 
of the points I have raised. In any event let me wish you good luck & safe conduct in 
your present situation." Hancock Letter, supra note 157, at 8. 
165. ld. at 760-64 (testimony of Sgt. Geoffrey Hancock, Jr.). 
166. Record at 1058-61,  1064-66 (testimony of William Treanor). According to 
Col. Brown's instruction regarding the other Article 133 charge, the fact that listeners 
knew Levy was an officer constituted one of the offense's elements, although that element 
was omitted in the instruction on the letter charge. /d. at 2598-600. 
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duties. 167 But the letter itself, which the prosecution read to the court­
martial, was inflammatory and helped create an image of Levy necessary 
for his conviction on the other Article 133 and 134 charges}68 Levy 
identified himself in the letter as "one of those 'people back in the states • 
who actually opposes our efforts [in Vietnam] & would refuse to serve 
there if I were so assigned. ..  The latter clause meant little to Hancock, 
given his assumption that Levy was a civilian. 169 The same phrase 
spoke loudly to the court-martial. Levy argued that U.S.  involvement in 
Vietnam could be understood only in the context of U.S .  cold war era 
foreign policy, which he described as "a diabolical evil, .. orchestrated by 
"the big business-military complex ...  That foreign policy, he argued, was 
marked by consistent support for right-wing alternatives to popular left­
liberal liberation movements to further the interests of U.S. companies 
and American investors.110 
Levy's comments on liberation movements in developing countries, 
on U.S.  allies, and on communist regimes such as Cuba and North 
Vietnam were even more likely to disquiet the court-martial. He 
described the press as the handmaiden of the U.S. government, ready to 
find communist subversion in any liberation movement that conflicted 
with U.S. interests. American intervention in the Dominican Republic 
and its support for tyrants in places such as the Congo could not be 
justified on the grounds of containment of communism, because the 
communist threat in these places was more imagined (or manufactured) 
than real. 171 But Levy did not rest his argument on dismissing a 
communist challenge. Instead, he argued that we must accept the fact that 
some people will choose communism and that in some contexts their 
choice will be rational: 
What if the majority of a people decide that Communism is 
good for them. Do we, does anybody have a right to deny 
them their choice. We might . . .  try to prove that our way is 
better but by any stretch of any moral principal can we deny 
them the choice. Is communism worse than a U.S. oriented 
government? The fastest growing economy in Latin America is 
Cuba. Everybody reads & writes in Cuba. Everybody has 
167. The court-martial found Levy guilty of the lesser included offenses of writing 
the letter with "culpable negligence" for the impairment of Hancock's performance of his 
duty. /d. at 2618. The prosecution then sought to dismiss the charges on the ground that 
the court-martial's fmdings were tantamount to an acquittal. /d. at 2619. 
168. /d. at 756. 
169. Hancock Letter, supra note 157, at 1 .  
170. /d. at 2-3, 6. 
171 .  /d. at 4 .  
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medical care. Was this true with the previously American 
backed governments? Not on your life. . . . Are the North 
Vietnamese worse off than the South Vietnamese? I doubt it. 
If they are why do so many back the Viet Cong? Guerilla 
terrorism? Unlikely. The truth is that the North has instituted 
land reform, schools, & medical facilities . . . .  Why hasn't it 
happened in the South & why do you insist that it will happen. 
It hasn't in any of our other colonies . . . .  
Geoffrey who are you fighting for? Do you know? . . . 
You, no doubt, know about the terror the whites have inflicted 
upon Negroes in our country. Aren't you guilty of the same 
thing with regard the Vietnamese? A dead woman is a dead 
woman in Alabama & in Viet Nam. To destroy a child's life in 
Viet Nam equals a destroyed l ife in Harlem. For what cause? 
Democracy? Diem, Trujillo, Batista, Chiang Kai Shek, Franco, 
Tshombe -Bullshit?172 
Finally, as the last paragraph quoted above indicates, Levy linked 
U.S.  involvement in Vietnam to the oppression of blacks and poor whites 
in the U.S.  Not only were the two situations parallel in result, but they 
were results of the same cause. He wrote: "The same people who 
suppress Negroes & poor whites here are doing it all over again all over 
the world & your [sic] helping them. "173 The same paternalist attitudes, 
coupled with the profit motive, underlay domestic and foreign policy 
toward " [ un ]sophisticated" peoples. 174 
· Levy's Jetter to Geoffrey Hancock did more than just define him as 
a political extremist before the court-martial. It violated the Army's 
construction of the Vietnamese. Nations prepare their citizens and armies 
prepare their soldiers for war by demonizing and dehumanizing the 
enemy. In earlier wars, the U . S .  had similarly fashioned the enemy in 
racist terms as something alien and subhuman. m Indeed, many of the 
pejoratives applied to the Vietnamese were recycled from earlier Asian 
wars. 176 Yet, soldiers in Vietnam, unlike soldiers in most prior 
172. Id. at 4-7. 
173. Id. at 6. 
174. Id. at 6-7. 
175. See generally JoHN W. DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER 
IN THE PACIFIC WAR (1986) (discussing the demonization of the Japanese enemy by 
Americans and of the American enemy by the Japanese during World War II). 
176. David Desser, "Charlie Don '1 Surf": Race and Cullure in Vietnam War Films, 
in INVENTING VIETNAM: THE WAR IN FILM AND TELEVISION 8 1 ,  96-97 (Michael 
Anderegg ed., 1991). In fact, U.S. Marines ftrst used the term "gook" to refer to 
Nicaraguans during the U.S. intervention in Nicaragua in 1912. LT. COL. GARY D. 
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American wars, had trouble distinguishing between friend and foe. 177 
It is not surprising that soldiers called all Vietnamese "gooks," "slopes," 
"slants, "  or "zips" in a setting where it was difficult to tell hostile from 
friendly civilians, where the civilian population resented and feared the 
Americans instead of welcoming them as liberators, and where the official 
and unofficial rules of engagement and the emphasis on maximizing body 
counts created an atmosphere where anything that moved or anyone who 
was dead was often deemed the enemy . 178 Indeed, Christian Appy 
writes that many American soldiers held greater respect for the enemy 
than for Vietnamese civilians. 179 
American conceptualizations of the Vietnamese fell along two 
extremes. Most typically, they were the alien Other. Drawing on the 
racial imagery and mythology of America's past experience with "savage 
war," Americans called themselves "cowboys" and talked of Vietnam as 
"Indian Country. " 180 The language and metaphors of cowboys and 
Indians flowed freely in Vietnam. In regard to this posturing and the 
invocation of Old West imagery to depict the Vietnamese enemy and 
name ground and air operations and outposts, 181 Richard Drinnon has 
noted that: "It was as if Cowboys and Indians were the only game the 
American invaders knew. "182 At other times, Americans made their 
characterizations of the Vietnamese as subhuman more explicit. To 
SOLIS, MARINES AND Mll..ITARY LAW IN VIETNAM: TRIAL BY FIRE 138 (1989). The 
tenn was almost certainly a corruption of the pejorative wgoo-goos," by which American 
soldiers referred to Filipinos at the turn of the century. See DOWER, supra note 175, at 
151-52, 162. 
177. On the difficulty of distinguishing civilians from insurgents during the U.S 
war in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War, and the consequent loss of civilian 
life, see DoWER, supra note 175, at 151.  
178.  APPY, supra note 43,  at 106-07; see also Gordon S .  Livingston, M.D.,  
Healing in Vietnam, in CRIMES OF WAR 430, 433 (Richard A. Falk et a!. eds . ,  1971). 
179. APPY, supra note 43, at 295-96. 
180. See RICHARD DRINNON, FACING WEST: THE METAPHYSICS OF INDIAN­
HATING AND EMPIRE-BUll..DINO 447-48 (1980); SLOTKIN, supra note 55, at 494-96, 523-
25, 546-47. Henry Kissinger would describe himself as the "Lone Ranger of American 
foreign policy. "  ld. at 754 n.3 1 .  This image of cowboys and Indians was not reserved 
for Vietnam. The CIA referred to its mercenaries employed against Cuba as "cowboys." 
DRINNON, supra, at 434-35. The concept of wsavage war" is discussed infra note 3 1 8  and 
accompanying text. 
1 8 1 .  Examples include "Prairie," "Sam Houston," "Hickory," "Davy Crocket," 
"Daniel Boone," and for that matter, "Crazy Horse." "Dodge City" seems also to have 
been a popular name. See DRINNON, supra note 180, at 443; SLOTKIN, supra note 55, 
at 524-25. Dodge City was also the name of a Montagnard outpost in John Wayne's THE 
GREEN BERETS (Warner Bros. 1968). 
182. See DRINNON, supra note 180, at 450 n.*. 
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General William Westmoreland, they were "termites" ;183 to the soldiers 
at My Lai, "ants. " 184 
Still other characterizations made Vietnam and the Vietnamese so 
alien that they were unnameable and unknowable, or that they became 
invisible. 185 American soldiers gave voice to this sense that the war 
"belong[ed] to an unearthly place" when they spoke of the U.S. as "The 
World. " 186 Lieutenant Calley expressed the further reaches of this logic 
when he said: "We weren't in My Lai to kill human beings, really. We 
were there to kill ideology that is carried by-I don't know. Pawns. 
Blobs. Pieces of flesh; and I wasn't in Mylai [sic] to destroy intelligent 
men. I was there to destroy an intangible idea. "187 
At the other extreme was a different assumption that rendered real 
Vietnamese just as invisible: the assumption that the Vietnamese, indeed, 
that everyone, wanted to be like Americans. 188 Expressing this idea, a 
colonel in the movie Full Metal Jacket says: "Inside every gook there is 
an American trying to get out. "189 One sees an example of this 
unwillingness to see the Vietnamese as Vietnamese in the practice of 
renaming Vietnamese admitted to U.S.  military hospitals with English 
nicknames in place of "perfectly adequate, pronounceable Vietnamese 
name[s] . "190 Similarly, Lyndon Johnson could imagine buying peace 
183. ld. at 448-49. Westmoreland's statement originally appeared in Lloyd 
Norman, How the Generals View the War Now, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 27, 1967, at 28-29. 
184. DRINNON, supra note 180, at 45 1 .  
185. See generally Desser, supra note 176; Cynthia J. Fuchs, All the Animals 
Come out at Night: Vietnam Meets Noir in Taxi Driver, in INVENTING VIETNAM: THE 
WAR IN FILM AND TELEVISION 33-55 (Michael Anderegg ed., 1991). Desser quotes 
several Vietnam novels that express this idea of an invisible enemy, including: MARK 
BAKER, NAM: THE VIETNAM WAR IN THE WORDS OF THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO 
FOUGHT THERE 1 1 1  (1981) ("I could deal with a man. That meant my talent against his 
for survival, but how do you deal with him when he ain't even there?"); PHILIP CAPliTO, 
A RUMOR OF WAR 55 (1977) ("ITlhere was no enemy to fire at, there was nothing to 
retaliate against. . . . Phantoms, I thought, we're fighting phantoms."); Desser, supra 
note 176, at 93-94. The enemy's invisibility often was reality for U.S. troops in Vietnam. 
Mines, by most estimates, accounted for one-fifth to one-fourth of all U.S. casualties, and 
even in firefights the enemy often went unseen. APPY, supra note 43, at 169-73. 
186. APPY, supra note 43, at 250. Appy writes that "'(w)hen I get back to The 
World . . . .  ' was a standard conversational opening." /d. 
187. LIEliTENANT CALLEY: HIS OWN STORY 103 (1971), quoted in DRINNON, 
supra note 180, at 456 (emphasis in original). 
188. Desser, supra note 176, at 83. In making this argument, Desser draws on 
arguments made by Loren Baritz. See LOREN BARITZ, BACKFIRE: A HISTORY OP How 
AMERICAN CULTURE LED Us INTO VIETNAM AND MADE Us FIGHT THE WAY WE DID 
(1985). 
189. FULL METAL JACKET (Warner Bros. 1987), quoted in Desser, supra note 
176, at 83. 
190. Livingston, supra note 178, at 433. 
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from the NLF and North Vietnamese by bringing the Great Society and 
the TV A to Vietnam.191 
Levy's letter defied both of these ways of imagining the Vietnamese. 
General Westmoreland would later pronounce that "[t]he Oriental doesn't 
put the same high price on life as does the Westerner. Life is plentiful, 
life is cheap in the Orient. As the philosophy of the Orient expresses it, 
life is not important. "192 Levy, by contrast, wrote to Sergeant Hancock 
that "[a] dead woman is a dead woman in Alabama & in Viet Nam. To 
destroy a child's life in Viet Nam equals a destroyed life in Harlem. "193 
In so writing, Levy demanded that Hancock see the pain and the death 
that the U.S.  brought to Vietnam and insisted on the humanity of the 
Vietnamese. t')4 And if the Vietnamese were no less human than 
Americans, could the Hippocratic Oath's command to "abstain from 
whatever is deleterious and mischievous" apply any less to them?195 
Thus, Levy's refusal to train, and his insistence that his conduct was 
grounded in medical ethics also repudiated the characterization of the 
1 9 1 .  Lyndon B. Johnson, American Policy in Viet-Nam: Remarks at Johns 
Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. (Apr. 7, 1965), in THE VIET-NAM READER 343, 348 
(Marcus G. Raskin & Bernard B. Fall eds.,  2d ed. 1967) ("For our part I will ask the 
Congress to join in a billion dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is 
underway. . . . And there is much to be done. The vast Mekong River can provide food 
and water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own T.V.A. "). Americans erroneously 
believed themselves to be operating in Vietnam on a blank slate, that there was no 
indigenous political culture. As Larry Cable shows, U.S. military doctrine of the period 
rejected the possibility of an "organic and unsponsored insurgency. "  CABLE, supra note 
52, at 145. Rather, "Any seemingly domestic in�urgent movement was either externally 
sponsored or was soon captured by an external sponsor." /d. at 5.  In the apparent 
absence of a pre-existing indigenous political culture, the process of "nation-building" 
became one of Americanization. Slotkin, supra note 54, at 84. 
192. HEARTS AND MINDS (Touchstone/Warner Bros. 1975), quoted in APPY, supra 
note 43, at 254. For a discussion of how this idea is represented in the 1978 movie Go 
Tell the Spartans (AVCO-Embassy), see Desser, supra note 176, at 9 1 -92. Americans 
expressed assumptions about Vietnamese valuation of Vietnamese lives in the amounts 
paid as solacium payments for the accidental deaths of Vietnamese civilians. According 
to Eric Herter, an Anny private assigned to USAID, the going rate was $35 for an adult, 
and $14.40 for a child under fifteen. See ]AMES W. GIBSON, THE PERPECT WAR: 
TECHNOWAR IN VIETNAM 310 (1986). 
193. Hancock Letter, supra note 157, at 7. 
194. Richard Drinnon discusses how Graham Greene develops this theme of the 
inability to see beyond abstraction to real wounds and real death in Greene's novel, THE 
QUIET AMERICAN (1955). The novel was modeled on Col. Edward Lansdale, an architect 
of U.S. counterinsurgency in the Philippines and in Vietnam. DRINNON, supra note 180, 
at 416-18, 427-28. 
195. See Oath of Hippocrates, in EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 3 1 1  
(Jay Katz ed., 1972). 
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Vietnamese exemplified by Westmoreland's statement, and asserted the 
equal preciousness of Vietnamese and American lives. 
The Hancock letter also rejected the second common construction of 
the Vietnamese: the unexamined assumption that they wanted to be 
Americans. Levy asked Hancock to consider the possibility that the 
Vietnamese would choose not to be like us, and to accept their decision 
to embrace that which we rejected.196 His letter assumed the common 
humanity of Vietnamese and Americans, but it also recognized (and 
accepted) their differences, and in so doing spoke heresy about the 
American character and the American mission. 
The prosecution did not explicitly develop the theme of Levy's 
heretical construction of the Vietnamese, although it not only read the 
letter to the court-martial, but also began closing argument with it.197 
The prosecution did, however, paint a picture of Levy as a dangerous 
violator of boundaries of rank and race by focusing on Levy's 
conversations with black enlisted men. Specifically, the prosecution 
elicited testimony from five black soldiers concerning conversations that 
Levy had with them about race and Vietnam. Their testimony, and the 
cast put on it by the prosecution, evoked frightening images of mutinous 
black soldiers and the white "outside agitator. "198 
The gist of the testimony was that Levy told these soldiers that he did 
not understand why blacks would fight in freedom's name abroad, when 
they had not won the struggle for freedom at home. Levy also stated that 
were he black he would not fight in Vietnam. Levy was not the first to 
express these ideas. Various civil rights activists and leaders had 
similarly l inked the civil rights struggle with struggles of people of color 
worldwide. Various civil rights activists and leaders had also said that 
blacks should not fight for the freedom in Vietnam that they did not enjoy 
at home. However, at the time, this probably remained a minority view 
196. In addition to the passage beginning "[w]hat if the majority of a people decide 
that Communism is good for them . . . .  " quoted above, Levy wrote, "Geoffrey these 
people may not be sophisticated (American style), but their [sic] grown men & women 
who have a right to live & choose their own government." Hancock Letter,  supra note 
157, at 8. 
197. Racial imagery regarding the Vietnamese would nevertheless play an 
important role in the court-martial. See infra notes 320-33 and accompanying text; supra 
notes 175-96 and accompanying text. 
198. This imagery was not lost on Donald Duncan, who wrote: "Many of us at the 
trial were horrified at the incipient racism contained in the lago-like-portrayal of 
Levy . . . as a sinister figure who sulked about preying on the weaknesses of 
disadvantaged people in order to subvert and disaffect them . "  Duncan, supra note 52, at 
52. 
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among blacks and in the civil rights community. 199 Of course, these 
199. The earliest movement statement linking civil rights and opposition to the 
Vietnam War was a leaflet circulated in McComb, Mississippi, under the heading "HBRE 
ARE FIVE reasons why Negroes should not be in any war fighting for America." The text 
was then published in the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party of McComb Newsletter 
in July 1965, to the chagrin of the MFDP executive committee. The leaflet, which was 
prompted by the death in Vietnam of John Shaw, a black McComb native, concluded by 
stating: 
We can write and ask our sons if they know what they are fighting for. If he 
answers Freedom, tell him that's what we are fighting for here in Mississippi. 
And if he says Democracy, tell him the truth-we don't know anything about 
Communism, Socialism and all that, but we do know that Negroes have 
caught hell right here under this American Democracy. 
The War on Vietnam: A McComb, Mississippi, Protest, in BLACK PROTEST: HISTORY, 
DOCUMENTS, AND ANALYSES 1619 TO THE PREsENT 415, 416 (Joanne Grant ed., 1st ed. 
1968). For a discussion of the McComb MFDP leaflet, see MICHAEL FERBER & 
STA UGHTON L YND, THE REsiSTANCE 3 1-33 (1971). The Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee ("SNCC"), which was closely related to the MFDP, also was a source of early 
opposition to the war. Robert Moses of SNCC, speaking at an August 1964 memorial 
meeting for James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, and Andrew Goodman, the three civil 
rights workers murdered in Neshoba County, Mississippi, specifically linked escalation 
of the war and the federal government's failure to enforce civil rights and to protect black 
Mississippians. Moses also spoke at the April 1965 antiwar demonstration in Washington. 
ld. at 29-30; ZAROULIS & SULLIVAN, supra note 33, at 41;  HOWARD ZINN, 
DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE: CROSS-EXAMINING AMERICAN IDEOLOGY 129-30 
(1990). In January 1966, SNCC released a statement expressing "sympathy with and 
support" for draft refusers, and like the McComb leaflet, linked the civil rights struggle 
with the struggle for freedom "of the colored people in . . . other countries. "  The 
statement partly paralleled the structure and themes of the Hancock letter in stating: 
The murder of Samuel Younge [a SNCC worker who was shot when he 
attempted to use a "white" restroom) in Tuskegee, Alabama is no different 
from the murder of people in Vietnam . . . .  In each case, the U.S. 
government bears a great part of the responsibility for these deaths. 
Samuel Younge was murdered because U.S. law is not being enforced. 
Vietnamese are being murdered because the United States is pursuing an 
aggressive policy in violation of international law. 
Statement on Vietnam (Jan. 6, 1966), in BLACK PROTEST, supra, at 416-17; see 
CLAYBORNE CARSON, lN STRUOOLH: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960s, 
at 186-89 (1981); see also Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25 (describing 
SNCC poster captioned "Uncle Sam Wants You, Nigger"). When SNCC communications 
director Julian Bond refused to disavow the statement, he was denied his seat in the 
Georgia House of Representatives, which he had won the previous November. Bond was 
ultimately seated in January 1967, after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in his favor. Bond 
v. Floyd, 385 U.S.  1 1 6  (1966); see also GARROW, supra note 48, at 458-59; MORGAN, 
supra note 46, at 150-61. By the summer of 1967, seventeen SNCC staff members had 
been indicted for refusing induction. FERBER & LYND, supra, at 127. For a discussion 
of SNCC and the Vietnam War, see generally CARSON, supra, at 183-89. 
Martin Luther King's public criticism of the war and calls for negotiations began in 
1965. It was, at first, couched hesitantly. His speech of April 4, 1967, at the Riverside 
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critical voices came mostly from outside the Army.200 
Church, given at the invitation of Clergy and Layman Concerned About Vietnam, was his 
most important statement on the war, his act to "break the betrayal of my own silences" 
on the war. King explicitly connected the civil rights and poor people's struggles with 
the need to oppose the war and offered "five concrete things" that the U.S. should do 
immediately to extricate itself from the war. GARROW, supra note 48, at 541-77 passim; 
YoUNO, supra note 3 1 ,  at 198-200. For the text of the Riverside Church address, see 
Martin Luther King, Jr., Beyond Vietnam, in VIETNAM AND BLACK AMERicA, supra note 
89, at 79-98. For additional criticisms of the war from within the civil rights movement, 
see Robert S. Browne, The Freedom Movement and the War in Vietnam, in VIETNAM AND 
BLACK AMERICA, supra note 89, at 61-78, and generally the essays and poems collected 
therein. 
A highly influential critic of the war was boxing's heavyweight champion, 
Muhammad Ali, who was stripped of his title and convicted for refusing induction into 
the armed forces. Ali's conviction was ultimately reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Clay, AKA, Ali v. United States,  403 U.S. 698 (1971). For discussions of the Ali case, 
see ALICE. LYND, WE. WON'T Go 226-34 (1968) (containing partial transcript of the 
administrative appeal concerning Ali's draft classification); MORGAN, supra note 46, at 
162-82 (discussing Morgan's involvement in the case). For a discussion of Ali's 
influence, especially among black Americans, see Ain 't Gonna Shuffle No More (1964-
1972), in EYES ON THE PRizE II: AMERICA AT THE. RACtAL CROSSROADS-1965 TO 1985 
(Blackside, 1989). 
For differing views on the extent of black opposition to the war from 1965 to 1967, 
compare FE.RBE.R & LYND, supra, at 30 ("By August 1965 every civil rights group was 
under pressure from below to take a stand on the war.") with GARROW, supra note 48, 
at 551-56 (discussing opposition within and without the civil rights community to King's 
stance on Vietnam) and Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25 (noting that 
most of the people in the communities where he worked supported the war, and that the 
black civil rights workers who testified on his behalf at the court-martial did so despite 
their disagreement with him on the war, and despite the risks they incurred by testifying). 
200. Private First Class James Johnson, a black soldier and one of the Fort Hood 
3, would, however, tie his opposition to the war to the civil rights struggle: 
Now there is a direct relationship between the peace movement and the civil 
rights movement. The South Vietnamese are fighting for representation, like 
we ourselves . . . .  Therefore the Negro in Vietnam is just helping to defeat 
what his black brother is fighting for in the United States. When the Negro 
soldier returns, he still will not be able to ride in Mississippi or walk down 
a certain street in Alabama. There will still be proportionately twice as many 
Negroes as whites in Vietnam. Those Negroes that die for their country still 
cannot be assured of a burial place that their family feels is suitable for them. 
Speech by PFC James Johnson, in THE. SIXTIES PAPERS: DOCUMENTS OF A REBELLIOUS 
GE.NE.RATION 308-09 (Judith C. & Stewart E.  Albert eds. ,  1984). Shortly after the Levy 
court-martial, two black Marines, Lance Cpl. William Harvey and Pvt. George Daniels, 
were convicted of violating Article 134 for telling other Marines that Vietnam was a white 
man's war in which black men should not participate, and for urging their fellow Marines 
to seek a meeting with their commander to discuss the issue. They were sentenced to six 
and ten years respectively; the sentences were later reduced to three and four years. 
United States v. Harvey, 19 C.M.A. 539, 42 C.M.R. 141 (1970); United States v. 
Daniels, 19 C.M.A. 529, 42 C.M.R. 131 (1970). The Harvey and Daniels cases are 
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The testimony of Specialist Wayne Barrows, a black Green Beret 
who received dermatology training before Levy's decision not to train, 
marked the transition from the order charge portion to the General 
Articles charges portion of the prosecution case. Barrows' testimony is 
typical of testimony that the prosecution elicited from other soldiers.201 
He described a conversation in which Levy pressed him on his reasons for 
joining Special Forces and spoke contemptuously of them.202 He added 
that Levy was critical of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Turning to the 
question of black soldiers and Vietnam, the following colloquy occurred: 
A: "He told me the colored American is discriminated 
against in the United States and America. He also 
told me that myself being a colored American should 
not fight in Vietnam because I am discriminated 
against in the United States. "  
Q: "What was your reaction to that?" 
discussed in PETER BARNES, PAWNS: THE PLIGfiT OF THE CITIZEN-SOLDIER 177-79 
(1972); Edward F. Shennan, Justice in the Military, in CONSCIENCE AND COMMAND, 
supra note 29, at 42. For a discussion of these cases focusing on the First Amendment 
issue and sympathetic to the military's position, see JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR.,  JUSTICE 
UNDER FIRE: A STUDY OF MD..ITARY LAW 152-54, 160 (1974). 
By 1969, one survey showed that nearly two-thirds of black enlisted men in Vietnam 
(and one--quarter of black officers and senior non-commissioned officers) thought that 
"their fight is in the U . S . "  Almost a third of the black enlisted men thought the U.S. 
should withdraw immediately because it had no business being in Vietnam. Wallace Terry 
II, Bringing the War Home, in VIETNAM AND BLACK AMERICA, supra note 89, at 200, 
204-05. Horace Coleman captures these sentiments in his poem, A Downed Black Pilot 
Learns How to Fty, in his closing lines: "Next time/1'11 wait and see if they've 
declared/war on me-or just America." Horace Coleman, A Downed Black Pilot Learns 
How to Fty, in CARRYING THE DARKNESS: THE POETRY OF THE VIETNAM WAR 75 (W. D. 
Ehrhart ed., 1985). 
The history of the GI antiwar movement is terribly underwritten. This oversight is 
especially pronounced in the case of black GI resistance. For a brief discussion of black 
GI resistance, see David Cortright, Black Gl Resistance During the Vietnam War, 2 
VIETNAM GENERATION 51 (1990). 
201. The testimony was atypical in one important way. Of the five, Barrows was 
the only witness who testified that Levy expressly said Barrows should not fight in 
Vietnam. The others testified somewhat more ambiguously that Levy had said that were 
he a Negro he would refuse to go to Vietnam. Record at 677 (testimony of Spc. Clifton 
H .  Davis); id. at 685 (testimony of Spc. James E. Jackson); id. at 695 (testimony of Sgt. 
John R. Ware; ambiguous testimony or a garbled transcription); id. at 739, 741 (testimony 
of Pfc. Eddie L. Cordy). 
202. According to Barrows, Levy said that Special Forces were "trained as killers 
and rapers of women. "  Record at 643. 
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A: "Well, sir. I told him where I was brought up I never 
knew any - never seen any discrimination?" 
Q: "Did he ever tell you what he would do if he were a 
colored soldier?" 
A: "He told me that if he was a colored soldier he would 
refuse to fight, sir. "203 
In addition to talking to black soldiers about the disparity between 
America's asserted aims in Vietnam and the condition of blacks in the 
United States, Levy talked to some soldiers about discrimination within 
the Army. Specialist Clifton Davis, a black Green Beret, testified that 
Levy told him that blacks were assigned the hardest duty in Vietnam and 
suffered most of the casualties.204 
Other soldiers also testified against Levy, relating his caustic 
comments about Special Forces and U.S.  involvement in Vietnam. But 
the prosecution quickly passed over that testimony in its closing 
argument, and emphasized instead Levy's conversations with a handful of 
black soldiers. That the case against Levy would be cast this way is not 
203. Id. at 644. 
204. Jd. at 676; see also id. at 685 (testimony of Spc. James Jackson). Levy's 
purported statement was grossly exaggerated, but not groundless. Martin Luther King, 
in his Riverside Church speech, put it more temperately when he said that the war was 
not only "devastating the hopes of the poor at home," but also "sending their sons and 
their brothers and their husbands to fight and to die in extraordinarily high proportions 
relative to the rest of the population. "  King, supra note 199, at 8 1 .  During the first 1 1  
months of 1966, black soldiers accounted for 22.4% o f  all Army troops killed in action 
in Vietnam, almost double the proportion of black draft-age males in the total U.S. 
population. JOHN H. FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: 
A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS 491 (6th ed. 1988). At the beginning of 1967, black 
soldiers had accounted for 20.6% of the combat dead. In response to the adverse publicity 
from civil rights leaders, the Defense Department made a conscious decision to reduce the 
proportion of black casualties, and by the war's end, the overall figure was proportionate 
·to the percentage of black draft-age males. APPY, supra note 43, at 20-21; see also 
DAVID PARKS, GI DIARY 86-88 (1968) (describing being assigned to dangerous forward 
observer job in his mortar platoon by a racist sergeant who reserved that job for black and 
Puerto Rican soldiers). 
There was much to Levy's assertion that blacks were discriminated against generally 
in the Army and in Vietnam. Studies of the military justice system showed that blacks 
were more likely to be convicted than whites, and that black soldiers were punished much 
more harshly than their white counterparts for similar offenses. BASKIR & STRAUSS, 
supra note 43, at 138-39. 
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surprising given the tone the military intelligence investigation had taken 
in the hands of the Columbia Field Office of the 1 1 1  th Military 
Intell igence Group. Once the intelligence investigation of Levy became 
fixed within a matrix of race, it was almost inevitable that the prosecution 
would remain within the same perimeters. Moreover, the prosecution 
may have recognized that without Levy's comments to black soldiers the 
Army did not have much of a case, at least for those charges that required 
a showing of a design to create disloyalty or to impair another soldier's 
performance of his duty.205 Calling a Special Forces trainee a 
"murderer[] of women and children"206 may be intemperate, but it is an 
implausible strategy for making political converts or for causing disloyalty 
or disaffection. Yet the prosecution focused on Levy's comments about 
service in Vietnam directed to black soldiers, not white ones.207 In so 
doing, the prosecution tapped into longstanding racial fears and evoked 
powerful images of insurrectionary armed blacks and of the white race 
agitator. It is a testament both to the Army Intelligence investigation's 
powerful impact on the case and to how deeply rooted the images evoked 
were within the collective unconsciousness of white America that men of 
unquestionable decency on racial matters framed the case as they did 
while other equally decent observers failed to voice any criticism.208 
205. Additional Charge I, which involved conduct unbecoming an officer and a 
gentleman (UCMJ Article 133), may be satisfied not only by disloyal statements, but by 
"[i]ntemperate, "defamatory," "provoking," "contemptuous, "  and "disrespectful" ones. 
See Appendix I, infra. 
206. Record at 700 (testimony of Spc. Warren Gerig). 
207. ld. at 732-33 (testimony of Spc. Daryl E. Radebaugh). 
208. There is no reason to question Richard Shusterman's recollection that he 
found offensive the racism, anti-semitism, and bigotry of all sorts that he saw both in the 
Army and in civilian society. See Telephone Interview with Richard Shusterman, supra 
note 127. Andrew Kopkind confused Shusterman's zealous advocacy for his client with 
a flight from moral choice under the camouflage of deference to institutional authority. 
He mistakenly assumed that Shusterman had resolved all doubts about the case in the 
name of "military necessity and good order." See Kopkind, supra note 29, at 22-23. But 
see Telephone Interview with Richard Shusterman, supra note 127 (recalling reservations 
regarding the Article 133 and 134 charges both because of First Amendment concerns and 
because of uncertainty as to whether the factual foundation for finding intent existed). Yet 
even in this uncharitable portrayal of Shusterman as a product of 1950s 
conformism-"Shusterman is Levy before Bellevue"-Kopkind nowhere suggests bigotry 
on his part. Kopkind, supra note 29, at 23. 
Yet, the prosecution's presentation of Levy as a white predator evoked racial fears 
and racist stereotypes. While the racist character ofthe prosecution's case was either lost 
on or ignored by the mainstream press, it was noted by Levy and his entourage. Let�er 
from Dr. Howard Levy to Charles Morgan, Jr. (July 27, 1967), in Levy Litigation Files, 
supra note 27 (recounting conversation with Col. Herbert); Duncan & Dunn, supra note 
25, at 50. 
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John Blassingame has identified two slave characters that pervade 
antebellum Southern literature: Sambo and Nat. 209 Southern writers 
attributed to Sambo, by far the most prevalent character, such 
stereotypical traits as indolence, childishness, docility, and musicality. In 
an effort both to rebut critics of slavery and to relieve their own anxieties, 
they also described him as faithful and loyal to the point of self-sacrifice 
on behalf of his master.210 Yet this stereotype could not hide or 
alleviate the slaveholders• endemic fear that Sambo was really Nat, a 
bold, treacherous, bloodthirsty rebel who might murder them in their 
sleep. Southern whites sought to reconcile these two images, and to 
reassure themselves by insisting that contented, docile, loyal slaves 
became rebellious only when incited by fanatical or opportunistic 
outsiders. 211 
Since colonial times, the prospect of black soldiers has raised 
nightmarish fantasies of bloody racial insurrection for some whites. 
Those images and more general doubts about the loyalty of black soldiers 
endured well into the twentieth century. They continued to spark fears 
and, at times, attacks on black soldiers. At the time of Levy's · court­
martial, this imagery had become far more potent because of the vivid 
images of race riots in American cities and expectations of another long 
hot summer in 1967. Paradoxically, these frightening images of dedicated 
insurrectionary black soldiers competed with stereotypes of black soldiers' 
incompetence or cowardice.212 
209. JOHNW. BLASSINOAMB, THESLAVE COMMUNITY: Pi..ANTATIONLIPE IN THE 
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 132-53 (1972). Blassingame identifies a third slave character, Jack, 
who appears far less frequently in this literature. ld. at 133-34. 
210. Blassingame writes: "The epitome of devotion, Sambo often fought and died 
heroically while trying to save his master's life. Yet, Sambo had no thought of freedom; 
that was an empty boon compared to serving his master." ld. at 134. 
211 .  ]d. at 142; see also HERBERT APTHEKER, AMERICAN NEORO SI..A VB REVOLTS 
105-13 (lnt'l Publishers Co. 1963) (1943) (discussing tendency to attribute insurrections 
to abolitionist "incendiaries"); KENNETH M .  STAMPP, THE PEcULIAR INSTITtrriON: 
SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOtrrH 137-38 (1956); cj Alex Lichtenstein, "That 
Disposition to Theft, with Which They Have Been BrandedH: Moral Economy, Slave 
Management, and the Law, 21 J .  Soc. HIST. 413, 426-27 (1988) (describing planter views 
regarding the disruptive consequences of slaves trading or associating with "white people 
of unexceptional character"). 
212. ARTHUR C. COLE, THE IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT 1 850-1865, at 341 (1934) 
(noting that fear ofblackjacobins alternated with assertions of black cowardice); DIOOINS, 
supra note 28, at 29; ROBERT V. HAYNES, A NIGHT OF VIOLENCE: THE HOUSTON RIOT 
OF 1917, at 57, 65 (1976); JENSEN, supra note 67, at 1 85-86; Benjamin Quarles, The 
Colonial Militia and Negro Manpower, in BLACK MOSAIC: ESSAYS IN AFRO-AMERICAN 
HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY25, 25-34 (1988) ("Slave or free, Negroes were excluded 
from the militia, save as noncombatants or in unusual emergencies. This policy of 
semiexclusion became so prevalent as to constitute a basic tenet of American military 
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The extent of concern about the loyalty and reliability of black 
soldiers can be seen in the amount of reassuring discussion that was 
dedicated to the issue in popular magazines.213 The military also 
expressly addressed popular concerns through no less prominent a 
spokesman than General William Westmoreland. In late April 1967, 
President Johnson brought General Westmoreland, then the commander 
of U.S. forces in Vietnam, back to the U .S .  for a series of appearances 
to bolster domestic support for the war. After addressing an Associated 
Press luncheon in New York, Westmoreland traveled to Columbia, South 
Carolina, the location of his mother's home and Fort Jackson.214 
Addressing the South Carolina General Assembly barely three weeks after 
Martin Luther King's Riverside Church speech condemning U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam, and fifteen days before Levy's court-martial was 
to begin, Westmoreland praised the courage, skill, and loyalty of black 
servicemen in Vietnam. 21' 
tradition."); SLOTKIN, supra note 55, at 1 14-15; Stephen G. Tompkins, Anny Feared 
King, Secretly Watched Him, MEM. COM. APPEAL, Mar. 21,  1993, at Al,  AS; Stephen 
G. Tompkins, In 1917, Spy Target Was Black America, MEM. CoM. APPEAL, Mar. 21, 
1993, at A7. 
213. See, e.g., Simeon Booker, Negroes in Vietnam: "We, Too, Are Americans, "  
EBONY, Nov. 1965, at 89; Special Issue: The Black Soldier, EBONY, Aug. 1968; 
Democracy in the Foxhole, TIME, May 26, 1967, at 15,  reprinted abridged as The 
Negro's Bright Badge of Courage, READERS DIG . ,  Aug. 1967, at 59, 59 ("In Vietnam our 
Negro troops are proving that there is no color in war; merit is the only measure of a 
man."); Only One Cowr, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 1965, at 42. These articles tended to 
advance, in addition to a reassuring message about the quality and loyalty of black 
soldiers, a pro-civil-rights message. Drawing on the melting-pot imagery of the formula 
World War II combat film, these articles often offered the hope that shared combat 
experience would help to overcome racial antagonism. 
214. At the AP luncheon, Westmoreland said that he, and the soldiers in Vietnam, 
were "dismayed . . .  by recent unpatriotic acts here at home." Text of Westmoreland's 
Address at A .P. Meeting and His Replies to Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1967, at 
A14; see also Peter Kihss, Westmoreland Decries Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1967, 
at A l .  General Westmoreland did not specify to which "unpatriotic acts" he was 
referring, but he subsequently wrote that his comments were prompted by an American 
flag burning in Central Park. GENERAL WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND, A SOLDIER 
REPoRTS 225-26 (1976). 
215. Westmoreland Hails Negro G./. , N.Y. TrMES, Apr. 27, 1967, at A10. 
Westmoreland's message and motivation were more complicated than simply attempting 
to reassure a nation historically wary of black soldiers. He had, after all, chosen to 
deliver his inclusive message about black soldiers to the all-white South Carolina 
Legislature, and in so doing gave voice to the progressive potential within the military's 
relationship to the black soldier. The day was replete with racial symbolism. Along with 
his address to the General Assembly, and his receipt of an honorary doctor of laws degree 
from the University of South Carolina, Westmoreland visited long-time family friend 
James Byrnes, the arch-segregationist former governor of South Carolina. /d. 
Westmoreland would repeat his praise for black Gls in an address to a joint session of 
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Within this context of racial fears, Captain Shusterman used his 
closing argument to construct an image of Levy as a predatory 
subversive. Levy, he argued, sought out vulnerable soldiers, found their 
weaknesses, and exploited their feel ings of racial injury in his project to 
sabotage the war effort. Indeed, this was true even of Sergeant Hancock, 
who, as a white soldier married to a black woman, had experienced 
discrimination. Hancock was especially "sensitive to" and "susceptible 
to" Levy's comparisons of the terror inflicted on American blacks and on 
the Vietnamese, as well as to Levy's suggestion that Hancock's talents 
were misdirected from the civil rights struggle.216 Even more 
susceptible to this appeal, however, were the black soldiers with whom 
Levy spoke. 
Turning from Hancock to these soldiers, Shusterman said: "The 
same appeal, the turning of a just cause into an illegal purpose is seen in 
Captain Levy's direct contact with a whole group of American Negro 
soldiers who came to him either as students anxious to learn or as 
patients. "217 Shusterman's framed Levy's conversations with black 
soldiers not as incidental conversations, or as genuine expressions of 
friendship and interest, but as cynical misuses of a just cause and an 
attempt to manipulate vulnerable prey. Repeatedly, the closing argument 
played on images of Levy stimulating and then preying on the injured 
sensibilities of black soldiers in order to subvert them. In speaking of 
Specialist Barrows, Shusterman described Levy's modus operandi: 
He walked into the office and Captain Levy approached him. 
How? First, he questioned him about his background, learning 
the same types of indicia of interest that he knew or thought he 
knew at the time he wrote the [Hancock] letter. "Where are 
you from? What kind of education do you have? Wouldn't you 
like to better your life? Haven't you felt discrimination?" The 
same questioning until he found in this man that type of appeal, 
that type of area where an appeal would be effective. 218 
Similarly, he said of Specialist Davis: "Here was a man who . . . 
casually dropped the thought that he had worked with SNICK [sic] . . . .  
Congress two days later. Tom Wicker, Westmoreland Tells Congress U.S. Will Prevail, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1967, at A l ,  A10. 
216. Record at 2554-56. Rather than saying that Treanor told Levy about 
Hancock, Shusterman says four times that Levy Mfound out" pertinent facts about 
Hancock. He thereby characterizes Levy as active in discovering Hancock's supposed 
susceptibility to a civil rights appeal. ld. 
217. ld. at 2556. 
218. Jd. at 2557. 
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Captain Levy picked that up. Here is his weakness, his sensitivity. 'I 
will get him for my cause . .,,219 
The prosecution described these black soldiers as especially 
"susceptible" or "sensitive" to Levy's appeal, a characterization that 
would resonate with the U.S. Army Board of Review, which affirmed 
Levy's conviction.220 It argued that these soldiers were easy marks for 
manipulation because of their youth and inexperience, their limited 
education and (in some cases) limited intelligence, and their feelings of 
racial injury.221 It also highlighted the disparity between Levy's rank 
and the witnesses' .  The prosecution suggested that crossing boundaries 
of rank and race implied a malign purpose. For example, the prosecution 
characterized Levy's patient, Private Eddie Cordy, as "not particularly 
bright," and said: "Surely Captain Levy wasn't interested in an abstract 
debate with this young man. "222 The implication is clear. His 
friendship was feigned. Why would someone like Levy bother to talk 
with someone like Cordy, unless in pursuit of some ulterior motive? 
Cordy, however, understood the relationship quite differently: 
Well, you know, he was different from everybody else, you 
know. Around an officer, I was still new in the Army, see, and 
around an officer, you know I assumed the at attention manner 
and everything, but he made me feel that-he would talk to you 
219. ld. at 2558. Here, as elsewhere in the closing argument, Shusterman uses 
a testimonial voice without distinguishing betwee!l actual testimony (or close paraphrase 
of testimony) and interpretive gloss. 
220. ld. ("[H]ere is a man who is susceptible."); id. ("[H)ere is his weakness, his 
sensitivity."); id. at 2559 ("an individual not particularly bright, somewhat slow, a man 
who might be particularly susceptible"); id. at 2560 ("Surely this young man was 
susceptible to having his morale affected. Here was a man who had gone AWOL . . .  a 
man not particularly bright, a man particularly sensitive to the appeal that Captain Levy 
directed to him."). In affirming Levy's conviction and sentence, the U.S.  Anny Board 
of Review echoed this characterization stating: "The statements . . . were directed to 
individuals of the enlisted grades, mostly Negro, and many of whom emotionally and 
educationally were susceptible to being influenced. "  United States v.  Levy, 39 C.M.R. 
672, 677 (1968). 
221. See, e.g. , Record at 2558 ("Here is a man at the very early stage of his Anny 
career; here is a man who is susceptible."); id. at 2559 ("And through the testimony of 
these witnesses you will recall, these are people for the most part with high school 
educations, some of them with less. You saw Specialist Jackson, an individual not 
particularly bright, somewhat slow, a man who might be particularly susceptible to this 
type of feeling."). 
222. Jd. at 2560. 
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like another EM or something. I considered him as sort of a 
friend and everything. 223 
In his closing argument, Shusterman repeatedly described Levy as 
these soldiers' "teacher" and "officer. "224 He intimated that they 
looked to Levy for guidance and for help, but that Levy betrayed their 
trust. Recognizing their vulnerability and their need for guidance, Levy 
attempted to manipulate them for his own purposes. 
This image of Levy as a subverter of the military culture, as a 
violator of the boundaries of race and rank, and as a deceptive and 
223. /d. at 739. Levy's manner with enlisted men did violate the unwritten 
protocol of the military, and struck both officers and enlisted men as unusual. In addition 
to Pvt. Cordy's testimony, see id. at 695 (testimony of Sgt. John Ware) ("Initially, I 
thought it rather strange that a man in his position would be talking about things of such 
complexity to a Private [Ware's rank at the time] . It struck me as being rather 
peculiar."). Levy's rank also affected how his comments were heard. Some witnesses 
indicated that they took Levy's comments more seriously than they would have had they 
come from a fellow enlisted man. E.g. , id. at 743 (testimony of Pfc. Cordy). 
Nevertheless, the witnesses also indicated that they were nor overawed by Levy's rank. 
Levy did not cause any witnesses to be disloyal or impair their performance of duties. 
Several of the witnesses testified to arguing with Levy vigorously. See, e.g. , id. at 712-
15 (testimony of Richard Gillum, noting, however, that he restrained himself slightly 
because of Levy's rank). Rabbi Feinstein testified that "essentially Doctor Levy has not 
incorporated into his personality the philosophy that one speaks differently depending on 
their rank . . . .  When he says something to a Private he's not saying it as Captain to 
Private, but as man to man, the same way he says it to me or to a Colonel or anyone 
else." /d. at 2041-42. Rabbi Feinstein attributed this absence of consciousness of rank 
to the peculiar status of military doctors, who (like military chaplains) hold rank without 
command. /d. 
No doubt the prosecution emphasized the disparity of rank in part to bolster its case 
on the Article 133 charges ("conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman"). The 
testimony relating to this issue and the emphasis given to it by the prosecution suggests 
that for those socialized to the mores of the military, Levy's casual familiarity with 
enlisted men and his willingness to discuss forbidden subjects with them struck at the core 
of Article 133, notwithstanding its vagueness. In discussing the case, Richard Shusterman 
contends that Levy's speech was more egregious because it was directed to enlisted men, 
and that such talk, officer to officer or enlisted man to enlisted man, might have been 
tolerated. Telephone Interview with Richard Shusterman, supra note 127. 
224. E.g. , Record at 2557 ("Captain Levy was [Barrows'] teacher. A man who 
is an officer he is expected to live up to."). This imagery of Levy as a teacher and an 
example for young troops may have had especial potency because Fort Jackson was one 
of the Army's basic training camps. Six of the court-martial members were attached to 
training brigades at Fort Jackson, and another was the Director of Training of the Third 
Army Drill Sergeants School. See Court Martial (undated), in Levy Litigation Files, 
supra note 27. At the time of the court-martial, Fort Jackson processed nearly 90,000 
recruits annually. Pat D. Kaye, Anliwar Protest Cancelled (Feb. 22, 1968}, in Levy 
Litigation Files, supra note 27 (clipping from unidentified newspaper}. 
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ruthless manipulator of vulnerable, young, mostly black soldiers, echoed 
recurring images in American, and especially southern, culture of the 
"outside agitator." These images reached back as far as the portrayal of 
the abolitionists by slavery's apologists, and the portrayal of Radical 
Republicans and "carpetbaggers" by the Redeemers.225 More recently, 
these images had been used to denigrate Communist Party activism among 
blacks, including Party involvement in the Scottsboro case, and to explain 
the civil rights movement. 226 As the court-martial approached, this 
imagery was given full play in the press. Various columnists claimed to 
see in Martin Luther King's opposition to the war the manipulating hand 
of either communists or of "well-heeled whites," who, in either case, 
were exploiting blacks as the shock troops of the anti-war movement.227 
225. See sources cited supra note 2 1 1 .  
226. MARK NAISON, COMMUNISTS IN HARLEM DURING THE DEPRESSION, at xv­
xvii (1983); CARSON, supra note 199, at 1 80-85; EAGLES, supra note 70, at 258-61;  
HUIE, supra note 70, at 130-3 1 .  In one survey conducted in December 1963, 39% of 
Northerners and 52% of Southerners surveyed agreed with the statement that '"Others' 
are really behind the Negro protest movement, while 21 % of Northerners and 27% of 
Southerners thought that those "others" were communists. Paul B. Sheatsley, lW!ite 
Altitudes Toward the Negro, 95 DAEDALUS 217, 231 (1 966). A Gallup poll in November 
of 1965 showed that 48% of those questioned thought that there was "a lot" of communist 
involvement in the civil rights movement and another 27% thought there was some 
communist involvement. Gallup Poll (Nov. 19, 1965), cited in CARSON, supra note 199, 
at 183. In Gibson v.  Florida Legislative Investigation Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 540-43 
(1963), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the contempt conviction of the NAACP 
Miami branch president for refusing to divulge membership information to a legislative 
committee. The purported state interest was to determine whether 14  people previously 
identified with the Communist Party or related organizations were NAACP Miami branch 
members. See also I.A. NEWBY, JIM CROW'S DEFENSE: ANTI-NEGRO THOUGHT IN 
AMERICA 160-61 ,  170-73 (1965) (discussing "outside agitator" figure in early twentieth 
century southern thought). 
227. For a discussion of the characterization of King's Riverside Church speech 
as the product of communist manipulation, see GARROW, supra note 48, at 554-55, 576-
77. The statement about "well-heeled whites" is from Kenneth Crawford, Let the Negro 
Do It, NEWSWEEK, May 8, 1967, at 46. In that particularly scurrilous piece, Crawford 
wrote: 
Negro activists have volunteered to spearhead the overt resistance 
movement. But they are to get covert financial support from well-heeled 
whites who disapprove of the war but prefer to have somebody else carry the 
banner. If the movement evokes a violent reaction, it will be the Negro and 
the cause of civil rights that suffer. The whites will remain safe behind their 
moneybag revetments. 
Without doubting the sincerity of King's explanation that his 
commitment to nonviolence requires him to oppose the war, it is obvious that 
less idealistic considerations entered into his decision to divert the "spirit" of 
the civil-rights movement into a new channel. And it seems to be working. 
898 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
In a trial evoking images of the white race agitator and charging 
Levy with attempting to promote disloyalty, Oedipal projections were 
inevitable. Levy was at once the rebellious son and the bad father 
portrayed in the Oedipal myth.228 His rebellion against the Army, its 
war effort, its hierarchy of rank, its political and social axioms, and its 
first principle of command and obedience, is plain. Usually, that 
rebellion was cast as the product of antiwar sentiments gone amuck, but 
at times the prosecution seemed to frame it as unreasoned rebelliousness 
flowing simply from the need to defy a father figure.229 
Because of his casual social relations with blacks and his "design" 
to plant the seeds of rebellion among black soldiers, Levy was again the 
rebellious son: a dangerous race traitor.230 But as an officer bent on 
It has tapped new sources, or retapped old sources, of the money any public 
cause must have. 
ld. Crawford saw rich whites, fearing that their sons would have to go to war, 
revivifying King and Stokely Carmichael, who were willing pawns because they 
recognized that the civil rights movement was being furthered. Crawford also suggested 
the possibility that Robert Kennedy was behind King's Riverside Church speech. ld. 
228. Cj. NORMAN COHN, WARRANf FOR GENOCIDE: THE MYTH OF THE JEWISH 
WORLD-CONSPIRACY AND THE PROTOCOLS OF THE ELDERS OP ZION 25&-68 (1967) 
(examining the Oedipal projections of the "bad son and bad father" fantasy underlying 
the myth of a Jewish world-conspiracy). 
229. In his closing argument, Shusterman said of Levy's refusal to train: 
There was the testimony of Lieutenant Wasserman, a personal friend of 
Captain Levy . . . .  He found out about the order, and Captain Levy said, "I 
had an order from Colonel Fancy, but I am not going to do it." Willful 
defiance. "Why not, Captain Levy? You know, Howard, why not do it? 
After all, you will get yourself in trouble." "I don't care; I'm not going to 
do it." Why, any explanation? No. Defiance of authority. . . . The 
testimony of Dr. Mauer to the same effect, a personal friend of Dr. Levy, 
encouraging him to do this training . . .  Dr. Levy to Dr. Mauer, "No, I won't 
do it." Any explanation? No. Defiance of authority. 
Record at 2564. The decision of the U.S.  Army Board of Review, aff11t11ing the court­
martial conviction and sentence similarly speaks of unearned rebellion: 
The record of trial in this case . . .  depicts a thirty-year-old man of better than 
average background and advantages, who agreed to serve his country for two 
years if he would be permitted first to obtain a medical degree, but who, when 
called upon to fulfill his bargain, failed miserably. 
United States v. Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672, 675 (1968). 
230. Cf EAGLES, supra note 70, at 260. Eagles writes of the shooting of two 
white civil rights workers in Lowndes County, Alabama: 
[Tom] Coleman did not shoot Ruby Sales or Joyce Bailey. Although he 
probably could not have fired at any woman, white or black, Coleman also 
knew that the two whites posed a much greater threat. He shot Daniels and 
Morrisroe because they were white men. They offended him the most. In 
Coleman's view . . .  they had grievously betrayed their race doubly by siding 
with the blacks and by associating publicly with black women. Traitorous 
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manipulating those to whom he owed leadership, he was also the bad 
father, ready to sacrifice his young to whom he owed fatherly guidance. 
From the comfort and safety of the dermatology clinic, he tried to 
ruthlessly misue black soldiers in turning them into the shock troops of 
his antiwar efforts. Notably, Levy shared his views about the war with 
officers as well as enlisted men, but he was prosecuted only for his 
statements to enlisted men. 231 
C. 1he Defense Case: Putting the War on Trial 
The Vietnam War was never at the center of the prosecution's case, 
but it was always present as a backdrop. Vietnam was a place where the 
skill and courage of young soldiers such as Hancock, Cordy, and Barrows 
would be tested, and it was therefore important that Levy nurture, not 
undermine, that skill and courage. 232 In the prosecution's case, the 
nature of the war went unquestioned . Its legality was assumed and, at 
any rate, nonjusticiable, and thus beside the point.233 
Defense counsel mimicked the prosecution's case by framing an 
alternative image of Levy. They offered a counter-story of a consummate 
civilian and doctor, who should not have been expected to adhere to, or 
even to have recognized, unwritten military norms. The defense 
portrayed a victim of Army persecution prompted by a dislike of his 
unconventional convictions.234 This comprised an attempt to weaken the 
prosecution's case by casting doubt on the prosecution's construction of 
Levy. Unl ike the prosecution, however, the defense counsel also moved 
whites threatened white don;Jinance more than insubordinate blacks because 
they represented a breach in white solidarity. 
231. E.g. , Record at 2038 (testimony of Capt. (Chaplain) Joseph H .  Feinstein); 
id. at 2346 (testimony of Capt. David J .  Travis). 
232. Record at 2555-56, 2557, 2561-62. 
233. Anticipating a defense that the war was illegal under international and U.S. 
Jaw, the prosecution prepared briefs arguing both the legality of the war and Levy's Jack 
of standing to raise the issue. See Telephone Interview with Richard Shusterman, supra 
note 127; Government Brief on the Qu.estion of the Legality of the Viet Nam War Under 
United States Constitutional Process [unsubmitted].  United States v. Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672 
(1968), appeal denied, No. 21 ,641 (C.M.A. Jan. 6, 1969) (on file with author). The 
defense did not raise the issue in the manner expected by the prosecution, and the 
prosecution apparently never submitted the briefs , which, at any rate, did not become a 
part of the appellate record. 
234. MORGAN, supra note 46, at 1 3 1 .  The defense characterization of Levy had 
a lasting impact on both Col. Brown's and Richard Shusterman's understanding of events, 
although neither would characterize his prosecution as the product of a political vendetta.  
See Telephone Interview with Col. Earl V .  Brown, supra note 45; Telephone Interview 
with Richard Shustern1an, supra note 1 27. 
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the war to the center of the case. They attempted to frame the case so 
that the war and the Army were on trial. 
The defense faced several problems as it forged its strategy. First, 
the court-martial panel would at best be baffled by, and almost certainly 
hostile to, Levy and his beliefs. Second, the defense case rested on 
arguments that were unprecedented in a military justice setting. Defense 
counsel would have to convince the law officer that the defenses were 
cognizable before they could become the bases for the stories that the 
court-martial heard. Third, unlike the prosecution, which basically had 
to tell one story that pulled together the different charges under a single, 
unified theory of Levy's motives and acts, the defense had a less tidy 
case. It would tell several stories to appeal to multiple audiences. 
In addition to the legal arguments that the defense would make with 
an eye to the reviewing courts, the defense also would address itself to 
Colonel Brown, the law officer, and to the court-martial, within the 
constraints imposed by the law officer. The defense was also aware that 
the court-martial was a political event with a larger audience. The public 
might, through the prism of the trial, come to view Levy, the Army, and 
the war differently. While it is not clear how this awareness actually 
affected the defense's courtroom conduct-indeed, it may have checked 
any inclination to politicize the trial too overtly-outside the courtroom, 
the defense aggressively attempted to influence the public's understanding 
of the case. 235 
The defense framed a strategy that would put the war on trial in two 
ways. First, it offered a defense of truth to counter the charges arising 
from Levy's statements to the Green Berets. Second, the defense sought 
to portray the order to train the aidmen as unlawful because it was 
inconsistent with Levy's understanding of medical ethics. 
235. Dr. Levy has said that he never doubted that the court-martial would convict 
him; his only concern was with the political impact of the trial. Morgan, however, 
believed that he could win an acquittal and, at any rate, recognized the need both to build 
a record for appeal and to minimize the sentence. Further, Levy credits Morgan with 
being astute and skillful in his dealings with the press, and states that because Morgan's 
mastery in that area was quickly clear to him, Morgan successfully curbed some of Levy's 
instincts to push the political message too hard. Levy also notes that Morgan quickly 
helped him to recognize that he w�uld win the political battle only if the public believed 
that he was trying to win the court battle. Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra 
note 25. For Morgan's statement that he was attempting to "build constitutional defenses 
for appeal and cut the sentence," see MORGAN, supra note 46, at 131.  
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1 .  TRUTH AND THE NUREMBERG DEFENSE 
Drawing on New York Tzmes v. Sullivan'ZJ6 and Garrison v. 
Louisiana'137 as legal support for the concept of truth as a defense, 
Levy's counsel sought to show that Special Forces were "killers of 
peasants and murderers of women and children. "'138 Morgan first 
introduced the truth defense rather casually in his cross-examination of 
Special Forces aidman Specialist Wayne Barrows. From the start the 
difficulty that he would face was apparent. '139 After taking Barrows 
through a long list of weapons to determine which ones he had been 
trained to use, 240 Morgan established that Barrows had been trained to 
use a 105 millimeter howitzer. When Morgan asked Barrows to describe 
"what the 105 [millimeter] howitzer does, "  Brown sustained the 
prosecution's objection on relevance grounds. In arguing relevance, 
Morgan said: "The man testified that Dr. Levy told hiin that special 
forces were killers of women and children. I'm trying to demonstrate 
what the 105 howitzer does . "  In again sustaining the prosecution's 
objection, Brown stated that while Levy's subjective belief might be 
relevant, the objective truth of his statements was not.241 In an out-of-
236. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
237. 379 u.s. 64 (1964). 
238. Levy's asserted defense stretched the meaning of Sullivan and Garrison. 
Unlike those cases, which dealt with libel, the Article 134 prosecutions were basically for 
incitement, and nothing in Sullivan or Garrison suggested that incitement could not be 
prosecuted if it relied on truthful statements for its effect. The Article 1 3 3  
prosecutions raised a somewhat different issue, and Morgan's argument that truth-telling 
about public issues could never be "dishonorable" or "conduct unbecoming" ought to have 
been taken more seriously. Finally, some of the particular offenses charged in the 
specifications for Additional Charge I included the making of "defamatory" statements. 
Regarding those offenses, the argumentthat Garrison should govern, while debatable, was 
quite strong. 
239. An indication of the defense's casual preparation for this part of the case can 
be seen in Morgan's statement: "We raised the defense of truth on the statements . . .  
that special forces were killers of women and children. I think that is explicit in this kind 
of warfare, and I think the court could almost take judicial notice of that." Record at 
949. By then Brown had rejected the truth defense, but he also indicated that he thought 
that Levy's statements implied more than just that civilians get killed in modem wars. 
Jd. The defense also sought to subpoena Col. Francis J .  Kelly, the Commander of Special 
Forces in Vietnam. The value of this strategy, aside from the political impact of putting 
Kelly on the stand, was that he would have had knowledge relevant to both the truth and 
medical ethics defenses. Brown denied the request. Jd. at 835. 
240. Morgan was establishing the cross-training of Green Beret aidmen to bolster 
both the truth defense and the medical ethics defense by showing that the aidmen were 
primarily combat soldiers. 
241. Record at 651. The prosecution immediately sought an out-of-court hearing 
on the relevance of Levy's subjective beliefs, arguing that they were similarly not a 
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court hearing on the first morning of the defense's case, Brown again 
ruled that the objective truth of Levy's statements was not a defense to the 
speech charges. He further stated that neither Levy's subjective belief 
that the statements were true, nor his belief that the order was unlawful, 
was a defense, but that either might be adduced in mitigation of his 
sentence. 242 
Then, unexpectedly, the case took a remarkable turn. In the course 
of his ruling, Brown, having just stated that the order to train was 
presumptively legal, began to talk of Nuremberg: 
Now the defense has intimated that the special forces aidmen are 
being used in Vietnam in a way contrary to medical ethics. My 
research on the subject discloses that perhaps the Nuremberg 
Trials and the various post war treaties of the United States have 
evolved a rule that a soldier must disobey an order demanding 
that he commit war crimes, or genocide, or something to that 
nature. However, I have heard no evidence that even remotely 
suggests that the special forces of the United States Army have 
been trained to commit war crimes, and until I do, I must reject 
this defense. 243 
Perhaps Brown meant nothing more by his injection of the 
Nuremberg principles than to explain why evidence of Levy's subjective 
belief that Special Forces were being trained to commit war crimes would 
be admissible in mitigation of sentencing.244 But Brown had thought a 
lot about Nuremberg. As a law instructor at West Point in the late 1940s, 
he had often discussed the implications of the Nuremberg and Tokyo war 
crimes trials with his students and colleagues. The movie Judgment at 
Nuremberg245 had made a lasting impression on him. He had read a 
number of law review articles about the Nuremberg trials. He had doubts 
about the wisdom, if not about the legality, of the Vietnam War. And 
defense to either the order or the speech charges. Brown accepted the prosecution's briefs 
and deferred a ruling on the issue until the beginning of the defense case. /d. at 654-62. 
During the defense's cross-examination of Spc. James Jackson, who wa.s not a Green 
Beret, the prosecution raised no objections when Morgan adduced Jackson's testimony that 
he had killed a woman in Vietnam and had seen a child killed there. /d. at 686-87. 
242. ld. at 874-76. 
243. /d. at 875. 
244. /d. This is the point Brown immediately went on to make. 
2�5. (Roxlom Films 1961). 
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Brown was worried about how he might be judged if he foreclosed any 
ventilation of the issues that Levy raised.246 
As Morgan pondered how he could go about proving a Nuremberg 
defense, Shusterman and Brown debated the boundaries of the Nuremberg 
principles, until Brown stated that if the aidmen were being "trained to 
commit war crimes, then I think a doctor would be morally bound to 
refuse" to train them. 247 Shusterman objected: "There has been not 
even an intimation of that in this case," and Brown agreed that "the issue 
· has not been raised. "248 Morgan took the plunge: "It is about to be I 
think. "249 ' 
Morgan would later write: "We were fresh out of defenses. "250 
Brown had denied Levy his truth defense, and had expressed doubt that 
Levy's concerns about medical ethics were relevant for any purpose 
beyond sentence mitigation. 251 Before the trial, the defense rejected the 
Nuremberg defense as "infeasible" and likely to antagonize the court­
martial. 252 Now it asked for an extra day to prepare the defense. 
Matching Morgan's matter-of-fact tone, Brown granted the request.253 
246. Telephone Interview with Col. Earl V. Brown, supra note 45. There seems 
also to have been an element of calling the defense's bluff. See Record at 948-49. 
247. · Record at 878. Brown quite consciously described this as a moral duty, 
leaving the legal question ambiguous. 
248. ld. at 879. 
249. ld. 
250. MORGAN, supra note 46, at 135. 
251. Record at 874-75. 
252. MORGAN, supra note 46, at 136. Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra 
note 25. Captain Sanders considered the possibilities of challenging the legality of the war 
or of Special Forces conduct in Vietnam in a memorandum to Morgan. Sanders 
concluded: 
Of course, it taxes credibility too severely to believe that such defenses, 
even if the facts on which they are based are proved true beyond a shadow of 
a doubt, would ever be recognized in a military court. But the reasons are far 
more of practical expedience than of theory. The Nurenberg [sic] Trials 
demonstrated the necessity that the courts at least admit that such defenses 
should exist, regardless of whether the judge would ever have the courage, 
shall I say the word, to hold that the prosecution of a particular war is illegal 
and that, therefore, a soldier may refuse to obey orders designed to further 
that war or that because certain individuals or groups in the military forces 
have committed war crimes, that an officer could refuse to train other persons 
who are members of the group. 
Memorandum from Capt. Charles M .  Sanders to Charles Morgan, Jr. 6 (Apr. 4, 1967), 
in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27. 
253. Record at 893; see also id. at 950. Morgan had previously asked for a recess 
until the following Tuesday, to allow him. to gather his witnesses, including one coming 
from Vietnam. After the Nuremberg issue was raised, Brown agreed to extend that recess 
until Wednesday, giving the defense a week to prepare. 
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New York Daily News reporter Anthony Burton captured some of the 
madness of the moment in writing with deadpan understatement that 
Morgan "must return to court next Wednesday with any witnesses or 
evidence he can find. Prosecutors at the Nurnberg [sic] war crimes trials 
had longer. "254 Finally, Brown indicated that he wanted to assess the 
war-crimes testimony out of the hearing of the court-martial . The 
Nuremberg defense would go to the court-martial only if the defense 
made a prima facie showing that Special Forces policy was to commit war 
crimes.255 
While the defense was delighted that Brown had introduced the 
Nuremberg defense, they also recognized how narrowly he had bounded 
it by requiring a showing "that the special forces of the United States 
Army have been trained to commit war crimes. "256 Brown 
characterized the defense position as saying that U.S.  involvement in 
Vietnam "is wrong, immoral, and illegal, "257 but he did not intend to 
entertain claims of this sort. His statement that "I know of no court, 
civilian or military, that is going to sit in judgment on the President's 
exercise of his power in disposing the troops of the United States, "258 
resolved all doubts as to the imposed limitations on the defense. Later, 
Brown added that he was "almost ready to take judicial notice" that the 
aidmen were not committing war crimes. 259 Thus, the limited scope of 
Levy's Nuremberg defense resulted from the restrictions of time and 
subject matter placed on his counsel by the law officer and not, as Donald 
Duncan and Andrew Kopkind would later surmise, from restrictions 
placed on the defense by the ACLU Board.200 
254. Anthony Burton, Levy Asks Peace Units for "War Crime • Data, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS, May 19, 1967, at 10. 
255. Record at 880-81. 
256. /d. at 875. 
257. /d. at 876. 
258. /d. at 875-76. 
259. /d. at 947. 
260. Duncan & Dunn, supra note 25, at 56; Kopkind, supra note 29, at 25-27. 
The case did create an uproar within the ACLU, and Vietnam would remain a divisive 
issue within the ACLU beyond the Levy case. WALKER, supra note 131 ,  at 271-72, 279-
87; Report Prepared by Edward Ennis, ACLU General Counsel, on United Stales v. Levy 
(May 29, 1967), in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27; Memorandum from "The 
Office" to the Board of Directors, ACLU (June 1 ,  1967), in Levy Litigation Files, supra 
note 27; Minutes, Executive Committee Meeting, ACLU (May 26, 19''7), in Levy 
Litigation Files, supra note 27. Despite the dissension over whether the ACLU ought to 
directly represent clients like Levy in cases that raised controversial non-civil liberties 
issues, and over whether the ACLU should issue a statement distancing itself from Levy's 
defense on the non-free-speech issues, the Board accepted its obligation not to bring these 
issues to the public consciousness while the court-martial was in progress, for fear that 
it would jeopardize the defense. The documents in the ACLU file show considerable 
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The defense was unprepared for the challenge of building a 
Nuremberg defense because they had ruled it out early on and did not 
anticipate that Brown would thrust it upon them. As Laughlin McDonald 
and Charles Sanders prepared to go to Fort Bragg to study Special Forces 
training manuals, Morgan appealed to critics of the war to come forward 
with war-crime evidence. 261 The next few days produced feverish 
activity as the defense sought out potential witnesses, mostly from the 
antiwar movement and the press. They were deluged by documents and 
offers to testify. Rumors abounded that Jean-Paul Sartre, Bertrand 
Russell, Mary McCarthy, Martin Luther King, and high officials in the 
NLF might testify.262 In the end, given Brown's constraints on the 
Nuremberg defense, few of the offers were material . Overwhelmed by 
the response, Morgan issued a press release on May 23, clarifying that 
despite Levy's opposition to the war, the testimony that the defense 
intended to offer would relate only to "the role of Special Forces in [land] 
warfare. "263 
When the out-of-court hearing reconvened on the morning of May 
24, the defense had found three witnesses. Two of them, Donald Duncan 
and Robin Moore, arguably knew as much about Special Forces in 
Vietnam as anyone outside the military, the Defense Department, and the 
CIA.264 Duncan was a former Special Forces Sergeant, who became 
uneasiness within the organization about the Levy case, but do not support the contention 
that the ACLU interfered with or narrowed the Nuremberg defense. According to Levy, 
the dissension within the ACLU had no influence on how the Nuremberg defense was 
presented. "fl1hat's not what happened with Nuremberg . . . .  There's no way Chuck 
could've held me back had we had more of an opening [from Brown] . . . .  There's no 
way he would've been held back." Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25. 
261. MORGAN, supra note 46, at 137-38; Homer Bigart, Captain's Trial Opened 
to 'War Crime' Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1967, at A2; Anthony Burton, Levy Asks 
Peace Units for "War Crime " Data, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 19,  1967, at 10. 
262. Kopkind, supra note 29, at 25; Burton, supra note 254, at 10. None of these 
officials testified. Sartre sent a supporting telegram, and Russell sent a crate of 
documents from the International War Crimes Tribunal that he had convened in Stockholm 
that May, but the documents arrived too late to be incorporated into the Nuremberg 
defense. MORGAN, supra note 46, at 138-39. 
263. Statement by Charles Morgan, Jr. 1 (May 23, 1967), in Levy Litigation Files, 
supra note 27; Captain Asserts the Green Berets Are His Target, Not U.S. Policy, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 24, 1967, at A3. ' 
264. For discussions of the relationship between Special Forces and the CIA in 
Vietnam, see generally DONALD DUNCAN, THE NEW LEOIONS {1967); ROBIN MOORE, 
THE GREEN BERETS (1965); JEFF STEIN, A MURDER IN WARTIME: THE UNTOLD SPY 
STORY THAT CHANGED THE COURSE OF THE VIETNAM WAR {1992); WESTMORELAND, 
supra note 214, at 106-09; see also Record at 959 (testimony of Robert L. Moore, Jr., 
better known as Robin Moore); id. at 996 (testimony of Capt. Peter G. Bourne); id. at 
1013 (testimony of Donald W. Duncan). 
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disaffected while serving in Vietnam and resigned from the Army. 
Writing of his experience in the leftist and antiwar journal Rampans, he 
declared that the U.S. justifications for involvement in Vietnam as support 
of ' "the. aspirations and desires of the Vietnamese people,' was a lie," 
since "the vast majority of the people were pro-Viet Cong and anti­
Saigon. "265 Duncan became the military editor of Rampans, and at the 
time of the court-martial he was awaiting publication of his book, 1he 
New Legions, which dealt with U.S.  involvement in Vietnam, Duncan's 
experiences in Special Forces, and the effects of militarism on American 
society. 266 Duncan had turned down a request to testify on behalf of the 
Fort Hood 3 at their court-martial, and was reluctant to testify for 
Levy. 'lf>? According to Morgan, Duncan was eventually persuaded to 
testify by various supporters within the peace movement.268 
The idea of using Robin Moore as a witness apparently came from 
Duncan, who accurately predicted that Moore would unwittingly be an 
excellent defense witness.269 In 1962, Moore, a public relations 
director of the Sheraton Hotels, convinced a military aide to Vice 
President Johnson to help him get permission to undergo Special Forces 
training and to visit several Green Beret encampments in Vietnam. His 
research culminated in a bestseller, 1he Green Berets .Z10 Like Duncan, 
Moore had a new book coming out, 1he Country Team, and Morgan 
lured Moore through his publisher, who "shrewdly inferred that the trial 
was a talk show where competing books might be reviewed or 
discussed . "271 
The defense did not need to lure their third witness, Captain Peter 
Bourne, an Army psychiatrist about to leave the service. While stationed 
in Vietnam, Bourne had studied the effect of combat stress on Green 
Beret A-team members.272 Upon first reading about the case, Dr. 
Bourne wrote to Levy, hinting that he would like to help with his 
defense.273 Though anxious about the trustworthiness of this "so 
265. Duncan, supra note 52, at 21-22. 
266. See DUNCAN, supra note 264. 
267. Conversation with Stanley Faulkner, Counsel for the Fort Hood 3 (undated 
notes), in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27. 
268. MORGAN, supra note 46, at 140. 
269. Conversation with Donald Duncan (undated notes), in Levy Litigation Files, 
supra note 27. 
270. MOORE, supra note 264. Moore describes how he came to write the book 
at id. at 1-5; see also Record at 956-57 (testimony of Robin Moore); Kopkind, supra note 
29, at 25. 
271. MORGAN, supra note 46, at 140. 
272. PETER G. BOURNE, M.D.,  MEN, STRESS, AND VIETNAM 103-25 (1970). 
273. Record at 1001 (testimony of Capt. Peter G. Bourne); Interview with Dr. 
Howard B. Levy, supra note 25. 
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smooth and so slick" expert on Special Forces who had fallen into their 
laps, the defense brought Bourne to Fort Jackson to bolster the medical 
ethics defense.274 When Nuremberg entered the case, Bourne's 
knowledge of Special Forces in Vietnam made him an obvious choice as 
a witness. The defense's hoped-for fourth witness, Associated Press 
correspondent Malcolm Browne, did not materialize.275 
In addition to the witnesses' testimony, the defense submitted 
Duncan's Rampans article and Moore's book.276 Columbia University 
industrial engineering professor Seymour Melman, who had been 
collecting newspaper accounts reporting U.S.  violations of the law of land 
warfare in Vietnam, worked with Ramona Ripston of the New York Civil 
Liberties Union to organize more than 4,000 such articles to be submitted 
as exhibits .m These articles included accounts of Special Forces 
violations of the law of war, but were by no means limited to instances 
involving Special Forces. They were proffered to establish Levy's 
knowledge of a pattern of war crimes and to stretch the confines of 
Brown's narrow framing of the Nuremberg defense by placing Special 
Forces conduct in the larger context of U.S.  military policy in Vietnam. 
With these materials, the defense submitted a brief prepared with the help 
of Richard Barnet of the Institute of Policy Studies, and Princeton 
international law professor Richard Falk, a leading critic of the war's 
legality. 278 The brief outlined relevant provisions of the law of war and 
provided Levy's proof on the war crimes issue.279 The defense also 
274. "So . . .  this guy's a Green Beret, comes out of the clear blue sky; that seems 
too good, somehow." Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25. 
Notwithstanding their anxiety, the defense recognized that they had to take a chance on 
Bourne. ld. ("I mean, the guy writes to you with those credentials, we weren't going to 
tum our back on him."). 
275. Witness Lists for Out-of-Court Nuremberg Hearing (undated notes), in Levy 
Litigation Files, supra note 27. Browne authored THE NEW FACE OP WAR (1965). 
276. Moore claimed that the book, with the exception of the last chapter, recounted 
actual events, but that for a variety of reasons he had decided to present them in the genre 
of fiction. He writes: "You will find in these pages many things that you will find hard 
to believe. Believe them. They happened this way. I changed details and names, but I 
did not change the basic truth. "  MOORE, supra note 264, at 1 1 .  Peter Bourne testified 
at the court-martial that he had either witnessed or heard about events similar to those 
described in Moore's book. The Pentagon was furious with Moore after the book's 
publication, charging numerous breaches of security. HELLMANN, supra note 57, at 53-
54. 
277. MORGAN, supra note 46, at 139. Melman's compilation of newspaper articles 
was subsequently published. See IN THE NAME OP AMERICA (Seymour Melman ed., 
1968). 
278. Appellate Exhibit 19, Memorandum on the Law of War and Defendant's 
Offer of Proof of War Crimes, in Record, vol. 16. 
279. /d. 
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submitted a list of thirty-eight people to be subpoenaed should Brown 
determine that a prima facie case existed, permitting the Nuremberg issue 
to go to the court-martial. These were mostly "reporters, photographers, 
doctors, and members or former members of the armed forces," who, 
according to the defense, had witnessed the commission of war 
crimes.280 To Shusterman's dismay, Morgan also requested permission 
to take depositions in Vietnam.281 
The defense hinged its showing of war crimes on the Army's 
manual, The Law of Land Warjare,282 published "to provide 
authoritative guidance to military personnel on the customary and treaty 
law applicable to the conduct of warfare on land. "283 The testimony 
and documentary evidence showed specific violations of several laws of 
war described in The Law of Land Warfare, committed either b y  Special 
Forces or by their Vietnamese counterparts (the LLDB, and strike forces), 
whom the Special Forces trained and advised and with whom they 
fought. 284 The violations they described included assassinations and 
placing a "price on the enemy's head,"  mutilation of the dead, forcible 
removal and resettlement of civilians, wanton destruction of civilian 
homes and property, torture and summary execution of prisoners, and 
impressment of civilians. Arguably, using weapons that caused 
unnecessary suffering, such as the M- 1 6  rifle and white phosphorous, also 
constituted violations. . 
What is remarkable about the Nuremberg hearing, beyond its having 
occurred at all, are the diverging interpretations of what occurred and 
what was shown. Ira Glasser, the Associate Director of the New York 
Civil Liberties Union, certainly a partisan, but nevertheless thoughtful and 
280. /d. at 15. 
281. Shusterman had a young child, and his wife was sick and pregnant. He did 
not relish the prospect of going to Vietnam for depositions. Telephone Interview with 
Richard Shusterman, supra note 127. Morgan specifically mentioned wanting to take the 
deposition of Col. Francis J.  Kelly, Commander of Special Forces in Vietnam. Record 
at 1047. Brown had previously denied Morgan's request to subpoena Kelly. /d. at 835. 
282. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956) 
(hereinafter THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE}; see also IN THE NAME OF AMERICA, supra 
note 277, at 45-54 (reproducing table of contents and selections from the Anny Field­
Manual). 
283. THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 282, 1 1 .  
284. Nothing in this discussion should be understood to imply that one side had 
a monopoly on war crimes in Vietnam. It is important that we not forget that the PLAF 
and North Vietnamese also committed atrocities, as did the other forces in Vietnam. Cf. 
Staughton Lynd, The War Crimes Tribunal: A Dissent, LmERATION, Dec. 1967-Jan. 
1968, at 76-79 (criticizing the Russell International War Crimes Tribunal for refusing to 
investigate the war crimes committed by both sides). Suffice it to say that the law of war 
does not recognize a defense of "the other side was doing it too," and as a nonnative 
matter, the argument that the enemy's war crimes licensed our own is gossamer-fine. 
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general! y careful in his discussion of the Nuremberg defense (and of other 
aspects of the case), concluded that the defense proved several violations 
of the law of war.285 A perhaps equally partisan but less thoughtful 
Time article proclaimed that "[t]o the surprise of almost no one, [the 
Nuremberg defense] failed dismally," having produced no evidence of 
Green Beret crimes.286 Brown, conceding only a bit more than Time, 
ruled that "[w]hile there have been perhaps instances of needless brutality 
in this struggle in Vietnam about which the accused may have learned 
. . .  there is no evidence that would render this order to train aidmen 
illegal on the grounds that eventually these men would become engaged 
in war crimes. "287 
Perhaps such polarized interpretations were inevitable, given the 
national rift over the war and the symbolic potency of the Nuremberg 
principles. Certainly, given the setting, the limitations placed on the 
defense, the difficulty of finding people who would confess to committing 
war crimes, and the infeasibility of developing the case in a week, 
Brown's ruling hardly seems surprising. Yet, even if the outcome was 
preordained, the expression of that outcome and the differing 
interpretations of what the defense showed owed much to the old frontier 
myth of the Indian fighter and the new frontier myth of the Green Beret. 
Having initially chosen not to challenge the legality of the war, the 
defense had l ittle time to craft its story in preparation for the Nuremberg 
hearing. It did, nonetheless, have a story to tell.  Now cast in the role of 
prosecutor, the defense had to show a pattern of Special Forces violations 
of the law of war. It did so by emphasizing the image of Special Forces 
as ruthless pragmatists, rule-breakers, and dirty fighters . In other words, 
the defense portrayed the Special Forces as modern-day Indian fighters, 
whose success resulted from their willingness to adopt the methods 
ascribed to the enemy and to ignore the restraints of "impractical" 
civilized authority, far removed from the real war. This image was 
double-edged, however. Juxtaposed against the law of war, the image 
exposed a dark underbelly of the counterinsurgency doctrine, and the 
casualness with which it discarded as soft-hearted and impractical the 
285. Ira Glasser, Judgment at Fort Jackson: The Court-Martial of Howard B. 
Levy, 4 LAW IN TRANSITION Q. 123, 145-46 (1968). Glasser was one of the people 
dispatched by the New York Civil Liberties Union to assist the defense. MORGAN, supra 
note 46, at 139 n, * .  A non-lawyer, Glasser wrote the best analysis of the applicability 
of the law of land warfare to the acts described at the Nuremberg hearing, notwithstanding 
his occasional factual misstatements. 
286. Men at War, TIME, June 2, 1967, at 15-16. The following week, Tune added 
that Levy "appeared more often stricken by confusion than conscience." Guilty as 
Charged, TIME, June 9, 1967, at 33. 
287. Record at 1049. 
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limited achievements of international law in curbing some of the worst 
barbarities of war. Yet it was precisely this disregard for the rules, along 
with cunning and extraordinary skill, that rendered first the Indian fighter 
and the gunfighter and then the Green Beret cultural icons and heroes. 
Morgan readily established the theme of Special Forces as flouting 
the ordinary rules of war. Asked "[i]s there any way to fight Guerrilla 
warfare by the rules?," Robin Moore responded: "Not that I know of. 
I have never seen it work yet. "288 Removing any doubt as to the 
meaning of Moore's statement, Morgan elicited Moore's assertion that 
assassination "is an integral part of guerrilla warfare. "289 Morgan 
amplified this theme in the following exchange with Donald Duncan: 
Q: "Can you teach guerrilla warfare without teaching the 
application of terror?" 
A:  "I can't-1 can't see how it is  done, and this is  the 
thing we used to talk about at the warfare school at 
Fort Bragg. We at that time used to state that we 
were trained in all the aspects of guerrilla warfare 
. . . and assassination and terror, and the application 
of these things are an integral part of guerilla 
warfare. "290 
Some of the testimony regarding violations of the law of war were 
destined to fall on deaf ears given our high tolerance for the shocking in 
a post-Dresd.en, post-Hiroshima world.291 Some of the rules do seem 
antiquated, intended, as Guenter Lewy argues, "for very different 
weapons in a very different world. "292 Thus, while both the Hague 
288. ld. at 968. 
289. ld. 
290. ld. at 1 024. References to Special Forces links to the CIA in Vietnam may 
have further enhanced this characterization of Special Forces. See id. at 959 (testimony 
of Robin Moore); id. at 996 (testimony of Capt. Peter G. Bourne). 
291. The Vietnam War nevertheless produced its share of shocking images, such 
as those of a terrified girl burned by napalm and running naked to escape the fighting near 
An Loc; of General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, head of the South Vietnamese National Police, 
summarily executing a handcuffed People's Liberation Armed Forces suspect in Saigon 
during the Tet offensive; and of the ravine full of dead bodies at My Lai. Film images of 
American casualties, both of the returning dead, and, perhaps more horrifically, of news 
broadcast images from the field of battle of the wounded, played a major role in 
ultimately turning popular opinion against the war. 
292. LEWY, supra note 3 1 ,  at 224. I do not mean to suggest that war was in any 
sense more civil and less brutish in some bygone era. 
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Convention293 and The Law of Land Warfarf?l prohibit weapons that 
cause unnecessary suffering, the defense could not have been surprised 
that Brown did not see war crimes in American use of either the M-16 
rifle,295 when other "legal" weapons were just as capable of ripping a 
body apart, or in using white phosphorous, 296 when other weapons 
destroyed property just as extensively or caused equal agony to their 
victims. Testimony that the Special Forces forcibly relocated civilians 
and destroyed their villages and crops had no greater impact on 
Brown.297 
Other testimony described acts that could not so easily be dismissed 
as the unfortunate results of military necessity. The Law of Land Warfare 
293. Hague Convention, Oct. 18,  1907, annex. no. IV, art. 23(e), reproduced in 
1 THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 627 (Oxford University Press edition, 1907). 
294. THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 282, 1 34. 
295. The arguments aboutthe M-16 rifle stem from its high-velocity bullets, which 
sometimes explode upon impact and pivot or "tumble" through the body. The bullets 
cause a wound similar to those caused by "dum-dum" expanding bullets, expressly 
prohibited by the 1899 Hague Convention. See Record at 960 (testimony of Robin Moore 
that he had seen photographs of people hit in the heel by an M-16 round and killed); id. 
at 1005 (testimony of Capt. Peter Bourne regarding tumbling effect of M-16 bullet); id. 
at 1018-19 (testimony of Donald Duncan: "I have seen this little bullet actually take off 
a man's leg, with one bullet . . . .  I hit a man in the chest with one of these bullets at very 
short range and he just had no chest left. "); see also IN THE NAME OF AMERICA, supra 
note 277, at 271-73. Arthur Danto has noted the paradox that "[t]he M-16 rifle, our 
routine infantry issue, has been ruled out on humane grounds for use against big game in 
all fifty states." Arthur Danto, On Moral Codes and Modern War, in WAR, MORALITY, 
AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION 481-82 (Malham M. Wakin ed., 1979). 
296. White phosphorous, an incendiary weapon, was used to mark targets and 
provide smoke screens, but was also used to bum houses and huts, often together with 
napalm. LEWY, supra note 3 1 ,  at 243. In addition to the physical destruction caused by 
white phosphorous, fragments of it that lodged in the body would continue to burn 
(because it could burn almost anaerobically) until they were extracted. See Record at 
1021 (testimony of Donald Duncan); id. at 961 (testimony of Robin Moore); IN THE 
NAME OF AMERICA, supra note 277, at 271 (quoting a Journal of the American Medical 
Association article relating the problem of continuing tissue destruction until all 
phosphorous is extracted).  The Law of Land Warfare permitted the use of incendiaries 
under some circumstances, but not their indiscriminate use. See LEWY, supra note 3 1 ,  
at 247. 
297. See Record at 966 (testimony of Robin Moore); id. at 993-94, 999, 1008-09 
(testimony of Capt. Peter G. Bourne); see also IN THE NAME OF AMERICA, supra note 
277, at 131-52, 305-4 1 .  But see Record at 970 (cross-examination testimony of Robin 
Moore, stating that strike forces often voluntarily move themselves and their families into 
camps for protection). Contra Appy, supra note 43, at 226-27, 288-89 (on voluntariness 
of relocation to refugee camps). These acts were implicated in THE LAW OF LAND 
WARFARE, supra note 282, 11 56, 58, 281, 504(j), as well as in provisions of the 1907 
Hague Convention and the 1949 Geneva Convention. 
9 1 2  WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
prohibits "putting a price on an enemy's head,"  and mutilating the 
dead.298 Both Moore and Duncan testified that it was common practice 
to pay a bounty to the strike forces for their kills; to ensure that the 
bounty was earned, the practice was to pay only for the number of ears 
delivered by the strikers?}'} While mutilation of the dead (or the dying) 
began as a way of keeping a tally, it was often used to terrify the enemy 
or as an outlet for sadism. 300 
The Law of Land Warfare also prohibits the assassination of enemy 
soldiers or civilians.301 Duncan and Moore both described assassination 
as an integral part of Special Forces guerrilla-warfare training.302 
Asked about assassination teams, Moore indicated that their targets were 
often the political, not military leadership of the enemy: "If you have a 
political chief, say in Vietnam, and you know that . . . he is damaging 
our effort, it only makes sense to assassinate him if possible. "303 Asked 
about Special Forces' role in training these teams, Moore replied: "I  
know of an instance where special forces are giving this advice. Thank 
God they are, because, the Vietnamese do a pretty botched up job of it 
left to their own advice. "304 
298. THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 282, ,, 3 1 ,  504(c). 
299. Record at 965 (testimony of Robin Moore); id. at 1036 (testimony of Donald 
Duncan); MooRE, supra note 264, at 35-37 (offer of bounty and display o f  collection of 
ears); id. at 136-37 (payment for kidnapping of PLAF officer). 
300. Record at 964 (testimony of Robin Moore) (describing significance of 
decapitation to Buddhists); id. at 1036 (testimony of Donald Duncan); see also IN THE 
NAME OF AMERICA, supra note 277, at 61-66. One incident that Duncan discussed with 
the defense but did not describe at trial involved a Vietnamese officer who, frustrated with 
an unsuccessful interrogation, cut out the gall bladder of a prisoner (to be worn later as 
an amulet) as two Green Berets looked on. DUNCAN, supra note 264, at 1 80-82; Notes 
on Testimony of Donald Duncan and Dr. Peter Bourne (undated), in Levy Litigation 
Files, supra note 27. 
301. THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 282, 1 3 1 .  
302. Record at 957 (testimony of Robin Moore); id. at 1012 (testimony of Donald 
Duncan); MOORE, supra note 264, at 5-6. 
303. Record at 968. By 1965, Special Forces was involved in the predecessor of 
the CIA's Phoenix program, which was an effort to "neutralize" the "Viet Cong 
infrastructure" ("VCI") and which would result in the killing of 20,000 supposed 
members of the VCI from 1968 to mid-1971. See YOUNG, supra note 3 1 ,  at 212-13. See 
generally STEIN, supra note 264. The defense could not have anticipated the ultimate 
scope of that "counter terror" program. They did have some inkling, however, that 
Special Forces-sponsdred assassinations were not uncommon. See Conversation with 
Donald Duncan (undated notes), in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27 ("Appel [sic], 
R.W., Jr. [referring to N. Y. Times correspondent R.W. Apple, Jr.] The best kept secret 
in Vietnam-SF trained assassination teams to work w/ pacification teams to kill 
uncooperative village chiefs.").  
304. Record at 968-69. Moore added that "[i]t is a necessity of winning a war." 
Id. For additional enthusiastic discussion of assassination teams, see id. at 978 (testimony 
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At its most riveting, the Nuremberg testimony focused on the 
mistreatment and murder of unarmed suspects and prisoners. Donald 
Duncan testified that while he was accompanying a strike force patrol, the 
strike force, under the pretext of capturing "Viet Cong suspects," forced 
civilians to carry the patrol's supplies and equipment and abused them 
psychologically and physically. When these civilians were no longer 
needed for their labor, they were no longer deemed to be suspects and let 
go.305 
Still more dramatic was the testimony of torture and murder. 
Duncan testified that while Special Forces doctrine favored the use of 
psychological methods of interrogation, Special Forces training also 
included torture techniques. He explained that Special Forces were taught 
that it is impossible to resist interrogation by a determined interrogator. 
A course called "countermeasures to hostile interrogation" was ostensibly 
for the purpose of teaching Special Forces what they might expect if 
captured. In reality, teacher and students alike understood that the course 
was designed to teach physical methods that might be useful where 
psychological techniques were impractical. 306 
of Robin Moore). 
305. ld. at 1025-26. For prohibitions of such conduct, see THE LAW OF LAND 
WARFARE, supra note 282, 11 266, 271 , 504(m). 
306. Record at 1015-16. Duncan gives a more detailed description in The New 
Legions. DUNCAN , supra note 264, at 156-6 1 .  There he describes the following 
exchange between a student and the instructor: 
"Sergeant Lacey, the name of this class is 'Counter-measures to Hostile 
Interrogation,' but you have spent most of the period telling us there are no 
counter-measures. If this is true, then the only reason for teaching them, it 
seems to me, is so that we'll know how to use them. Are you suggesting we 
use these methods?" 
The class laughs, and Lacey looks down at the floor, creating a dramatic 
pause. When he raises his head, his face is solemn but his deep-set eyes are 
dancing. "We can't tell you that, Sergeant Harrison. The Mothers of 
America wouldn't approve." The class bursts into laughter at the sarcastic 
cynicism. "Furthermore, "  a conspiratorial wink, "we will deny that any such 
thing is taught or intended. "  
ld. at 159. Duncan stated that he had both taken and taught the class on torture. Record 
at 1015-16. Later, other Vietnam veterans who had been interrogators would tell very 
similar stories of what James Gibson has described as the "dual structure" of the Army's 
intelligence curriculum, "a 'legal' education in the formal educational materials, and an 
illegal education taught orally by instructors. "  GIBSON, supra note 192, at 183-85. Inga 
Markovits describes a quite similar dual structure in the instruction of East German 
judges. The East German Supreme Court would issue "Guidelines" or "Viewpoints" 
regarding noncontroversial matters to help direct lower court judges and prosecutors. 
Policy directives that dealt with more ticklish matters or that contravened the formal 
protections of East German law, such as the policy of denying the protections of the Labor 
Code to people who had applied for exit visas, were hidden as part of the oral instruction 
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Moore, Bourne, and Duncan each told of the nearly universal Special 
Forces practice �f turning prisoners over to their South Vietnamese 
counterparts or to the ClOG, even though it was understood that once 
handed over, prisoners would be tortured and, frequently, murdered.307 
Often these prisoners were tortured in the presence of Americans. While 
they may have found torture distasteful and counterproductive, Special 
Forces soldiers acquiesced in the practice and continued to turn prisoners 
over to the Vietnamese. Duncan stated that " [t]he normal practice was 
when it started you turned around and lit a cigarette. "308 Moore 
attempted to explain this acquiescence: 
I have seen torturing, but if an American was present, . . . the 
only way he was allowed to express dissent and even though it 
was his camp, . . .  the only recourse allowed him by our own 
rules was that he could walk out on it. . . .  So if he did any 
more than that, if he tried to stop the Vietnamese [camp 
commander] chances were he would be relieved and his career 
would suffer and also it would cause an incident between the 
Vietnamese senior corps and American. 309 
Yet, when asked by Morgan whether he had any knowledge of any Green 
Beret who had been punished for attempting to stop the torture of a 
prisoner, Moore had to acknowledge that he knew of no such case.310 
Prisoners can be a liability in counterinsurgency warfare. Their 
intelligence value may be offset by their taxing of limited supplies and 
of East Gennan judges. lnga Markovits, Last Days, 80 CAL. L. REv. 55, 82-85 (1992). 
307. Record at 964-65 (testimony of Robin Moore); id. at 995 (testimony of Capt. 
Peter Bourne); id. at 1013-14, 1021-22 (testimony of Donald Duncan); see also MooRE, 
supra note 264, at 39-43, 46-47, 80, 229; IN THB NAMB OP AMERICA , supra note 277, 
at 58-61 , 66-87; Duncan, supra note 52, at 21 . For further examples, not contained in 
the court-martial record, see DUNCAN, supra note 264, at 166-69, 179-82. Article 12 of 
the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War limits the 
circumstances under which a country that has captured prisoners of war may transfer them 
to another country's control, and specifically requires that the capturing country satisfy 
itself of the transferee's willingness to abide by the Convention. Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 12; see also THB LAw op LAND 
WARPARB, supra note 282, 1 88. The Law of Land Warfare treats complicity in the 
commission of war crimes as a war crime. See id. 1 500. Numerous paragraphs deal 
with the treatment of prisoners of war, outlawing torture, cruel treatment, and putting 
prisoners to death summaril y. See, e.g. , id. 11 89, 90, 93, 118,  128, 175,215, 270, 271, 
502. 
308. Record at 1014. 
309. ld. at 972-73. 
310. ld. at 976-77. 
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tendency to impede a patrol's mobility in enemy or contested 
territory. 311 Duncan testified that in his training he was taught "to 
avoid taking prisoners as much as possible," and that those taken and not 
converted to our side had to be "eliminated. "312 Asked if he had ever 
been told to dispose of prisoners, Duncan recounted one mission behind 
enemy lines where the team inadvertently took two prisoners on the first 
day. This jeopardized the mission, so Duncan radioed back for 
instructions. Duncan was told to " [g]et rid of them," and when he 
instead returned with the prisoners he was reprimanded for not killing 
them.3t3 
Sometimes the killing was in revenge for a village's support of the 
PLAF (the so-called Viet Cong) or motivated by pure sadism, rather than 
by a tactical purpose. Bourne described an instance where his patrol 
captured a village known to be harboring PLAF or their sympathizers. 
After suspects were weeded out and other villagers were given some time 
to gather belongings, the houses were set afire to ensure that the PLAF 
could not use the village. Bourne angered the LLDB lieutenant by 
rescuing one man who had been tied up and left to burn to death in a hut. 
Bourne filed a report on the incident, but was told by the Special Forces 
captain in charge, "Don't rock the boat . "  The captain explained that 
while he would be happy to pass the report up the chain of command, 
"As soon as it gets to the Special Forces Corps advisor, he will just have 
to ignore it. "314 
Although the defense was able to develop negative images by 
demonstrating Special Forces' violations of the law of war, their 
construction of Special Forces as rule breakers evoked positive images as 
well. Special Forces' willingness to cast aside the restrictions of the law 
and traditions of war (or of one set of traditions of war) placed them in 
the mythic tradition of the frontier fighter and ranger. 315 Throwing off 
the constraints of the somewhat effete, Europeanized metropolis, they 
became pragmatic innovators who embraced the methods of the "savage" 
enemy, thereby appropriating his power for themselves.316 When one 
3 1 1 .  The Law of Land Warfare nonetheless prohibits killing prisoners "even in the 
case of . . .  commando operations." THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 282, 1 
85. 
3 12. Record at 1021-22. 
3 1 3 .  ld. at 1016-17; see also id. at 995 (Capt. Peter Bourne testifying that the 
Vietnamese felt that there was no value in torturing "hard core VC" and that the 
Vietnamese would usually "kill them immediately"). 
3 1 4 .  ld. at 993-95. 
3 1 5 .  See SLOTKIN, supra note 55 passim. Slatkin also specifically addresses the 
"ranger mystique." Id. at 453-6 1 .  
316. ld. at 455. The apotheosis o f  this mythic imagery i n  recent American culture 
is the ex-Green Beret John Rambo. For a discussion of Rambo as an expression of the 
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of Robin Moore's Green Beret captains was forced by his new, "in the 
country for one week," B-team superior to divulge an intelligence source 
to his Vietnamese counterpart, leading inevitably to the source's death, a 
Green Beret intelligence specialist "grunt[ed] in disgust. . . .  'It takes a 
good B-tearn commander a couple of months, sometimes more . . . to 
learn when not to go strictly by State and Defense Department 
policy.'"317 Only then was he ready to fight a dirty war. 
Richard Slatkin writes that at the core of the frontier myth was the 
myth of "savage war." In the wilderness, temporarily separated from the 
metropolis, the American would regress to a more primitive state, and 
struggle both against a hostile environment and a primitive but relentlessly 
savage people in a savage war, leading ultimately to triumph and 
"regeneration through violence." Savage wars are especially horrifying 
and bloodthirsty struggles that result from " ineluctable political and social 
differences-rooted in some combination of 'blood' and culture-[that] 
make coexistence between primitive natives and civilized Europeans 
impossible on any basis other than that of subjugation. "  The savagery of 
the natives necessarily provokes an in-kind response; the rules of civilized 
society, including the law of war, must be temporarily set aside. In the 
face of native savagery, these wars "inevitably become 'wars of 
extermination. '"318 To Americans culturally nourished on the 
struggle of the wilderness against the metropolis and of his ongms in the "liberal 
aspirations of the Kennedy era," see John Hellmann, Rambo 's Vietnam and Kennedy 's 
New Frontier, in INVENTING VIETNAM: THE WAR IN FILM AND TELEVISION 140, 141 
(Michael Anderegg ed.,  1991). The contrast between European and American fighting 
styles is a recurrent strand in American folklore and literature. See HELLMANN, supra 
note 57, at 28-29. 
317. MOORE, supra note 264, at 105. 
318.  SLOTKIN, supra note 56, at 53 ("'Savage war' was distinguished from 
'civilized warfare' in its lack of limitations of the extent of violence, and of 'laws' for 
its application."); SLOTKIN, supra note 55, at 10-12. Slatkin notes that the image of the 
Indian savage was such that death was more welcome than capture and therefore: 
"Military folklore from King Philip's War to Braddock's Defeat to Custer's Last Stand 
held that in battle against a savage enemy you always saved the last bullet for yourself." 
I d. In The New Legions, that tradition is echoed by the Special Forces instructor teaching 
the course in counter-measures to hostile interrogation: "If you are operating a guerrilla 
net in a foreign country, you must not be taken prisoner . . . .  You will be interrogated 
by experts . . . .  I recommend that those of you who are Catholics and have scruples about 
taking a pill try to make a break and get yourselves shot. " DUNCAN, supra note 264, at 
157. 
One important difference between savage war and the counterinsurgency war of 
Special Forces in Vietnam was that in its counterinsurgency phase, the war was never 
conceived of as a war of extermination. Instead, its premise was that the hearts and 
minds of the Vietnamese could be won, leaving the NLF and its insurgents isolated. The 
war took on the coloration of a war of extermination only after the build-up of 1965, and 
the accompanying strategic transformation from a counterinsurgency to a war of attrition. 
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Hollywood Western and the frontier myth, Vietnam looked l ike one more 
recurrence of the frontier cycle. Philip Caputo captures these beliefs in 
A Rumor of War when he writes: 
As for the United States, we did not call it "the World" for 
nothing; it might as well have been on another planet. There 
was nothing familiar out where we were, no churches, no 
police, no newspapers, or any of the restraining influences 
without which the earth's population of virtuous people would 
be reduced by ninety-five percent. It was the dawn of creation 
in the Indochina bush, an ethical as well as geographical 
wilderness. Out there, lacking restraints, sanctioned to kill, 
confronted by a hostile country and a relentless enemy, we sank 
into a brutish state. 319 
The image of the Green Beret as frontier Indian fighter did more than 
simply loosen the restraints of the law of war-it evoked images of the 
Vietnamese as the savage, primitive Other. 320 These images were 
reinforced by the prosecution's response to the Nuremberg testimony: an 
effort to distance Special Forces and the Army from the acts of their 
Vietnamese counterparts. Repeatedly, the prosecution elicited agreement 
from the defense witnesses that the savagery they described were acts of 
See sources cited supra note 60. 
319. PHU..IP CAPUTO, A RUMOR OF WAR, at XX (1977}, quoted in APPY, supra 
note 43, at 252. 
320. The linkage between Indian savagery and that of the Vietnamese enemy is 
quite stark in John Wayne's loose adaptation of Moore's book in the film version of THE 
GREEN BERETS (Warner Bros. 1968). When the Chief of a Montagnard village refuses 
to cooperate with the "Viet Cong," the Chief and various other villagers are brutallly 
murdered and the young men are forced to join the communist forces. The enemy's 
depravity is symbolized by the fate of the Chiefs young granddaughter, who is carried 
off into the woods by five Viet Cong soldiers where, we are to presume, she is repeatedly 
raped and then murdered. The sight is apparently so ghastly that the Green Beret medic 
who finds her will not let the antiwar journalist, who has attached himself to the A-team, 
see her body. The film audience is similarly spared. Here, Wayne repeats a familiar 
trope from two John Ford/John Wayne Westerns, RIO GRANDE (Republic 1950) and THE 
SEARCHERS (Warner Bros. 1956). For a discussion of the use of this convention in those 
films to represent the Indian enemy's "horror," see SLOTKIN, supra note 55, at 361, 465-
66. Soon after this incident, when the Viet Cong overrun the strike force camp that the 
Green Berets are protecting, they are shown looting the bodies of the dead over the din 
of "war whoops, "  a scene reminiscent of the Hollywood western. This construction of 
the Vietnamese as Indians was not reserved for the enemy. Tl171e 's annonymous reviewer 
noted that "Berets even has the South Vietnamese talking like movie Sioux: 'We build 
many camps, clobber many V.C. '" Far from Vietnam and Green Berets, TIME, June 2 1 ,  
1968, a t  84 (quoted i n  HELLMAN, supra note 57, at 91). 
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the LLDB or the strike force and that they had not seen Special Forces 
soldiers engaged in atrocities. There was no testimony that Special 
Forces soldiers had mutilated the enemy dead. Special Forces soldiers 
did not go out on assassination team missions.321 They did not torture 
or murder prisoners. 322 To be sure, American soldiers sometimes 
witnessed these acts, but as helpless bystanders, not participants. 323 
Indeed, Robin Moore would testify that the American presence had a 
moderating effect on the Vietnamese inclination toward brutality.324 
The image that emerges from this attempt to separate Special Forces 
from these acts portrays the Vietnamese as the barbaric, alien, Oriental 
Other. In his examinations of Moore and of Bourne, Brown referred to 
the "endemic" propensity toward torture and the "rather careless attitude 
toward life," which "seems to cover all [the indigenous people] of 
Southeast Asia. "325 Moore, after playing on the image of the savage 
Orient where "brutality . . .  is a way of life," volunteered, "there seems 
to be something in the brain cells of the people over there that this is part 
of the game. "326 
In reviewing the Nuremberg hearing, Ira Glasser writes: 
The chilling fact is that the army does not deny the existence of 
war crimes; it simply denies its responsibility for such crimes, 
despite the clear requirements of its own written law. The army 
continues to protest that American soldiers do not themselves 
practice torture or commit murder, as if that alone released 
them from all charges of complicity . . . .  
. . . And so the Special Forces do not practice torture in 
Vietnam. Torture just happens, murder just happens, war 
321. Record at 978 (cross-examination testimony of Robin Moore). 
322. /d. at 972-73, 979 .(cross-examination testimony of Robin Moore); id. at 1004 
(examination of Capt. Peter G. Bourne by law officer); id. at 1 027 (cross-examination 
testimony of Donald Duncan). 
323. For conflicting testimony regarding the extent that LLDB control over the 
camps was real or nominal, compare id. at 973 (testimony of Robin Moore) with id. at 
995-96 (testimony of Capt. Peter G. Bourne). 
324. Id. at 975. 
325. /d. at 979, 1000. Morgan reports that Bourne paused and stared at Brown 
before "icily" responding: "I gathered that this sort of feeling was regarded in some way 
as a defense to what the Japanese did in World War II, but I think we judge [sic] them 
by our standards then and I suppose this is how we judge incidents now." MORGAN, 
supra note 46, at 144 (quoting Record at 1000). For a discussion of the use of similar 
imagery to depict the PLAF and to justify U.S. involvement in Vietnam, see SLOTKIN, 
supra note 55, at 527-28. 
326. Record at 973. 
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crimes just happen. No one does it; no one is responsible. It's 
called complicity and, in many ways, it is the major unpunished 
crime of our century .327 
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Glasser is  correct in his characterization of the intellectual gymnastics 
the Army engaged in to say, "This is not our act."  The same rationale 
allowed Brown to agree that while there may have been instances of 
unnecessary savagery, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that 
Levy, or the Army, needed to worry about entanglement with war crimes. 
Yet, by likening this distancing to the protests of the Nazi bureaucrat, as 
Glasser does, he may understate the degree of Special Forces and U.S.  
complicity in these atrocities.328 For Levy's Nuremberg hearing 
contained evidence not simply of acquiescing in, but of directing the 
brutal acts of Vietnamese. 
The Nuremberg hearing illustrated a kind of division of terror. 
United States forces used such "legal" terrors as free fire zones, napalm, 
white phosphorous, defoliation, fragmentation bombs, the torching of huts 
with Zippo lighters, and massive air strikes on populated target areas. 
Our allies were relegated to such terrors as mutilation, assassination, and 
the torture and murder of prisoners. We achieved a kind of savage war 
by proxy. U.S.  forces were not merely helpless onlookers, but benefitted 
from the brutal acts of their Vietnamese or strike force counterparts. 
While Americans might have considered Vietnamese torture techniques 
to be unrefined, they thought that the information gleaned was useful all 
the same. 
Moreover, the testimony showed that, at least sometimes, this 
. division of terror was deliberate, and the brutality of our counterparts was 
at our direction. This does not mean that U . S .  forces corrupted a gentle, 
pacific people. Certainly, the Vietnamese were capable of brutality 
without instruction by Americans, the French, or the Japanese.329 Yet, 
327. Glasser, supra note 285, at 154. 
328. To be sure, Glasser's comparison is not with just any Nazi bureaucrat. The 
elided text in the passage quoted above is: 
Adolf Eichmann lodged a similar protest at his trial in Jerusalem; "With the 
killing of Jews I had nothing to do. I never killed a Jew, or a non-Jew for 
that matter-I never killed any human being. I never gave an order to kill 
either a Jew or a non-Jew; I just did not do it." 
ld. at 154 (quoting testimony of Adolf Eichmann, quoted in HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN 
IN JERUSALEM 1 9  (1963)). Glasser's discussion seems to encompass not only the 
Eichmanns, but those who are much more remote and yet ultimately necessary for the 
commission of mass crimes. ld. at 154-55. 
329. See, e.g., NEIL SHEEHAN, A BRIGHT SHINING LIE: JoHN PAUL VANN AND 
AMERICA IN VlETNAM 101-10 (1988) (describing use of torture, as well as indiscriminate 
bombing, and Vann's belief that t.iese activities were both immoral and 
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the reason Montagnard strikers returned to camp with their victims' ears 
was not because of something coded "in the[ir] brain cells," but because 
Americans paid piece rate and demanded confirmation of their kills. 
Special Forces did teach assassination and other "counter terror" 
techniques. Duncan testified that in Special Forces training, teachers 
emphasized that it was important to avoid the appearance that U.S.  
soldiers were involved in torture or murder because of the racial 
resentment such involvement would generate. 330 Writing of the incident 
when he was told to "get rid of" prisoners he had taken while on a 
mission, Duncan recalls that when he returned to base a major told him, 
"You know we almost told you right over the phone to do them in." 
When Duncan said that he could not have done that and would have 
refused, the major responded: "Oh, you wouldn't have had to do it; all 
you had to do was give them over to the Vietnamese. "331 Duncan 
bluntly described American direction of torture in 1he New Legions 
(which had not been published and was not in evidence at the Nuremberg 
hearing). He quotes his instructors in countermeasures to interrogation 
as having said: 
When you are in a foreign country as part of a guerrilla 
organization, you will not be doing the interrogating. Your job 
is to teach the various methods of interrogation to your 
indigenous counterpart. It would be very bad form for you, as 
an outsider, to do the questioning-especially if it gets nasty. 
The forces opposing your guerrillas will probably be native, be 
the same color, have the same religion. If you display a 
willingness to harm the natives, even though they are the 
enemy, it could be misunderstood by your guerrillas as 
prejudice. The indigenous guerrilla leader must believe that the 
idea for a course of action comes from himself; your control 
must be by suggestion_332 
counterproductive). For a critical discussion of the tendency of some on the antiwar left 
to project the idealized image once reserved for America onto the NLF and North 
Vietnamese, and onto third world liberation movements more generally, see GITLIN, supra 
note 27, at 261-63, 270-74. 
330. Record at 1015, 1022. 
3 3 1 .  Duncan, supra note 52, at 21.  I n  his Ramparts article, Duncan wrote of the 
emphasis that his instructors put on the need not to be saddled with prisoners. "We were 
continuously told 'You don't have to kill them yourself-let your indigenous counterpart 
do that. ' "  He adds: "I know of a couple of cases where it was suggested by Special 
Forces officers that Viet Cong prisoners be killed. "  /d. at 14, 2 1 .  
332. DUNCAN, supra note 264, a t  159. The instructor also taught that prisoners 
may need to be disposed of: "[A]gain, this must be done by the indigenous leader. " ld. 
at 161.  
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The defense was unable to show that this division of terror, while 
partly real, also masked the reality of American brutality. Descriptions 
of Vietnamese savagery were in part a strategy of projection to help 
Americans evade responsibility for their participation in a savage 
war. 333 As the returned soldiers testified at the Vietnam Veterans 
Against the War Winter Soldier Investigation334 and at the Dellums 
Committee Hearings on War Crimes in Vietnam,335 the Vietnamese held 
no monopoly on brutality. While it was contrary to official military 
dogma, U.S.  soldiers sometimes tortured prisoners.336 Christian Appy 
notes that: "Mutilation was not universally practiced by American 
infantrymen; but in some units it was common-place, and most combat 
veterans at least witnessed it. "337 And the rape and indiscriminate 
killing of Vietnamese civilians were commonplace enough to make My 
Lai remarkable for its scale, but not for its occurrence. 338 Yet, these 
veterans most importantly tried to show that there was no clean or 
unsavage side to the division of terror. As Appy writes, the deaths of at 
least a half-million Vietnamese civilians were not "unfortunate accidents 
[but the] inevitable result of American military strategy. "339 
Some of the evidence that the defense offered during the Nuremberg 
hearing was little more than a description (sometimes a hearsay 
description) of what might be an isolated incident. As a law officer, 
Brown knew that individual soldiers sometimes violated the law of war, 
and that the military prosecuted them for their offenses. He could easily 
assimilate isolated bad acts to his image of the U.S.  military as a lawful 
333. APPY , supra note 43, at 253; cf SLOTKIN, supra note 55, at 12-13 
(describing process of scapegoating Indians "for the morally troubling side of American 
expansion"). 
334. THE VIBTNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR, THE WINTER SOLDIBR 
INVESTIGATION: AN INQUIRY INTO AMERICAN WAR CRIMES (1972). 
335. THE DELLUMS COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON WAR CRIMES IN VIETNAM: AN 
INQUIRY INTO COMMAND REsPONSIBILITY IN SOUTHEAST AsiA (Citizens' Commission of 
Inquiry eds. ,  1972). 
336. See GIBSON, supra note 192, at 1 82-87. 
337. APPY, supra note 43, at 265; see also PARKS, supra note 204, at 95, 108-09 
(describing incidents of mutilating the dead); John Balaban, Mau Than, in CARRYING THE 
DARKNESS, supra note 200, at 9, 10 ("One counts the ears on the GI's belt."). The 
practice of collecting ears and fingers of the dead had become so prevalent that in October 
1967, Gen. Westmoreland issued a directive to all commanders ordering that steps be 
taken to end it. LEWY, supra note 3 1 ,  at 329. Nevertheless, the practice continued with 
such sufficient regularity that in 1971, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division was 
compelled to outline a written policy on how to handle customs seizures of body parts. 
MICHAEL BILTON & KEVIN SIM, FOUR HOURS IN MY LA! 367 n.* (1992). On the 
prevalence of this practice during World War II, see DOWER, supra note 175, at 63-7 1 .  
338. APPY, supra note 43, at 268-77. 
339. ld. at 8. 
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participant in the war. Other evidence, such as the testimony regarding 
the M-16 rifle, put into question universal U.S.  military practice. But the 
law of war held the rifle to such vague and seemingly inapt standards as 
the prohibition of weapons that caused "unnecessary suffering," which if 
applied in this case might have led to paradoxical results. It was unlikely 
that the fitness of the M-16 rifle would be settled in this forum.340 
Brown may also have been inclined to discredit Donald Duncan's 
testimony. At the end of Duncan's testimony, Brown asked him if the 
point of his Rampans article was that we were supporting the wrong side 
in Vietnam.341 
Nevertheless, the defense offered substantial evidence that certain 
violations did occur, not as deviations from the norm but as routine 
practice. Certainly this was true with regard to the treatment of prisoners 
and the American practice of turning prisoners over to an ally whom we 
knew would not abide by the standards of the Geneva Conventions. 
Certainly it was also true of paying bounties for kills and the concomitant 
encouragement of mutilation. Significant evidence seemingly showed that 
Special Forces taught and counseled assassination. 
Other grounds might have foreclosed the Nuremberg defense. It 
could have been argued that the Geneva Conventions were largely 
inapplicable to South Vietnam and U.S.  conduct in South Vietnam, 
especially as it affected civilians. However, the U.S.  did not adopt that 
position.342 Appl ication of the Nuremberg principles to Levy would 
arguably extend them beyond existing precedents because of his attenuated 
relationship to Special Forces conduct in Vietnam.343 Yet, instead of 
340. At the same moment, the M-16 was under attack by critics who claimed that 
it tended to jam and fail in battle. See William Beecher, Marines ' Chief Defends the M-16 
Rifle, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1967, at A3; Dick Elliot, Ml6: Combat Weapon, Center of 
Controversy, COLUM. S.C. STATE, May 28, 1967, at 7; Eugene B. Sloan, Levy Trial 
Issue: Ml6, COLUM. S.C. STATE, May 28, 1967, at I ,  7. 
341.  Record at 1040. 
342. For a discussion of the competing views, see LEWY, supra note 3 1 ,  at 224-
28; TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAOEDY 130-34 
(1970). 
343. Telford Taylor argues this position, likening Levy's invocation of Nuremberg 
as a basis for his refusal to train to that of a hypothetical cook who might refuse to feed 
aidmen at Fort Jackson because of their conduct in Vietnam. TAYLOR, supra note 342, 
at 164. The analogy is inapt because unlike the cook's act of feeding, Levy's act in 
training the aidmen is directly related to their combat roles in Vietnam, since the purpose 
of requiring the training was to facilitate their political and military mission in Vietnam. 
The cook analogy would have been better suited had Levy refused to treat aidmen. 
Notwithstanding the argument that Taylor frames, the question of how attenuated a 
relationship would still support invocation of the Nuremberg principles was not a trivial 
one. Taylor was quite sympathetic to Levy's medical ethics defense. Id. at 164-65. 
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grounding the denial of the defense in one of these arguments, Brown 
simply ruled that Levy had failed to make a prima facie showing. 
Perhaps, then, I.F. Stone was right in cautioning that the invitation 
of the Nuremberg defense "looks like a trap. "344 Certainly, the 
constricted nature of the Nuremberg defense that Levy was permitted to 
raise and the lack of time to develop the case gives hindsight support to 
Stone's view. As Levy recalls: "If I had to prove that the whole war was 
in violation of [the Nuremberg principles], that would've been simple as 
pie . . . .  To prove that the special forces medics were violating . . .  that's 
drawing the net pretty finely. "345 
Yet, if it was a trap, it was not deliberately set. "Nuremberg" 
carried with it connotations of Nazis and Nazi atrocities, and in so doing 
set too high a threshold. Certainly few Americans could accept an 
analogy likening U.S.  behavior to the Nazis.346 Indeed, Americans 
would find it hard to believe that we could be capable of atrocities of any 
sort.347 As Edward Opton and Robert Duckles showed in their study 
of psychological defenses employed in the aftermath of the My Lai 
revelations, a characteristic American response was disbelief that " [o]ur 
boys would[] do this. "348 Against this backdrop of strong psychological 
incentives for denial, two intellectual forces helped to doom the 
Nuremberg defense. On the one hand, the defense's failure resulted from 
the construction of the war, of ourselves, and the Vietnamese within 
which Brown, and at that time, most Americans, were prepared to hear 
Levy's arguments. War was brutal , we told ourselves. And wars like the 
one in Vietnam were especially savage. But the savagery was not our act; 
it came from them. On the other hand, the defense failed because of the 
awe and trepidation that any court (even one not presided over by a judge 
344. I. F. Stone, The Meaning of the Nuremberg Issue in the Capl. Levy Court 
Martial, I.F. STONE'S WEEKLY, May 29, 1967, at 2. 
345. Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25. 
346. Some within the new left embraced this analogy in adopting the Germanic 
spelling "Amerika. "  See GITLIN, supra note 27, at 288, 408; CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE 
TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRITICS 494 (1991). Their rhetoric was 
neither illuminating nor likely to persuade the unconverted. 
347. See ZAROULJS & SULLIVAN, supra note 33, at 352-53 (describing minimal 
interest in the findings of the Russell tribunal and in In the Name of America). 
348. Edward M. Opton, Jr., & Robert Duckles, II Didn 'l Happen and Besides, 
They Deserved It, in CRIMES OF WAR 441, 441 (Richard A. Falk et al. eds., 1971) 
(condensed version of a study published by the Wright Institute under the title MY LAJ: 
IT NEVER HAPPENED AND BESIDES, THEY DESERVED IT (1970)); cf DOWER, supra note 
175, at 61 ("The Japanese public was not completely unaware of brutal behavior by 
Japanese troops abroad. . . . To the majority of Japanese, as to the Anglo-Americans, 
atrocities committed by one's own side were episodic, while the enemy's brutal acts were 
systematic and revealed a fundamentally perverse national character."). 
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who regarded the President as his Commander-in-Chief) would feel 
having been asked "to sit in judgment on the President's exercise of his 
power in disposing the troops of the United States . "349 
2. MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE CRITIQUE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY 
[T]here is every possibility of a positive use of Special Forces 
in underdeveloped areas, in the manner of the 'Colonel 
Hillandale' of The Ugly American, who had such a great 
personal influence on Asian people by offering medical aid to 
their children. 3so 
Like the prosecution, the defense attempted to tell a story built upon 
its characterization of Levy. Of course, unlike the prosecution, the 
defense described Levy not as a subversive, but as a good doctor. In its 
attempt to defend Levy's refusal to teach Special Forces aidmen on 
medical ethics grounds, the defense told a story of Levy as a caring and 
dedicated doctor.351 According to that story, Levy, true to the precepts 
of his profession and to his oath as a doctor, refused to compromise his 
duty as a healer or to facil itate the misuse of his medical knowledge. In 
framing its story this way, the defense evoked popular images of the 
doctor as a dedicated healer. 352 
The defense described three ethical objections to training the aidmen. 
First, the aidmen's intrusion into the dermatology clinic threatened the 
privacy of Levy's women patients and those patients seeking treatment for 
venereal disease. 353 Levy's other objections bore directly on the way 
349. Record at 876. 
350. GeorgeJ .  W. Goodman, The Unconventional Warriors, EsQUIRE, Nov. 1961, 
at 128, 130. On the influence of William Lederer and Eugene Burdick's novel, The Ugly 
American, on U.S.  foreign policy and counterinsurgency doctrine, see HELLMANN, supra 
note 57, at 3-38; SLOTKIN, supra note 55, at 447-53. 
351 . See, e.g., Record at 610-11 (testimony of Capt. Ivan Mauer, describing Levy 
as an excellent doctor and teacher); id. at 2035 (testimony of Capt. Joseph H .  Feinstein, 
noting his satisfaction with Levy as a physician); id. at 2084-85 (similar testimony of 
Capt. Ernest Porter); id. at 2181 (testimony of Capt. Robert Petres); id. at 2628-29 
(statement of Individual Counsel (Morgan) before sentencing deliberations). 
352. On the image of the doctor in popular culture, see generally RICHARD 
MALMSHEIMER, "DOCTORS ONLY": THE EVOLVING IMAGE OF THE AMERICAN 
PHYSICIAN (1988); JOSEPH TUROW, PLAYING DOCTOR: TELEVISION, STORYTELLING, AND 
MEDICAL POWER (1989). Respondents to a survey conducted in 1961 indicated that they 
were considerably more satisfied with and admiring of their own doctor than they were 
satisfied with and admiring of the medical profession overall. Richard Carter, �at 
Women Really Think .About Their Doctors, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Aug. 1961, at 60. 
353. For the defense's developmentofthis aspect of Levy's medical ethics defense, 
see Record at 250-51 ,  263-64, 273-74, 506-13 (cross examination of Col. Fancy); id. at 
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in which Special Forces employed the aidmen in Vietnam (and potentially 
elsewhere). The defense showed that the aidmen, unlike other medical 
corpsmen, performed a medical role similar to doctors, and portrayed 
them as lacking the necessary knowledge and skill to avoid great medical 
mischief. Finally, the defense argued that the aidmen were more than 
merely medically incompetent. As warriors and participants in civic 
action, the aidmen conflated the rol� of combatant and medic in violation 
of the Geneva Conventions and medical norms prohibiting the 
subordination of medicine to political and military goals. Consequently, 
the aidmen practiced a politicized, distorted form of medicine. This last 
defense argument suggested a broad critique of counterinsurgency 
doctrine. While focused on medical civic action programs, it suggested 
more broadly that the benevolent facade of counterinsurgency's civic 
action hid a raw exercise of power and imposition of American will 
throughout the world. The subordination of medicine to political and 
military ends was inimical both to medicine and to the freedom of those 
receiving America's supposed beneficence. 
As noted above, the defense argued that the aidmen were 
incompetent to perform their medical role in Vietnam. That role was first 
to administer to the medical needs of their A-team and their Vietnamese 
counterparts. They also had a critical civic action mission, to provide 
medical care in the villages and hamlets of the contested countryside. 
The trial testimony made plain two distinctions between the aidmen and 
other medics: aidmen were not limited in their medical role to providing 
first aid, and they generally operated without a doctor's supervision. The 
defense distinguished between first aid-limited, stabilizing care for 
emergency situations-and more advanced medical skills. Defense 
witnesses testified that the former should be universally taught, while the 
latter should not be taught indiscriminately because of the potential for 
misuse.354 The course coverage for aidmen at Fort Jackson indicated 
615-16 (cross examination of Capt. Ivan Mauer); id. at 1079-94 (testimony of Dr. Robert 
W. Ball, Director, Division of Venereal Disease Control, S.C. Board of Health); id. at 
1094-2005 (testimony of Mrs. Matjorie Helton); id. at 2005-1 1  (testimony of Mitchell R. 
Helton). Developing this as an important part of the ethics defense bolstered the defense's 
portrayal of Levy as a good and caring doctor. Nevertheless, privacy appeared to be a 
secondary aspect of Levy's objection to the training program for aidmen. Indeed, during 
the period before Levy banished the aidmen from the dermatology clinic, he had dealt 
with this issue without incident by simply excluding the aidmen from the room when he 
examined a woman patient or took her medical history. Record at 701 (testimony of Spc. 
Warren Gerig). 
354. See, e.g., Record at 2070-71 (testimony of Capt. Ernest Porter: "I interpreted 
their role to be as corpsmen, first aidmen"; "as first aid corpsmen, they had no need for 
a stethoscope or a ophthalmoscope which involved certain diseases that require a doctor's 
attention . . .  they had too little background of education, and medicine itself, to be able 
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that they were being prepared to do more than render first aid.355 The 
dermatology training that Fancy ordered Levy to give the aidmen evinced 
a similar expectation regarding the role of aidmen in Vietnarn.356 
Witnesses agreed that Special Forces aidmen in Vietnam were 
permitted to do things that only a doctor could do in the United States, 
though they disagreed about the conclusions that one should draw from 
that fact. Peter Bourne testified that Special Forces aidmen in Vietnam 
dispensed drugs and narcotics with as free a hand as a U.S.  physician, but 
without equivalent judgment. 357 Lieutenant Col. Richard Coppedge, 
formerly the Center Surgeon of the JFK Center for Special Warfare, 
conceded that no state licensed Special Forces aidmen to practice 
medicine in the U.S.  in the manner that they did in Vietnam. He added 
that probably none ever would. 358 Because of the nature of 
counterinsurgency warfare, aidmen, unlike other Army medics, operated 
essentially without physician supervision.359 
to handle the problems that required the use of the ophthalmoscope or the stethoscope"); 
id. at 2074 (testimony of Capt. Porter); id. at 2270-71 (testimony of Jean Mayer). 
355. The rotation schedule for aidmen trainees divided their nine weeks among 
surgery, dermatology, podiatry, pediatrics, dentistry, urology, orthopedics, cardiology, 
general medicine, and contagious diseases. Prosecution Exhibit 1 ,  Master Rotation 
Schedule Course: 300-F1 Class No. 9, in Record, vol. 12; Record at 551-55 (testimony 
of Sfc. Herman Cornell). The list of subjects also shows that soldiers were not the only 
intended beneficiaries of the aidman's care. See Lt. Col. Louis T. Dorogi, Early Special 
Forces Medical Training 1952-1971, 3 SPECIAL WARFARE 28, 29-30 (1990) (describing 
detailed didactic training in appendectomy procedure in the 1950s). 
356. See Prosecution Exhibit 2, Letter Order from Col. Fancy and Enclosure (Oct. 
1 1 ,  1966), in Record, vol. 12; Record at 2319-21 (testimony of Capt. Peter Bourne that 
of all the diseases that Levy was ordered to cover in his instruction, at most one fell 
within the ambit of first aid training). Despite official dogma ostensibly providing stricter 
control over Army medics and Marine corpsmen than over aidmen, actual practice often 
deviated from stated dogma. See Appy, supra note 43, at 280 (medic performing 
operations in the field); id. at 284 (medics freely dispensing amphetamines). 
357. Record at 2321. 
358. 1d. at 2136. 
359. /d. at 2334 (testimony of Capt. Peter Bourne); see aLso Dorogi, supra note 
355, at 29 ("The prevailing philosophy was that the enlisted personnel were, in essence, 
independent aidmen and physician substitutes . . . . The restrictions that applied to 
stateside medicine would not be valid in a guerilla situation-especially when evacuation 
from behind enemy lines was out of the question."); Interview with Col. Roger A. Juel, 
U.S. Army Medical Corps, by Lt. Col. Louis Dorogi (Dec. 17, 1976) (on flle with the 
U.S. Army Military History Institute Archives, Carlisle Barracks) [hereinafter Col. Juel 
Interview] (noting that they had assumed that an aidman faced with a problem beyond his 
level of competence would radio for a doctor's help, but that in Vietnam radio 
communication was often impossible for tactical reasons, necessitating that the aidman do 
the best he could on his own). 
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Special Forces aidmen scored well on the Army's intelligence 
tests.360 Yet the limits in their education, maturity, and medical training 
ensured that some would do harm as medical practitioners. Captain 
Ernest Porter, a Fort Jackson ophthalmologist, testified that they were 
young, often high-school dropouts, whose greatest shortcoming was poor 
judgment. This was not Porter's view alone. He explained that he was 
repeating the opinion of a Captain who had come to Fort Jackson from 
the Army Medical Field Service School to explain the aidmen training 
program. 361 
At the time Levy refused Colonel Fancy's order, aidmen followed a 
thirty-seven week course of training.362 In addition to the eight-week 
basic medic's course, aidmen received an extra ten weeks of classroom 
instruction. Following the classroom work, they pursued a nine-week 
"applicatory phase" in · an Army hospital, such as the hospital at Fort 
Jackson. There they rotated through various hospital wards and clinics, 
spending approximately ten hours in each. Then they returned to the JFK 
Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg for additional classroom study and 
participation in the "dog lab. "363 
Speaking of the Army's civic action medical programs in Vietnam, 
one proponent conceded of the "village sick-call patrol" that "[i]n many 
cases less medicine is practiced than 'medical show business. ' " 364  
360. Record at 2020 (testimony of Col. Roger A. Juel). Aidmen were required 
to have a GT score of at least 100, and their average score was 127. The GT test score 
was roughly equivalent to an IQ test score. /d. 
361. Record at 2081 .  The rapid expansion of Special Forces in the mid-1960s was 
widely thought to have diluted the quality of the Green Beret recruits, including aidmen. 
See DUNCAN, supra note 264; Col. Juel lnterview, supra note 359, at 18-19 (comment 
by Dorogi, describing "inferior product" produced in 1965-66). 
362. Dorogi, supra note 355, at 32. Soon afterwards, the Anny reduced the 
program to 32 weeks. /d. at 33. 
363. /d. at 32. In the dog lab, each aidman received a dog whose vocal cords had 
been removed and who had been shot in the leg. The aidman performed the necessary 
surgery on the leg wound, and then cared for the dog during its recovery. The aidman 
also amputated the dog's left front paw. The purpose of the exercise was to teach both 
surgical technique (debridement and amputation) and compassion. Record at 571-73 
(testimony of Spc. Sanford Henry); Gen. Yarborough Interview, supra note 67, at 20; 
Interview with Lt. Col. Richard Coppedge, U.S. Army Medical Corps, by Lt. Col. Louis 
Dorogi (undated) (audio tape on file with the U.S. Army Military History Institute special 
collections; copy of tapes on file with author). Morgan recounts that after he sent 
Laughlin McDonald and Charles Sanders to Fort Bragg to gather evidence for the 
Nuremberg hearing, New York Times correspondent Homer Bigart told him, "I think all 
that your young man will come up with at Fort Bragg is the largest []herd of three-legged, 
nonbarking dogs in captivity. "  MoRGAN, supra note 46, at 137-38. 
364. C.R. Webb, Jr. ,  Medical Considerations in Internal Defense and 
Development, 133 MIL. MED. 391 (1968), quoted in E.A. Vastyan, Warriors in White: 
Some Questions About the Nature and Mission of Military Medicine, 32 TEx. REP. ON 
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Irrespective of the Army's and Special Forces' intent, often the training 
of Special Forces aidmen had a similar Potemkin-village quality. 
Lieutenant Colonel Coppedge noted that the doctors he spoke to at Fort 
Jackson about training Special Forces aidmen were "quite uninterested in 
the program. "365 Their nonengagement stemmed from the hospital 
command's indifference, as well as their own. Prior to the time that 
Colonel Fancy presented Levy with his written order to train, the hospital 
staff had not been told what training they were expected to give. Indeed, 
no other doctor was told what to teach before the preferral of charges 
against Levy.366 The other doctors who testified said that they tolerated 
the aidmen's presence, but did little more than permit them to observe. 
Not knowing why the aidmen were in their wards or clinics, the doctors 
offered little formal instruction and limited it to teaching first aid.367 
Captain Porter testified that he did not learn of the purpose and nature of 
the aidmen training until the day before his testimony, when some 
members of the hospital staff met with a captain who had been dispatched 
by the Army Medical Field Service School to Fort Jackson.368 
There was little doubt that many of the aidmen were idealistic and 
dedicated. At least some had been good students in their medical 
BIOLOGY & MED. 327, 334 (1974). 
365. Record at 2232. Coppedge added that he "[w]ould much preferred [sic] to 
have had expressions of disagreement rather than the apathetic reception that we 
encountered. "  ld. 
366. See, e.g. , id. at 635 (cross-examination testimony of Capt. Del Lutsenhizer); 
id. at 2070-71 (testimony of Capt. Ernest Porter); id. at 2169, 2172, 2181  (testimony of 
Capt. Robert Petres). 
367. ld. Captain Petres stated that he assumed that the aidmen were merely 
corpsmen assigned to help him. ld. at 2169. Captain Porter said that he assumed that the 
instruction was to be in first aid only and refused to let them use a stethoscope or 
ophthalmoscope. ld. at 2070-71 , 2081.  
368. ld. at  2074-76. It  was not clear whether Capt. McBride's visit was simply 
a matter of exquisite bad timing on the Army's part in scheduling its annual visits to 
hospitals participating in Phase II of aidmen training, or whether his visit was an effort 
to bolster the testimony of the Fort Jackson hospital staff in the hopes of averting further 
embarrassing incidents like the adverse testimony of prosecution witness Capt. Ivan 
Mauer. For a description of Mauer's testimony, see infra text accompanying notes 429-
3 1 .  Porter testified that after the court-martial charges were preferred against Levy, he 
received a list of five diseases that he was supposed to talk about with the aidmen, but 
since the list made little sense to him, he ignored it and continued to teach them fust aid. 
ld. at 2074. 
One Army doctor, Maj .  Billy Jones, head of the dermatology clinic at Fort Gordon, 
Georgia, testified that the aidmen dermatology training was adequate and was consistent 
with medical ethics. He stated that "[i]n medical school, I had two hours of dermatology 
my whole four years . . . .  These men are getting more than I did in medical school. "  
Record at 2441 . 
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training. 369 It was far less clear from the court-martial testimony 
whether the aidmen were adequately prepared for their mission in 
Vietnam and whether, as a purely medical matter, they were doing more 
good than harm. 
Both those persons charged with overseeing the Special Forces 
medical program and the Fort Jackson doctors who testified noted their 
concern that aidmen recognize and not exceed the limits of their 
knowledge and ability.310 Lieutenant Colonel Coppedge acknowledged 
that "[t]he real difficult thing, of course, to train anyone is 
judgment. "371 From the vantage of the Fort Jackson hospital, Levy's 
witnesses could only speculate about the harms that might result from the 
aidmen's poor judgment or incompetence: perhaps they would 
misdiagnose an eye disease;372 or perform a nonindicated 
tracheotomy;373 or promote disease-resistant strains of diseases through 
the indiscriminate use of medicines.374 Brown was evidently 
unimpressed . 375 
Among Levy's nonhostile witnesses, only Peter Bourne had detailed 
knowledge of aidmen practices in Vietnam. Bourne testified that despite 
Army regulations relating to narcotics and drugs there were no real 
controls on their use. He stated that during a period when he had 
oversight of twenty-six A-camps, there were problems in some camps 
with aidmen "using up vast quantities of drugs and being unable to 
369. See Smithson, supra note 46 (Levy noting idealism of many of the Special 
Forces soldiers he encountered). But see Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 
25 (commenting on the cynicism of many of t!,,e Special Forces soldiers with regard to 
their activity in Vietnam). For a study that examines the idealism and personality of 
Green Berets and of war resisters, see generally DAVID MARK MANTELL, TRUE 
AMERICANISM: GREEN BERETS AND WAR REsiSTERS; A STUDY OF COMMITMENT (1974). 
In cross-examining Spc. Wayne Barrows, Morgan asked a series of questions about the 
treatment of syphilis and gonorrhea. Record at 669-70, 672. Barrows appears not to 
have stumbled, and Morgan did not pursue that tactic again in cross-examining other 
aidmen. 
370. See, e.g. , Record at 2139-40 (testimony of Lt. Col. Richard Coppedge); id. 
at 2170-78 (testimony 9f Capt. Robert Petres). 
371. !d. at 2139. 
372. /d. at 2086 (testimony of Capt. Ernest Porter that aidmen were unequipped 
to diagnose any eye diseases other than conjunctivitis). 
373. /d. at 2173-74 (testimony of Capt. Robert Petres describing the risks of 
unnecessary tracheotomy). 
374. !d. at 2177-78 (testimony of Capt. Robert Petres relating to the risks of 
prescribing medicines). This last danger was not all that speculative given the availability 
of various medicines, the limits on supplies, and a medical delivery system built partly 
on the village sick-call patrol. 
375. ld. at 2178-79 (sustaining prosecution's objections and asking Morgan "to 
bring it right back to Fort Jackson"). 
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explain where they went, using them promiscuously!'376 Major Craig 
Llewellyn, who served for sixteen months as group surgeon for the 
Special Forces in Vietnam, insisted that "there is a great deal of control 
exercised over what drugs we allow them to requisition. "m 
Bourne thought that the aidmen "were practicing inadequately"378 
and were using medicine primarily for political purposes, in violation of 
professional norms.379 Nevertheless, Bourne was willing to train 
aidmen because he thought that the little good they did outweighed the 
harm. 380 The Army's witnesses, along with Robin Moore, were much 
more enthusiastic about the aidmen's medical performance.381 
The testimony regarding the aidmen's value to the indigenous 
population bespoke the arrogance of Western medicine and again reflected 
a tendency either to see the Vietnamese as alien or to assume that they 
inhabited a cultural vacuum. However limited the value of the aidmen's 
care, it was at least within Western traditions of medicine and thus 
presumptively superior to the care otherwise available to the Vietnamese. 
Indigenous medicine, by contrast, was "primitive by our standards of 
scientific medicine. "382 The Montagnards integrated disease into their 
religious beliefs and sought cures through "spirit worship, " sacrifices, and 
the aid of "witch doctors. "383 Other Vietnamese relied on "Chinese 
doctors. "384 Except for Major Llewellyn, who noted that some 
"herbalist doctor[s] . . .  do a great deal of good," the witnesses were 
utterly dismissive of Vietnamese medicine. Dr. Edward Kimbrough, 
testifying as a prosecution rebuttal witness, stated: 
There were many-1 don't know exactly what they were-we 
called them Chinese Physicians-! am sure that they weren't 
Chinese or physicians either, but kind of witch doctors that 
376. ld. at 2321, 2332. 
377. ld. at 2487. Llewellyn's statement was somewhat ambiguous and may have 
addressed only the issue of controlling drug supply, but not use. 
378. ld. at 2331. He described the village sick-call as a kind of rapid-turnover 
mass medicine marked by "rapid and superficial diagnosis and passing out pills." /d. at 
2318. 
379. /d. at 2322. 
380. ld. 
381.  See, e.g., id. at 971 (testimony of Robin Moore); id. at 2406-08 (testimony 
of Dr. Edward E. Kimbrough); id. at 2488 (testimony of Maj. Craig Llewellyn). 
382. /d. at 1037 (Prosecution's question during cross-examination of Donald 
Duncan). 
383. Id. (testimony of Donald Duncan). Duncan's description appears to have 
been accurate, although somewhat incomplete. For further discussion of Montagnard 
beliefs regarding disease, see BOURNE, supra note 272, at 145-65 (1970). 
384. Record at 2486 (testimony of Maj.  Craig Llewellyn). 
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treated patients with aqua puncture [sic] and cupping on the 
chest and painting designs on the chest for severe diseases.385 
93 1 
In Robin Moore's testimony, the "Chinese doctors" or "witch doctors" 
disappeared completely, leaving a void. Asked about the medical care 
available to people in Vietnamese villages, he replied that "[t]he only 
medical care they had was what medical care special forces gave 
them. "386 In such a perceived vacuum, it is little wonder that the 
aidmen, despite their deficiencies, were thought to be doing at least a little 
good for the Vietnamese. 
· 
Nine years later, some of the friends of Special Forces medicine 
would be far less sanguine about the aidmen's competence and 
achievements in Vietnam. In interviews conducted for a proposed 
monograph on the medical role of Special Forces in Vietnam, Major 
Llewellyn and Colonel Roger A. Juel, who had command over Special 
Forces medical training at the Medical Field Service School, revealed 
doubts about the aidmen's training and ability, as well as their significant 
problems in the field . Colonel Juel, in particular, dismissed the aidmen 
as a "primitive product," and while insisting that many of them 
performed impressively, he also commented that the program was rife 
with incidents of inadequate treatment.387 Major Llewellyn noted that 
some of the aidmen they received had long since completed their medical 
training and in the interim had been assigned to non-medical duties and 
become quite "rusty . "  He added that Special Forces did not inform U . S .  
Military Assistance Command (MACV), Vietnam, o f  this problem, 
because had MACV known, it would have pulled those aidmen from the 
field.388 Asked if aidman training was "adequate for Vietnam," Colonel 
Juel replied: "No, it was the best we could do. "389 Asked if the aidman 
could be tactically justified, he responded : "They are incompetent. "390 
The court-martial did not hear these criticisms and concerns, however. 
385. /d. at 2406. 
386. /d. at 971. 
387. Col. Juel Interview, supra note 359, at 17-18, 24, 26-27. At the time of the 
interview, Juel was engaged in a campaign to have Special Forces replace the aidman with 
a more thoroughly trained physician's assistant, and he was meeting resistance from 
Special Forces. Jd. at 17-18, 32. Consequently, his criticism of the aidman program 
might not have been wholly disinterested, much like his earlier praise. 
388. Interview with Maj. Craig Llewellyn, U.S.  Army Medical Corps, by Lt. Col. 
Louis Dorogi (undated) (audio tape on file with the U.S.  Army Military History Institute 
special collections; copy of tapes on file with author); see also Col. Juel interview, supra 
note 359, at 25 (describing problem of unused skills getting rusty). On the whole, the 
Llewellyn interview is more positive about aidman performance than Juel's. 
389. Col. Juel Interview, supra note 359, at 32. 
390. Jd. at 17. 
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Other risks of the aidman program, such as frequent use of the antibiotic 
chloromycetin, 391 never seemed to register. The case that Special 
Forces aidmen were, as a purely medical matter, a harmful addition to the 
Vietnam countryside, was never sufficiently made. 
For Levy, political and military use of medicine and the contlation 
of medical and military roles were the most objectionable aspects of the 
aidman program. 392 No one denied that the aidmen were first and 
foremost combat soldiers whose healing role was subordinate to their 
combat mission. Like other Green Berets, the aidmen were cross-trained 
in at least one other military specialty, and took their turns on 
patrols. 393 
By blending military and medical functions, Special Forces had 
abandoned the traditions of military medicine dating back to the first 
Geneva Convention. Tracing that tradition from the 1860s through the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, Harvard nutritionist Jean Mayer, an expert on 
paramedical personnel and a former officer in the Free French Forces, 
stated that "the whole thrust of progress has been to separate the functions 
of the doctor and his auxiliary from the main function of our means which 
has to do with destruction of life and property . . . . "394 Mayer 
explained that this tradition of separation served the utilitarian principle 
391 .  See Record at 2082 (testimony of Capt. Ernest Porter regarding 
chloromycetin, but not linking it to Special Forces medicine in Vietnam); id. at 614 
(testimony of Capt. Ivan Mauer regarding dangers of chloromycetin). Levy said of this 
practice: "They use drugs, such as Chloromycetin, that I hesitate to use myself. " See 
Elinor Langer, The Court-Martial of Captain Levy: Medical Ethics v. Military Law, 156 
SCIENCE 1346, 1349 (1967) (quoting Levy). Chloromycetin can cause aplastic anemia and 
other blood disorders, resulting in death. It also can result in the overgrowth of 
nonsusceptible organisms. In light of these dangers, the 1967 edition of the Physicians' 
Desk Reference included a warning box for chloromycetin. It cautioned that 
chloromycctin "should not be used when other less potentially dangerous agents will be 
effective," and that it "should be used only for serious infectiops ."  It also noted that "[i]t 
is essential that adequate blood studies be made during treatment with the drug" in order 
to detect some resulting blood disorders before they became irreversible. MEDICAL 
ECONOMICS, INC . ,  PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE TO PHARMACEUTICAL SPECIALTIES 
AND BIOLOGICALS 908-9088 (21st ed. 1966). For contemporary cases noting the dangers 
of chloromycetin, see Stottlemire v. Cawood, 213 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1963); 
lncollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206 (Pa. 1971). 
392. Interview with Dr. Howard Levy, supra note 25. 
393. See, e.g. , Record at 569 (testimony of Specialist Sanford Henry); id. at 1005 
(testimony of Capt. Peter Bourne); id. at 1010 (Statement of the Information Office of the 
U.S. Army Special Warfare Center); id. at 2205 (testimony of Donald Duncan). Robin 
Moore wrote: "Every man is cross-trained in at least two other basic team skills. A 
medic, say, can not only efficiently patch up the wounded and care for the sick, but 
knows how to lay down a deadly accurate mortar barrage and blow up the enemy's rail 
lines and bridges. "  MOORE, supra note 264, at 10. 
394. Record at 2269. 
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of distinguishing doctors and medics from other soldiers on the battlefield, 
so they could continue to provide care unmolested and without regard for 
the tides of battle or whether their forces had withdrawn. 395 He added 
that it was also derived from the medical ethics principle that the doctor 
must be an impartial healer. 396 
The Geneva Convention provided that medical personnel should not 
abandon their patients when their forces retreat. Special Forces aidmen 
purported, however, to have opted out of the Geneva Convention 
protections.397 Unlike other medics, they were subject to the command 
of a non-medical officer, who was the final arbiter of whether and when 
they would function in a combat or a medical role.398 In that capacity, 
the A-team commander made decisions regarding how the aidman would 
practice medicine. 399 Donald Duncan testified that when a CIDG camp 
was overrun, all Special Forces soldiers, including aidmen, were ordered 
to evacuate and to leave their non-American patients behind.400 
Jean Mayer noted that as an officer in the Free French Forces he 
would not countermand his medical personnel . He said that it would 
violate his conscience to train paramedical personnel if he knew that they 
would be required to subordinate medical judgment to their commanders' 
political and military judgments. 401 
Prosecution rebuttal witnesses saw their ethical duties differently. 
Dr. William DeMaria of Duke University Medical School testified that his 
obligation was to give the paramedical trainee the best education possible. 
But in an eerie echo of the Nuremberg Hearing division of labor theme, 
he added: "I cannot be responsible for his action once he completes this 
395. /d. ;  see also id. at 2324 (testimony of Capt. Peter Bourne). This principle 
of separating roles was widely believed imperiled by the North Vietnamese and the PLAF, 
who were accused of showing little respect for the red cross brassard. Telephone 
Interview with Col. Earl .V. Brown, supra note 45. 
396. Record at 2269-70. 
397. ld. at 1010 (Statement of the Information Office of the U.S. Army Special 
Warfare Center). 
398. ld. at 2151-52 (testimony of Lt. Col. Coppedge); id. at 2319 (testimony of 
Capt. Peter Bourne)� 
399. /d. at 2319 (testimony of Capt. Peter Bourne). 
400. ld. at 1023; see also id. at 2152 (testimony of Lt. Col. Coppedge conceding 
this possibility); MOORE, supra note 264, at 63-66 (describing how preparations to 
evacuate all Green Berets from camp under attack despite the medic's warning that "[i]f 
we pull out . . .  a lot of wounded are going to die," were obviated by last minute air 
support destroying the attacking battalion). 
401. Record at 2270-71 ,  2274. Asked if he would change his mind if shown that 
these paramedical personnel did some medical good, Mayer responded that the threat to 
medical independence seldom came from its opponents but rather "it is much more likely 
to come from people who have very good intentions. "  /d. at 2271 .  
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level of training. "402 This ethical detachment of cause from effect was 
undergirded by a Panglossian view of what the aidman did in Vietnam. 
Dr. DeMaria testified that knowing an aidman's commander might order 
the aidman to abandon his patient for the greater good did not alter his 
view on training aidmen. Nor would he question the order to abandon a 
patient. If the commander gave the order, it would be appropriate. 403 
Conflating the roles of healer and combat soldier similarly failed to 
trouble DeMaria. His testimony spoke of the aidman's combat role as 
casually as one might of someone's hobby: "I think the fact that he 
chooses to do something else in addition to his health act is not my 
concern ethically as a physician. "404 Reassured that aidmen do not wear 
the red cross brassard, prosecution witness Dr. Amos Johnson thought the 
conflation of killer and healer beneficial . Once the fight was over, he 
explained, who but the aidman could best minister to those whom he had 
wounded but failed to kill.405 
While Levy had a "fleeting idea" of the Geneva Conventions' 
prohibitions, he did not turn naturally to them in shaping a critique of 
Special Forces medicine: "Those . . .  questions . . .  were largely raised 
by lawyers. "406 The Geneva Conventions argument was but one 
translation of Levy's fundamental objection to the aidman program for an 
audience of legal decisionmakers : that it used medicine as an instrument 
to effect political and mil itary objectives . The challenge for the defense 
was to cast that objection in a way that would enable a court-martial to 
find Levy's disobedience of Colonel Fancy's order excuseable. 
At the court-martial, the defense could show only a handful of 
examples of Special Forces aidmen using medicine for immediate overt 
military ends. No biological warfare laboratories were hidden in the 
402. /d. at 2364. On the relationship between Duke's physician's assistant 
program and Special Forces, see Col. Juel lnterview, supra note 359, at 22-23. 
403. /d. at 2365; cj. Dr. Robert T. Jensen, Another View of Medical Ethics and 
the Mililary, 20 THE NEW PHYSICIAN 505, 509 (1971) ("[l]t is not inappropriate that 
[medical officers] should be responsible to the line commanders in combat units . . . .  If 
war is too important to be left to the generais then medical care, and . . .  medical ethics, 
is too important to be left entirely to doctors.").  Dr. Jensen's article is a response to a 
position paper of Physicians for Social Responsibility, which was authored by three 
doctors, including Dr. Victor Side!, one of Levy's medical ethics defense witnesses. Dr. 
Robert Liberman et al., Medical Ethics and the Military, 17 THE NEW PHYSICIAN 17 
(1968). Both articles focused much of their attention on issues raised in the court-martial. 
404. Record at 2364. 
405. ld. at 2398-99. Levy captured the absurdity of these conflated roles when he 
doffed a green beret and came "charging into his chief counsel's motel room screaming, 
'Kill! Kill! Cure! Cure!'" Nicholas von Hoffman, The Troubled World of Captain Levy, 
WASH. POST, May 21,  1967. 
406. Interview with Dr. Howard Levy, supra note 25. 
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CIDG camps. The defense did elicit Robin Moore's acknowledgment of 
at least one instance in which an aidman administered sodium pentathol 
to aid in the interrogation of a prisoner.407 The Green Beret, which had 
been placed in evidence, added only a couple of other instances of Green 
Berets using medicine for immediate military purposes.408 
But Levy's conversations with the Green Berets who sought 
instruction in his clinic had led him to conclude that the danger of Special 
Forces medicine was not especially that the aidmen would kill by medical 
means (at least not in the sense of injecting poisons or pathogens into 
their victims).409 He reached the decision to stop teaching medicine to 
the aidmen when he came to see "that the medical aspect of the Green 
Berets was a ruse . . . a method by which you could infiltrate Vietnam 
viilages" to achieve military ends.410 Levy had concluded from his 
conversations with aidmen that the aidman program converted medicine 
into a sophisticated weapon of war. Under the benign face of medical 
aid, the aidman would gain entree into Vietnamese villages. They would 
next militarize them by recruiting their inhabitants, isolating the insurgent 
enemy from its popular base and destroying it. He recognized, in other 
words, that civic action was merely another method of warfare. Levy 
came to believe that his participation in this program violated his ethical 
obligations as a doctor and transformed him into something only slightly 
removed from a combatant.411 
407. Record at 966-67. 
408. MOORE, supra note 264, at 1 12-13, 119 (aidman fits Vietnamese girl with 
diaphragm so she can become mistress of PLAF colonel and eventually lure him to his 
capture); id. at 137 (aidman injects sodium pentathol in captured colonel before 
interrogation); id. at 305, 307, 309 (aidman administers "nerve-paralyzing serum" in 
portion of book that Moore does not purport to base on real incidents-a fantasy of 
insurgency in North Vietnam). Writing about the court-martial, Dr. Peter Bourne 
described an incident where aidmen "deliberately used their skills on the wives of known 
Viet Cong in the hopes that these women could then be persuaded to provide intelligence 
information which in tum would probably lead to the deaths of their husbands." Bourne, 
supra note 38, at 58. This description was absent from his testimony. 
409. It  did occur to him, however, that those taught to cure plague could similarly 
be taught to spread it. Interview with Dr. Howard Levy, supra note 25. 
I d. 
410. ld. 
4 1 1 .  Levy said: 
I had already said to myself . . .  I would go into the Army but I probably 
wouldn't go to Vietnam. That's where I would draw the line . . . .  I knew 
that there would be a line drawn that I wouldn't cross and that line probably 
was Vietnam. Well, . . .  as I'm training these guys, I 'm getting perilously 
close to being in Vietnam even though I haven't gotten orders to go to 
Vietnam, by proxy. So I'm saying to myself, wait a minute, this is where we 
draw the line right now. 
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Levy was unaware at the time that the proponents of 
counterinsurgency had explicitly described medicine as a kind of Trojan 
horse, well-suited to the battle for the hearts and minds of Asian peasants. 
Captain Leonard R. Friedman, a Special Forces psychiatrist, put it bluntly 
in entitling an article he published in 1966: American Medicine as a 
Military-Political Weapon. 412 Friedman declared medicine the 
"cornerstone" of civic action and "one of the most successful instruments 
. . .  in stability operations. "413 He proclaimed that "Western medicine 
has been the key to the oriental home and has unlocked a store of good­
will for Western man entering an Eas'tern world. "414 Friedman 
explained that in Vietnam, the tactical use of medicine might lead first to 
a greater acceptance of the Saigon government by its people, especially 
non-ethnic Vietnamese, and then to "further acceptance of Western ideas 
and ideals. "  "Subsequently," he continued, "the minority group may be 
led to a wish to provide its own military contribution to the Central 
Government" as an expression of gratitude for its medical 
beneficence. 415 
The value of medicine for counterinsurgency lay partly in its 
appearance of universality and neutrality. Colonel Spurgeon Nee!, a 
former Surgeon of the U.S.  MACV, could write with no apparent sense 
of irony that the medical component of stability operations provides an 
"essentially apol itical avenue through which favorable influence may be 
maintained. "416 
E.A. Vastyan, a critic of these "warriors in white," documents that 
the doctrine of political medicine embraced both political and military 
412. Capt. Leonard R. Friedman, American Medicine as a Military-Political 
Weapon, 131  MIL. MED. 1273 (1966). The U.S. Army exhibit at the 1967 American 
Medical Association convention, which prominently featured a picture of a Special Forces 
aidman treating a Vietnamese patient, appeared under the title: "medicine as a weapon." 
Liberman et al., supra note 403, at 19. 
413. Friedman, supra note 412, at 1273. "Stability operations" was a common 
synonym for counterinsurgency. 
414. Id. at 1276. Friedman lay partial blame for the fall of China on American 
failure to use medicine to gain a foothold there. For a different view of the political 
efficacy of political medicine, at least among the Montagnards, see BOURNE, supra note 
272. 
415. Friedman, supra note 412, at 1277. 
416. Col. Spurgeon Nee!, The Medical Role in Army Stability Operations, 132 
MIL. MED. 605, 605 (1967). The contradiction was not lost on RichB .J Cowan, a 
medical student who wrote in a letter to the New England Journal of Medicine that what 
Nee! was calling apolitical, others would recognize as interference "in the internal 
political affairs of other countries, in behalf, if necessary, of governments disliked by their 
people." Cowan added that "[m]edicine is to be used politically because it provides a 
facade of apolitical activity." Richard B.T. Cowan, Letter to the Editor, NEW ENO. J .  
MED., Feb. 8, 1968, at 336. 
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objectives. He further shows some of the ways in which this approach to 
medicine as an instrument of war distorted medical values and practices. 
Political medicine generated a theory and practice of what Vastyan calls 
"political triage, and "psychological triage. "417 Political triage entails 
subordinating decisions regarding treatment and the allocation of medical 
resources to such political and military goals as intelligence gathering and 
cementing local loyalty. 411 Psychological triage entails medical 
decisionmaking that seeks to achieve the greatest immediate loyalty impact 
instead of medical impact. 419 
Though unable to point to published Army doctrine, the defense 
attempted to show that in Vietnam, Special Forces had converted medical 
care into a military and political weapon. Donald Duncan spoke of the 
aidmen as "your greatest chance of getting entree, into contested 
villages.420 Duncan explained that: 
Once he leaves the camp [his primary mission] would be the 
treatment of local civilians, holding sick call, and whatever. 
It's in training-it is pointed out that in many areas in which 
you will go, you are going to be very unpopular, especially you 
as a guy carrying a gun, that is coming in there trying to 
organize them into going out to get themselves shot in some sort 
of a village defense organization; that the one great "in, that 
you have is this medic because people are short on doctors and 
trained medical personnel in there; that the thing to do is sort of 
417. Vastyan, supra note 364, at 333-34. 
418. Jd. at 334 (describing treatment in ancillary role to intelligence and the 
procedures for justifying admittance of Vietnamese civilians to U.S. Army hospitals). 
419. Jd. at 333-34. Spurgeon Nee! noted that U.S. military hospitals admitted 
Vietnamese civilians selectively for "'high impact' surgical procedures," focusing on 
corrective surgery for major deformities and disfigurements, primarily in children. Nee! 
writes that "[t]he psychological impact on the inhabitants of the village to which the 
restored patient is returned is tremendous. "  Nee!, supra note 416, at 607. In response, 
Richard Cowan would write, "It seems to me that this program uses an indication for 
surgery with :which I am unfamiliar-namely, psychological impact on the patient's 
community." Cowan, supra note 416, at 336. In the mid 1970s, Col. Roger Juel, a 
hostile defense witness at the court-martial, expressed the extent to which political and 
military objectives had displaced medicine in civic action medicine. When told by Louis 
Dorogi that some aidmen delivered babies in Vietnam, Juel responded with dismay. He 
explained that aidmen were taught that they should defer to the village midwife, who 
would be far more practiced in this area, and at most take a helping role under her 
direction. He then made clear the source of his concern: "Leave the responsibility where 
it belongs, because they could destroy a team's mission by being thrown out of a village 
or having some important person's wife die as a result of their actions." Col. Juel 
Interview, supra note 359, at 26-27. 
420. Record at 2204. 
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push a medic up there in front and Jet him get the confidence of 
these people by treating them; usually it starts off-sometimes 
it starts off very slow, but the word gets around. More and 
more people are coming for this treatment; certain dependency 
is sometimes involved; then, of course, this lays the way open 
now for the rest of the team to come in and organize them in 
their primary mission which could be border surveillance; it 
could be CIDG strike force; it could be regional forces, popular 
forces_421 
Bourne and Moore similarly defined the aidmen's function, which Bourne 
labeled "the pursuit of political medicine, "422 as the effort to win hearts 
and minds through the allurement of medical care. 423 
The prosecution's rebuttal witnesses and the hostile defense witnesses 
emphasized that the aidmen's primary mission was to ensure the health of 
the A-team and their Vietnamese counterparts and diminished the 
importance of the aidmen's civic action.424 The prosecution emphasized 
the value of the aidmen to their comrades in situations where, because of 
the nature of the mission, evacuation to an Army hospital might be 
impossible. Lieutenant Colonel Coppedge, one of the architects of the 
Army's doctrine regarding medicine's role in counterinsurgency, did not 
mince words, however. Asked what was medicine's primary mission in 
Vietnam, he replied: 
It became rather evident with our increasing involvement in 
[counterguerrilla warfare] that the victory in this sort of struggle 
was more than a matter of weapons, that is, arms, gunfire; that 
in a struggle like this which is in many respects a social struggle 
that we have got to turn to use of social instruments such as 
medicine. So in this way we sought to use medicine as a means 
of approaching the enemy and imposing our will on his. 425 
Referring to Mao's aphorism that the guerrilla is a fish and the people are 
the sea, Coppedge added: "The basic support for the guerrilla is really the 
421. /d. at 1034-35. 
422. /d. at 2318. 
423. /d. at 963 (testimony of Robin Moore); id. at 2321-22 (testimony of Capt. 
Peter Bourne). 
424. See, e.g., id. at 2025-26, 2029 (testimony of Col. Roger Juel); id. at 2476-78 
(testimony of Maj. Craig Llewellyn). 
425. /d. at 2128-29 (emphasis added). 
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people around him . . . .  We sought to deny the population support for the 
guerrilla by winning him to us. "426 
To succeed with the medical ethics defense, Levy's counsel had to 
show first that Levy's objections were indeed those of a doctor rather than 
those of an opponent of the war. Additionally, although the defense 
witnesses stated that ultimate responsibility for ethical judgments must 
reside in the individual doctor, 427 they needed to show that Levy was 
not a crank. 428 The defense sought supporting testimony from other 
doctors to show that Levy's ethical concerns about the aidman program 
were within the medical ethics mainstream. 
Their case began to gel somewhat unexpectedly when prosecution 
witness Captain Ivan Mauer demonstrated that Levy was not alone in his 
concerns . Mauer, who was probably Levy's closest friend among the 
Fort Jackson doctors, had been called to testify that he had pleaded with 
Levy to reconsider his refusal of the order to train.429 On cross­
examination, Mauer, who had succeeded Levy in the dermatology clinic, 
but who had not been asked to teach aidmen, stated that if aidmen were 
trained for combat and served as combatants or were ·used to gain entree 
into Vietnam villages, he would refuse to teach them medicine.430 
Mauer's testimony was sufficiently dramati� to capture the headline in 
some newspaper accounts from the day's other big story, testimony by the 
parade of black soldiers.431 
As Mauer left the courtroom, someone at the defense table whispered 
audibly, " [T]here goes our next client. "432 Mauer was not prosecuted, 
but the rumor that he had been reassigned to Vietnam as punishment for 
his testimony seemed all too plausible to defense witness Captain Ernest 
426. /d. at 2129. 
427. See, e.g. , id. at 1 003 (testimony of Capt. Peter Bourne); id. at 2338-39 
(testimony of Dr. Benjamin Spock). 
428. In an out-of-court hearing on the admissibility of Lt. Col. Coppedge's 
testimony and the testimony of other doctors on the medical ethics question, Brown said: 
"I wonder if it would be advisable for me to hear testimony as to the respectability of 
such a belief from other medical sources to show that it's really not so odd with the 
accused. "  /d. at 2226. 
429. On Levy's relationship with Dr. Mauer, see Interview with Dr. Howard 
Levy, supra note 25. Levy's closest friendships, however, were within the local civil 
rights community. /d. 
430. Record at 616, 624-26. The dermatology instruction had been farmed out to 
a civilian doctor. 
431. Homer Bigart, An Army Doctor Backs Capt. Levy: Says He, Too, Would 
Refuse to Teach Combat Men, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1967, at 8; Tony Burton, Another 
Doc Says He Won 't Teach Green Berets, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 16, 1967, at 5. 
432. Nicholas von Hoffman, Nuremberg Raised at Capt. Levy's Trial, WASH. 
PoST, May 16, 1967, at A4. 
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Porter.433 Fearing that he would share Mauer's or Levy's fate, Porter 
repeatedly attempted to invoke the Fifth Amendment when asked his 
views about teaching the aidmen medicine. 434 While Porter, who had 
previously limited his instruction to first aid, attempted to avoid saying 
that he would refuse to teach the aidmen more advanced topics, he 
nevertheless indicated that he shared Levy's ethical objections to the 
aidman program. 435 Captain Robert Petres, though repeatedly prevented 
from answering Morgan's questions regarding the aidman program, also 
expressed his ethical doubts about Special Forces medicine. 436 
In addition to Peter Bourne and the Fort Jackson doctors, the defense 
called a number of medical luminaries to lend credence to the medical 
ethics defense and to bolster the image of Levy as the good doctor. 
Along with Jean Mayer, Drs. Louis Lasagna,437 Victor Sidel,438 and 
Benjamin Spock439 testified on Levy's behalf. Each witness testified 
433. Record at 2100-01 (testimony of Capt. Ernest Porter). Mauer was not sent 
to Vietnam. 
434. /d. at 2072-74, 2089-92. 
435. The following exchange is typical: 
Q [Shusterman]: "The question is, Dr. Porter . . . .  " 
A: "Are you asking me, will I continue to train them the way I had trained 
them?" 
Q: "Yes." 
A: "I think that could incriminate me. I refuse to answer that." 
Q [by law officer] : "How would that incriminate you?" 
A: "If you're asking me the way I train them, it would appear, presently, 
since I have been informed how they are to be trained, and that the way I 
trained them in the past was improper, and to state that I'm going to continue 
that way, I think, would be to incriminate myself. To say that they be 
taught-if I say they're going to be taught all the intricacies of medicine, I 
think that I would find myself going against the Hippocratic Oath in some 
way." 
/d. at 2090. 
436. /d. at 2176-80, 21 82-83. 
437. Dr. Lasagna was on the faculty at Johns Hopkins Medical School and had 
published widely in the field of medical ethics. Jd. at 2293-95. 
438. Dr. Side! was on the Harvard Medical School faculty. He had published on 
a variety of topics in medical ethics, including issues relating to medicine and warfare. 
ld. at 2279. 
439. Dr. Spock was on the Western Reserve Medical School faculty. A leading 
figure in the antiwar movement, Spock would soon face trial (along with Rev. William 
Sloane Coffm, Jr., Mitchell Goodman, Michael Ferber, and Marcus Raskin) for his part 
in the circulation and publication of A Call to Resist Illegitimate Awhority, a statement 
encouraging draft resistance. On the Boston 5 Conspiracy Trial, see JoHN F. BANNAN 
& ROSEMARY S. BANNAN, LAW, MORALITY AND VIETNAM: THE PEACE MILITANTS AND 
THE COURTS 87-106 (1974); RON CHRISTENSON, POLITICAL TRIALS: GORDIAN KNOTS IN 
THE LAW 131-37 (1986); JESSICA MITFORD, THE TRIAL OF DR . SPOCK (1969); Noam 
Chomsky et al., Reflections on a Political Trial, in TRIALS OF THE RESISTANCE 74-105 
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that medical ethics was central to the practice of good medicine; that the 
separation between the roles of healer and combatant created by the 
Geneva Conventions was grounded in important ethical and practical 
considerations; and that medicine must remain nonpartisan and not serve 
as an instrument for achieving military or political goals.440 Each, 
when presented with a hypothetical based on the aidman program, 
supported Levy's decision as ethically appropriate.441 In rebuttal the 
prosecution called several witnesses who testified that they did not see a 
basis for an ethical objection to the aidman program.442 Whose ethics 
witnesses fared best was a matter in the eye of the beholder.443 
In its medical ethics case the defense sought to deemphasize Levy's 
political motivation for refusing Colonel Fancy's order. Instead, it cast 
Levy's act in terms of universal medical principles embodied in the 
Hippocratic Oath and the American Medical Association Principles of 
Medical Ethics.444 To do otherwise would have strengthened the 
prosecution's efforts to depict Levy as bent on subverting the war effort. 
Yet, by universalizing the argument, the defense blunted the impact of its 
critique of the Army's use of medicine in Vietnam. 
Also, the attempt to cloak Levy's act under the mantle of the good, 
apolitical doctor created contradictions within the medical ethics defense. 
Shusterman was right in characterizing Levy's refusal to train aidmen as 
bound up with his opposition to U.S.  intervention in Vietnam. Levy 
would say retrospectively: 
[A]t that time . . .  I had very strong feelings, but they were 
largely political feelings. I knew what the war in Vietnam was 
(1970). 
440. Record at 2269-70, 2274-75 (testimony of Jean Mayer); id. at 2280-81 , 2283-
84, 2287-88 (testimony of Dr. Victor W. Side!); id. at 2299-302, 2307-08 (testimony of 
Dr. Louis Lasagna); id. at 2337-40 (testimony of Dr. Benjamin Spock); see also id. at 
2324 (testimony of Capt. Peter G. Bourne). 
441. ld. at 2270-71 ,  2274 (testimony of Jean Mayer); id. at 2283 (testimony of Dr. 
Victor W. Side!); id . . ai 2299-300, 2304-05 (testimony of Dr. Louis Lasagna); id. at 2341 
(testimony of Dr. Benjamin Spock). 
442. The prosecution called Drs. William J. DeMaria, Amos Neill Johnson, 
Edward E. Kimbrough, Maj. Billy E. Jones, Capt. Sander S. Shapiro, and Maj. Craig 
Llewellyn. 
443. Compare Telephone Interview with Col. Earl V. Brown, supra note 45, and 
Telephone Interview with Richard Shusterman, supra note 127 (expressing view that 
prosecution medical witnesses were more convincing than defense witnesses) with 
Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25 ("People . . .  Jove Ben Spock . . .  
Craig L!ewllyn just ain't no match for Ben Spock. "). 
444. Dr. Spock testified that general medical principles, not his opposition to the 
war, undergirded his support for Levy's decision. Record at 2341-42. 
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all about, and I was very profoundly . . .  opposed to that war. 
So, much of what I said and did was colored by that 
background. Had it not been that, who the bell knows what I 
would have done. . . . To me, medical ethics is not just an 
abstraction out there. If it were just an abstraction, I might not 
have done anything. I might have been just like all the other 
doctors. But, in the background was my opposition to the 
war.445 
As Levy noted, his response to the aidmen program was not typical of the 
other doctors. Although Ira Glasser would later report that other Army 
doctors who were not permitted to travel to Fort Jackson for the court­
martial were prepared to testify that they shared Levy's objections to 
training the aidmen, there could be little doubt that Levy did not represent 
the dominant view in the medical profession.446 The effort to frame 
Levy's objection as a doctor's response was undermined by its atypicality. 
The attempt to identify Levy with the image of the good doctor also 
left the defense vulnerable to criticism that drew on less flattering images 
of doctors as monopolists and elitists.447 The prosecution cast Levy as 
an elitist who would sooner see American soldiers denied medical care 
than permit paramedical personnel to attend to them.448 Indeed, the 
prominence of Levy's medical ethics witnesses in contrast to such 
homespun prosecution witnesses as small-town North Carolina practitioner 
Amos Johnson may also have undermined Levy's medical ethics 
defense. 449 
445. Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25. 
446. IRA GLASSER, JUDGMENT AT FORT JACKSON: THE TRIAL OF HOWARD LEVY 
M.D.  (Southem StudentOrganizingCommittee) 4 (1967), reprinted in CHRISTIANITY AND 
CRISIS, Aug. 7, 1967. More probably the American Medical Association expressed the 
dominant view within the profession. See infra note 474. 
447. This image of the profession has a long history. For discussions of nineteenth 
century characterizations of the medical profession as aristocratic and monopolistic, see 
generally JOSEPH P. KETT, THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL PROFESSION: 
THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS, 1780-1860, at 97-131 (1968); WILLIAM G. ROTHSTEIN, 
AMERICAN PHYSICIANS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: FROM SECTS TO SCIENCE 123-74 
(1972). 
448. Record at 2003-04 (cross-examination of Maljorie Helton); id. at 2009-10 
(cross-examination of Sgt. Mitchell Helton). Elinor Langer detected this tactic and 
discussed it in her article reporting the case. See Elinor Langer, The Court-Martial of 
Captain Levy: Medical Ethics v. Military Law, 156 SCIENCE 1346, 1350 (1967); see also 
Telephone Interview with Richard Shusterman, supra note 127 (characterizing Levy's 
medical ethics defense as elitist). 
449. See Telephone Interview with Col. Earl V. Brown, supra note 45 (discussing 
relative impact of Johnson's testimony and the testimony of Levy's witnesses). Johnson 
described how he trained a black paramedic to assist him in his practice. His assistant 
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New York Times correspondent Homer Bigart called the medical 
ethics defense "eloquent. " "Yet," he added, "in the minds of the ten 
stony-faced career officers [of the court-martial panel] ,  there must have 
remained a simplistic but commonsense notion that the Green Beret 
medics did more good than harm. "4.50 In the end, the court-martial 
panel was not asked to decide the issue. 
Brown ruled that Levy's medical ethics objections to teaching 
medicine to the aidmen did not give rise to a defense. He instructed the 
court-martial that the order was lawful and that Levy was not entitled to 
disobey on the grounds of a conflict between the order and his notion of 
medical ethics.451 Colonel Brown has said that he would have been 
very troubled and might have let the medical ethics defense go to the 
court-martial had Levy shown that Special Forces were using the aidmen 
as a recruiting device in Vietnamese villages.452 He is also convinced 
that Levy made no such showing at the court-martial. 'Perhaps Brown's 
perspective on the medical ethics issue has evolved over time, and he was 
far less will ing to recognize so unprecedented a defense at the time than 
he now believes. Perhaps the evidence of the political and military use 
of medicine was overwhelmed and lost in the untidiness of the case. Or 
perhaps, as was true of the war crimes evidence, the difficulty of 
acknowledging that these acts were ours and not some other nation's made 
it all too easy not to see what had been shown. 
Brown's ruling left unanswered the questions whether and when a 
doctor could be compelled to follow military orders that required that she 
or he disregard personal beliefs regarding the dictates of medical 
ethics. 453 At first blush, the claim that an Army doctor might refuse to 
obey a facially lawful order on medical ethics grounds closely resembles 
was trusted by both Johnson and his patients and performed a large array of procedures 
skillfully without immediate supervision. Record at 2391-94 (testimony of Dr. Amos 
Johnson). 
450. Homer Bigart, Military Justice: The Issues Went Beyond the Case of Captain 
Levy, N.Y. T!MES,__June 4, 1967, at D4. 
451. Recoi:d at 2591 .  
452. Telephone Interview with Col. Earl V. Brown, supra note 45. 
453. For a recent variant on the issue involving conflicting demands of obedience 
to military and religious authority, see Eric Schmitt, Military Chapiflin Fights a Battle 
over LuyalJies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1993, at A20 (describing Air Force Chaplain 
Garland L. Robertson, who was disciplined and discharged after he published a letter 
shortly before the start of the Persian Gulf War in which he questioned the morality of 
using force against Iraq). The question of conflicting loyalties and professional ethical 
obligations within the military has received scant attention in nonlegal sources as well. 
For one exception, see Arlene K. Daniels, The Captive Professional: Bureaucratic 
Limitations in the Practice of Military Psychiatry, 1 0  J.  HPALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 255 
(1967). 
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a claim of selective conscientious objection, and it is not surprising that 
so construed, the argument was fated to fail .  454 Beyond the claim of 
selective conscientious objection, however, lay a more potent argument, 
though one that never quite gelled at trial, that suggested that the 
military's power to direct the conduct of its doctors was subject to the 
constraints of law. 
If such constraints did exist, they derived from two sources. First, 
as a signatory to the Geneva Conventions, the U.S.  could not use its 
military medical personnel as combatants. Most directly, as Levy's 
defense argued, this meant that using medical personnel like the aidmen 
to realize military objectives constituted a violation of the laws of war. 
Therefore Levy might legitimately refuse to abet such violations. More 
indirectly this allowed the defense to argue, or at least to suggest, that 
Levy's role itself had been transformed from physician to an ancillary to 
combat in violation of the Conventions' separation of the roles of healer 
and combatant. 
Somewhat more perilously, the defense might have drawn on the 
Supreme Court's suggestion in Orlof  v. Willoughbf55 that the 
government may not specially subject doctors to the draft because of their 
professional skills, but deny them the opportunity to practice medicine 
once conscripted.456 The defense could have used this suggestion to 
argue that requiring Levy to violate his understanding of medical ethics 
would be tantamount to the deprivation condemned in the Orlof  dicta. 
The defense might have argued, in other words, that because the practice 
of medicine necessarily entails the freedom to follow one's understanding 
of the dictates of medical ethics, any interference with Levy's ability to 
make ethically informed medical decisions would constitute an assignment 
to nonmedical duties. The defense medical ethics witnesses had laid the 
foundation for such an argument by contending that a doctor denied the 
ability to follow his conscience and training regarding medical ethics 
"would stop . . . in his tracks within an hour of getting up in the 
morning. "457 Yet the defense never explicitly drew the connection from 
this testimony to the Orloff argument. 
Orloff, a cold-war-era decision, was certainly a two-edged sword. 
It upheld the Army's right to draft and retain, without commissioning as 
454. Recently, however, the Department of Defense has accepted precisely that 
sort of claim made by military doctors who have refused to perform abortions. According 
to a Department spokesperson, the military ucannot force doctors who cite the Hippocratic 
oath to perform the procedure. " Morning Edition: Abortions Still Not Perfonned at 
Overseas Bases (National Public Radio broadcast, June 14, 1993). 
455. 345 u.s. 83 (1953). 
456. !d. at 87-88. 
457. Record at 2339 (testimony of Dr. Benjamin Spock). 
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an officer, a doctor who had refused to sign a loyalty certificate and to 
answer questions regarding membership in various "subversive" 
organizations. While Justice Jackson's majority opinion stated that the 
government had a legal obligation "to assign Orloff to duties fall ing 
within 'medical and allied specialist categories, '"  it also proclaimed that 
the military was a specialized, largely self-regulating community entitled 
to enormous deference and minimal scrutiny in its assignments of 
duty.458 Indeed, Orloff would eventually serve as a foundation for the 
Supreme Court's characterization of the mil itary as a "society apart from 
civilian society, "  upon which it buttressed its decision in Parker v.. 
Levy.459 
D. Hearts and Minds 
Who cared about the defense? That wasn't what this was all 
about. I mean, the part that I was concerned about, I thought 
we won. 
Howard Levy400 
Bereft of defenses, Morgan attempted to recast the case as one in 
which the local command had acted rashly and set in motion a chain of 
uncontrolled events that would result in tragedy for Levy, the Army, and 
the nation, unless the court-martial acted heroically and stopped its 
progression. Everyone recognized, he argued, that Levy did not belong 
in the Army.<Ui1 The process leading toward conviction should never 
have begun, because Levy should never have been at Fort Jackson. Once 
begun, the process should never have culminated in a court-martial. 
Morgan told the court-martial: "I think, looking back on it, that each of 
you knows that . . .  there are procedures all the way along the l ine to 
stop this case from coming here. And that in this rather terrifying 
comedy of errors, we wind up now in a case . . . that has grown to 
monumental proportions. "<Ui2 
458. Orw.fl 345 U.S. at 92-95. 
459. Parker v.  Levy, 417 U.S. at 744. When the defense eventually did draw on 
Or/nff in the Middle District of Pennsylvania habeas proceedings, the focus of the case 
had so shifted that the defense only hinted at the argument described above and focused, 
instead, on Justice Black's statement in his dissenting opinion that the military could not 
treat Dr. Orloff as a "pariah" because he exercised his constitutional rights. District 
Court Habeas Bri�f, supra note 68, at 159-63. 
460. Interview with Dr. Howard Levy, supra note 25. 
461. Record at 2569. 
462. ld. 
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Morgan insisted that to convict Levy would be to punish him for 
"words, political beliefs and opinions. "463 Such a conviction not only 
would make an unnecessary martyr, it would tarnish the image of the 
military and harm the nation. Morgan explained: "I've felt ever since 
December, when we got into this case, that it wasn't just Howard Levy 
who was on trial, and it's proved to be pretty true, I think. "464 
Morgan invited the court-martial to transform the story into one 
about their own heroism and dedication to country and the Army.465 He 
told them that someone had to stop the chain of events that had spun out 
of control and that only they could.466 Asking them to write the story's 
end, he said: "I know that you know that you have an opportunity for 
greatness, and there's a call for that greatness. "467 
It is not clear what impact Morgan's closing argument had on the 
court-martial. On June 2, 1967, the panel found Levy guilty of the order 
charge and the two speech charges that did not relate to the Hancock 
letter. 468 They convicted him of the lesser included offenses of writing 
to Hancock "with culpable negligence," rather than with the intent to 
impair his performance. 469 Believing that the court-martial finding was 
tantamount to an acquittal on the letter charges, the prosecution moved to 
dismiss those charges. 410 The following day, the court-martial imposed 
a three-year sentence. 471 
Within the Fort Jackson courtroom, a particular construction of the 
case prevailed. The war escaped condemnation and was safely restored 
to its place as a backdrop, rather than as a matter for legal dispute. 
According to that construction, bad things sometimes happened in 
Vietnam, but such is the nature of war. Besides, we had a civilizing 
influence on an otherwise primitive people. The allegiances of Army 
officers were deemed to take precedence over the oaths of doctors . And 
463. /d. at 2566. 
464. /d. at 2575. 
465. This genre of closing argument casting the jury as the hero may be one of the 
standard scripts in the defense attorney's narrative quiver. For a detailed analysis of a 
closing argument built upon a narrative of jury heroism, see Anthony G. Amsterdam & 
Randy Hertz, An Analysis ojCwsing Arguments to a Jury, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 55 
(1992). 
466. Record at 2574. 
467. Id. at 2586. 
468. Id. at 2617. 
469. /d. at 2618. 
470. /d. at 2619. 
471. Jd. at 2634. For a discussion of the sentence, see Telephone Interview with · 
Col. Earl V. Brown, supra note 45 (noting that the three-year sentence did not reveal 
much about the jury's reaction to Levy and to Morgan's argument, and expressing 
surprise that the convening authority did not reduce the sentence). 
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military discipline was restored. The prosecution's vision of the case by 
and large prevailed. Law Officer Brown and the court-martial agreed that 
despite some interesting detours, the case had been about Levy and his 
acts of defiance. 
Outside the courtroom, the meanings gleaned from the case were 
much more varied. Within the medical community and, particularly, the 
military, the case had an immediate impact. The case helped to 
crystallize a medical resistance movement. Galvanized by the case, 
medical students signed and circulated pledges not to serve in the 
military. 472 Others in the medical community who were not confronted 
with the immediate issue of the draft also seized on the case to help create 
opposition to the war. Opponents of the war within the medical 
community report having felt challenged by Levy's act to consider 
whether they should be doing more.413 Although they always remained 
a minority within the medical community,474 the medical resistance 
472. See Student Dissent on Vietnam, 278 NEW ENG. 1. MED. 282 (1968) 
(containing "A Pledge of Nonparticipation" and reporting that in the New York City area, 
at least 90 medical students had signed the pledge not to serve in Vietnam); The Doctors ' 
Dilemma, THE NATION, May 29, 1967, at 676-77; The Draft: Protest, Debate, Renewal, 
NEWSWEEK, May 22, 1967, at 25; Physicians Urge Draft Revision, BALTIMORE SUN, May 
18, 1967, at 1 ;  Spock on a Visit Backs Capt. Lery, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1 967, at 5; 
Statement of Arthur Kaufman, LIBERATION, Aug. 1967, at 22 ("Let us serve notice to the 
Army and to the administration that if they think Doctor Levy's non-cooperation is an 
isolated affair, they haven't seen anything yet."). Ironically, while Levy initially 
supported medical draft resistance, he ultimately advocated that doctors enter the military 
and work from within to end the war and reform the military. For an expression of the 
former view, see Letter from Dr. Howard B .  Levy to Charles Morgan, Jr. (Dec. 16, 
1967), in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27. For expressions of the latter view, see 
Smithson, supra note 46; Dr. Reuben Barr, What Ever Happened to Captain Lery, HosP. 
PHYSICIAN, May 1970, at 65, 139-40. 
473. Telephone Interview with Dr. Benjamin Spock (May 1 1 ,  1993) (recalling his 
admiration for Levy's courage and describing Levy as more courageous than he, although 
also noting a feeling of foreboding that he might end up imprisoned after visiting Levy 
following Levy's confmement); see also Dr. Arthur S. Blank, Jr., The Army and Dr. 
Lery, LIBERATION, Aug. 1967, at 20. 
474. In rdponse to Levy's court-martial, the American Medical Association's 
House of Delegates unanimously approved a resolution declaring: 
There is no conflict between the ethics of the medical profession and the oath 
which officers must take when sworn into the Armed Services. This oath, 
applicable to medical and other officers , provides that all officers shall support 
and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign 
and domestic, that they will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution 
of the United States and that they take such obligation freely and without any 
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. There is nothing in this oath which 
conflicts in any way with the ethics of the medical profession. 
AMERICAN M EDICAL ASSOCIATION, HOUSE OP DELEGATES, Resolution 89 (June 18, 
1967), quoted in United States v.  Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672, 677 n.3 (1968); see also Donald 
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remained a voice of opposition to the war and the locus of a counter­
interpretation of the Levy case. 
Levy's impact within the military was powerful and immediate. 
News of the court-martial prompted expressions of support from other 
soldiers.475 Levy recalls that he was greatly surprised at the large 
number of Gls who flashed him a peace sign or a clenched fist salute at 
the time of the court-martial. 476 During the court-martial, five Fort 
Jackson Gls invoked Levy's stand on the Green Berets and refused to 
carry their weapons. 477 According to Army documents, three Fort 
Jackson enlisted men refused orders to go to Vietnam.478 Fort Jackson 
Janson, Doctors Urged to CombaJ Government Planning, N.Y. TIMES, June 2 1 ,  1967 at 
A24 (discussing House of Delegates vote and describing it as a "rejection of the 
contention of Dr. Howard B. Levy that the physician's Hippocratic Oath might conflict 
with orders from military superiors"); Telephone Interview with Dr. Benjamin Spock, 
supra note 473 (guessing that perhaps as much as 90% of the profession either did not 
notice the Levy case or considered Levy "very deviant" and believed that he was using 
ethics as an excuse for being uncooperative, and adding that the AMA "felt responsibility 
for making it clear that Levy didn't speak for them"). For other indications of support 
for Dr. Levy within the medical community in addition to materials previously cited, see 
We Support Capt. Howard Levy, M.D. , N.Y. TIMEs, May 7, 1967, at D4 (advertisement 
sponsored by the New York Medical Committee to End the War in Vietnam, signed by 
672 doctors, nurses, medical students, and other health professionals); Captain Levy 
Backed by Pickets Here, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1967, at AS; Letter from Dr. Lytt I. 
Gardner, National Chairman, the Physicians Forum, to Charles Morgan, Jr. (May 12, 
1967), in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27 (noting resolution of the organization 
supporting Levy). Doctors and medical students also organized the Committee for 
Howard Levy, M.D.,  which circulated petitions in support of Levy. See Committee for 
Howard Levy, M.D.,  materials, in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27. 
475. Six soldiers from Fort Sill, Oklahoma, telegraphed their support for Levy. 
See Soldiers Support Levy, THE BOND, June 23, 1967, at 3. This was followed by other 
statements of support. See Another Gl Speaks Out, THE BOND, July 2 1 ,  1967, at 1 
(statement of Pvt. Richard Perrin); Levy Gets New Backing, THE BoND, July 7, 1967, at 
1 (soldiers from Fort Sheridan, Ill.). 
476. Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25. 
477. Letter from Howard Levy to Charles Morgan, Jr. (July 14, 1967), in Levy 
Litigation Files, supra note 27 (letter from jail abstracting conversation from Col. Herbert 
Meeting, Jr., Fort Jackson Staff Judge Advocate, in which Meeting told Levy about the 
five Gls, how they were put in the stockade and were persuaded to end their protest after 
Levy's conviction). 
478. Memorandum to Secretary of the Army from Brig. Gen. Kenneth J .  Hodson 
(June 5, 1967), in JAG Files, supra note 77 (noting in discussion a paper prepared for 
meeting between the Secretaries of the Army and Defense regarding the issue of post-trial 
confinement and other issues relating to the Levy case which stated that "[a]t the present 
time three enlisted men at Fort Jackson are in pre-trial confinement for refusing to obey 
orders to depart for Vietnam"); Col. Waldemar Solf, Talking Paper 2 (June 8, 1967), in 
JAG Files, supra note 77. 
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soon became the target of the first GI coffeehouse.479 As an early 
resister, Levy became a part of the folklore of the GI movement.4lKl 
Often, the specifics of the case were lost, replaced by the image of Levy 
as someone who had stood up to the Army, said no to the war, and had 
willingly faced punishment rather than abandon his convictions.481 
Once released from prison482 Levy became a frequent speaker both at 
479. Fred Gardner, Hollywood Confidential: 1, 3 VIETNAM GENERATION 50, 50 
(1991). The idea of the Gl coffeehouse was to provide a place off base, where Gls could 
talk about the war and their other concerns, and where a Gl movement could naturally 
grow. ld. at 51-52; Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25. 
480. . Conversation with Skip DeLano (July 20, 1993). 
481. For a typical example of a garbled account of the case, see Citizens 
Commission of Inquiry, Introduction to THE DE.LLUMS COMMTITE.E. HEARINGS ON WAR 
CRIMES IN V!E.TNAM, at vii (The Citizens' Commission of Inquiry ed. ,  1972). Levy 
recalls that when he was transferred from Fort Jackson to the United States Disciplinary 
Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, he arrived too late for officers' mess and was brought in 
to be fed while the enlisted prisoners were eating (even at the disciplinary barracks, the 
privileges of rank inhered). As he entered the room, he received a standing ovation from 
the enlisted prisoners, many undoubtedly supporters of the war who were applauding Levy 
not for the substance of his position but for standing up to the Army. Interview with Dr. 
Howard B. Levy, supra note 25; see also Letter from Dr. Howard B. Levy to Charles 
Morgan, Jr. (Dec. 15, 1967), in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27 (describing reception 
at Leavenworth as "tumultuous" and stating that "we've got about 1400 sympathizers 
here. "). 
482. After Levy's ·convictio� and sentencing, the issue of bail pending appeal 
became a critical part of Levy's case. The Manual for Courts-Martial vests broad 
discretion in the Commanding Officer to either hold or release the prisoner pending 
appeal. M.C.M.,  supra note 138, 1 21(d). The Acting Commander, Brig. Gen. E.B. 
Roberts, denied Levy's requests for release pending further review. Letter from Brig. 
Gen. E.B. Roberts to Charles Morgan, Jr. (June 3 ,  1967), in JAG Files, supra note 77; 
Letter from Brig. Gen. E.B. Roberts to Charles Morgan, Jr. (June 12, 1967), in JAG 
Files, supra note 77; see also Memorandum from Brig. Gen. Kenneth J .  Hodson, Acting 
the Judge Advocate General, to the U.S. Army Chief of Staff (June 15,  1967), in JAG 
Files, supra note 77. Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor similarly denied Levy's 
request for release pending appeal. Letter from Alfred B. Pitt, General Counsel of the 
Army, to Charles Morgan, Jr. (June 15, 1967), in JAG Files, supra note 77. 
In making his decision, Gen. Roberts relied partly on an FBI report that an unnamed 
informant had learned from Levy's girlfriend that Levy expected to be convicted and 
intended to flee to a communist country from whence he would "denounce the United 
States by every means available to him." FBI Memorandum Titled "Howard B. Levy" 
(May 3 1 ,  1967), in JAG Files, supra note 77. The informant stated further than Levy 
would eventually seek to return to the U.S. The report misidentified Levy's girlfriend, 
Trina Sahli, as "Tina or Nina (last name unknown)." /d. The Defense Department and 
the Army felt some discomfort in relying on this confidential report. A memo in the 
litigation flles states: "Vance [probably Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance] read 
news story & called Rezor [sic) & said we can win w/o stooping to that confidential 
informer," and that the Army decided to "playO down" the FBI report. Memorandum 
from Philip M.  Surrey [?] (June 29, 1967) (signature illegible), in JAG Files, supra note 
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GI protests and within the larger antiwar community. 483 That these 
groups sought him as a speaker suggests that many did not accept the 
construction of the case that prevailed at Fort Jackson. Indeed, the 
existence of a GI movement stood as a rejection of that interpretation. 
That Dr. Levy served just shy of twenty-six months in prison is 
testament to the coercive power of the law. That his case inspired acts 
of resistance by soldiers, medical students, and others, that it helped some 
soldiers and civilians alike to see the potential for a GI antiwar 
movement, and that it was yet another instance demonstrating that one 
77; see also Draft of District Court Brief, in JAG Files, supra note 77 (noting that the 
sentence "The infonnation as to intent to flee would of itself warrant the restraint 
imposed" was to be "deleted per Gen. Fuller's direction"). Nevertheless, the affidavit 
submitted by Gen. Roberts to the district court recited the content of the FBI report. See 
Affidavit of Brig. Gen. E.B. Roberts (June 26, 1967), in JAG Files, supra note 77. 
Levy unsuccessfully sought relief from Gen. Roberts' adverse decision both within 
the military justice system and the federal courts. See Levy v .  Resor, 17 C.M.A. 135, 
37 C.M.R. 399 (1967); Levy v. Resor, Civ. No. 67-442 (D.S.C. July 5, 1967), a.ff'd, 384 
F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1967) (per curiam), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1049 (1968). 
On August 2, 1969, Justice Douglas, who had dissented from the denial of certiorari 
in Levy's bail case, granted Levy's motion for bail pending appeal in his federal habeas 
proceeding. Levy v. Parker, 396 U.S. 1204 (1969). At the time of his release Levy had 
nine days left to serve on his sentence. 
When Judge J. Robert Elliot ordered Lt. William Calley, Jr.,  released on bond 
pending his appeal, he noted Levy's release as precedent for his action. Without any 
sense of irony the Judge stated: "The only difference which I can observe in the position 
of Lt. Calley as compared to that of Captain Levy is that Captain Levy was convicted for 
refusal to perfonn a military duty, whereas Lieutenant Calley's conviction arose from his 
willing service in the anned forces. "  See Wayne King, Calley Free on $1000 Bond l7y 
Order of Civilian Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1974, at A 1 ,  A17. 
483. See Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25; Short & Seidenberg, 
supra note 24, at 67-69; Smithson, supra note 46. Levy's antiwar activities were reported 
both in the GI press and in his Anny Intelligence ftles. For a sampling, see Gl's United 
Marchfor Peace, BRAGG BRIEFS, Nov. 1969, at 1 ,  6; November Moratorium-New Twist, 
As You WERE, Nov. 1969, at 1 ,  2 ("Published Underground Of, By, and For G.l .  's At 
The Fort Ord Military Complex."); Levy Anny Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 2-4 
(speech in Monterey, Cal., in conjunction with November Moratorium); id. at 241-43 
(speech given at cocktail party sponsored by the ACLU in Moorestown, N.J. ,  Oct. 1970); 
id. at 244-45 (demonstration at Fort Gordon-Augusta, Ga., area, July 1 1 ,  1970); id. at 
251-52 (demonstration sponsored by Gl's and WAC's United Against the War, Port 
McClellan/Anniston, Ala., May 16, 1970); id. at 290-91 (demonstration at University of 
South Carolina protesting the closing of the UFO Coffee House [Gl Coffee House in 
Columbia/Fort Jackson area], Jan. 18, 1970); id. at 295-97 (speech to University of 
Kentucky medical students, Jan. 19, 1970); id. at 378-81 (demonstration sponsored by 
GI's United Against the War in Vietnam at Fort Bragg/Fayettesvilie, N.C.,  area, Oct. 1 1 ,  
1969); id. at 384-85 (speeches at Duke University and University o f  North Carolina, Oct. 
10, 1969). 
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could find a powerful critique of the war even within law's language, is 
testament to the I imits of that coercive power. 
CONCLUSION 
I stood before the judge that day as he refused me 
bail. 
I knew that I would spend my time awaiting trial in 
jail. 
I said, "There is no justice," as they led me out the door. 
The judge said: "This isn't a court of justice, son. 
This is a court of law." 
Billy Bragg"84 
I remember once I was with [Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes]; 
it was a Saturday when the Court was to confer . . . .  When we 
got down to the Capitol, I wanted to provoke a response, so as 
he walked off, I said to him: "Well, sir, goodbye. Do 
justice!" He turned quite sharply and he said: . . .  "That is not 
my job. My job is to play the game according to the rules ."  
Judge Learned Hand485 
I thought we were going to lose, before the court-martial, at the 
court-martial , and after the court-martial . . . .  [E]ven in those 
days, I had very little faith in this legal system. 
Howard Levy486 
By the time the Supreme Court decided Parker v. Levy in 1974, the 
U.S. was no longer in Vietnam in a combat role. The war was similarly 
no longer actively in the case. Hidden beneath exchanges in the Justices' 
opinions about ,the changing or enduring nature of the military and of 
moral proscriptions, lay a debate about the war and the manner in which 
it was fought. The opinions also hid a battle over the symbols with which 
484. BILLY BRAO<J, Rotting on Remand, on WoRKERS PLAYTIME (Elektra Records 
1988). 
485. LE!ARNE!D HAND, THE SPIRIT OP LmE!RTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OP 
LEARNED HAND 306-07 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960). Judge Hand added: "I have 
never forgotten that. I have tried to follow, though oftentimes I found that I didn't know 
what the rules were. " Jd. at 307. 
486. Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25. 
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best to debate these questions that were permitted brief expression in what 
in other times would have been an obscure makeshift courtroom in  South 
Carol ina. The racial imagery, the competing constructions of the 
Vietnamese and of black soldiers, which had so occupied the stage at 
trial, and which, in so doing, had doubtless distracted attention from the 
debate about the war, also had blended into the background, obscured by 
the Court's debate. In place of a discussion of whether there were any 
constraints on the manner in which Americans would make war, there 
were formal, technical arguments about the extension of the vagueness 
and overbreadth doctrines to the military. A case that had been 
overflowing with political heat now imparted the relative coolness of a 
constitutional debate over two statutory provisions that would not touch 
most Americans.487 It masked its political origins.488 
James Gibson and others have noted that few Americans during the 
mid- and late 1970s wanted to talk about the Vietnam War.489 There 
was, instead, a collective evasion. Viewed in this context, Parker v. 
Levy's suppression of the war and failure to confront the issues related to 
how it was fought are unremarkable. 
But the courts' evasions in the Levy case, and in other cases relating 
to the war, were not the cultural or psychological products of the mid-
1970s. From the first, these courts were unwilling to wrestle with the 
legality of the war in any of its aspects . As Anthony D' Amato and 
Robert O'Neil noted in 1972: "Few controversies in our history have so 
clearly warranted resolution of conflicting constitutional claims at the 
highest level. Yet few major issues-perhaps none-have been so 
persistently avoided, postponed and deferred by the courts than the 
Indochina War. "490 The United States Supreme Court repeatedly 
avoided deciding cases putting into question the legality of the war. 491 
487. Of course, the issue of soldiers' rights, which remained in the case, was no 
less political, but it was not at the center of most Americans' political concerns. 
488. If the politics of such an overtly political case are so easily buried, one 
wonders how mu.ch more effectively courts mask the more subtle politics of more 
mundane cases. 
489. GIBSON, supra note 192, at 3-1 1 ;  Fuchs, supra note 185. 
490. ANTHONY A. D'AMATO & ROBERT M. O'NEIL, THE JUDICIARY AND 
VIETNAM 3 (1972). See generally BANNAN & BANNAN, supra note 439; ARYEH NEIER, 
ONLY JUDGMENT: THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION IN SOCIAL CHANGE 141-53 (1982); 
LAWRENCE R. VEL VEL, UNDECLARED WAR AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: THE AMERICAN 
SYSTEM IN CRISIS 1 1 3-80 (1970). 
491. See, e.g. , DaCosta v. Laird, 405 U.S. 979 (1972); Orlando v. Laird, 404 
U.S. 869 (1971); Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970); Mora v. McNamara, 389 
U.S. 934 (1967); Mitchell v. United States, 386 U.S. 972 (1967). 
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Generally, lower federal courts were no more receptive to these 
issues.492 The courts' performance in the face of the crisis created by 
492. For examples of courts declaring these questions non justiciable or finding no 
standing to raise them, see Velvet v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236, 237-39 (lOth Cir. 1969), aff'g 
287 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1968); United States v. Battaglia, 410 F.2d 279, 284 (7th Cir. 
1969); Simmons v. United States, 406 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir. 1969); Ashton v. United 
States, 404 F.2d 95, 97 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.  960 (1969); Luftig v.  
McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 665-66 (D.C. Cir. 1967), a.ff'g 252 F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C. 
1966); United States v.  Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323, 324 (2d Cir. 1966), cerl. denied, 386 
U.S. 972 (1967); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (three-judge panel), 
a.ff'd, 41 1 U.S. 91 1 (1973); Davi v. Laird, 318  F. Supp. 478 (W.O. Va. 1970); United 
States v.  Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 5 1 1  (D. Mass. 1968); Medeiros v. United States, 294 F. 
Supp. 198 (D. Mass. 1968). Ultimately, the United States Courts of Appeal for the First 
and Second Circuits both addressed the issue of the war's legality, and each rejected 
claims that the war was illegal. Massachusetts v.  Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); 
Orlando v .  Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'g Orlando v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 
1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) and Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). Judge 
William Sweigert of the Northern District of California, while not reaching the ultimate 
question of the war's legality, also held that the issue was justiciable and that several 
reservists had standing to raise it. Mottola v. Nixon, 3 1 8  F. Supp. 538, 553-54 (N.D. 
Cal. 1970) (denying the government's motion to dismiss), rev'd, 464 F.2d 178, 183 (9th 
Cir. 1972). Similarly, Judge Orrin Judd, who had ruled in the government's favor in 
Berk, granted Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman's and several airforce servicemen's 
request for a declaratory judgment that the continued bombing of Cambodia during the 
summer of 1973 was unauthorized by Congress and therefore illegal, and for an order 
enjoining the bombing. · Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553, 566 (E.D.N.Y. 
1973), rev 'd, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that the issue was a nonjusticiable 
political question and that, at any rate, the bombing was authorized hy Congress and that 
plaintiffs Jacked standing), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). On Hollvnan, see 
WALKER, supra note 1 3 1 ,  at 287. One other court that did hear testimony about the war 
was the Wisconsin court that tried Karlton Armstrong for the 1970 bombing of the Army 
Math Research Center at the University of Wisconsin, in which Dr. Robert Fassnacht was 
unintentionally killed and five other people were injured. Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Armstrong pleaded guilty to second degree murder, arson, and possession of explosives. 
At his sentencing hearing, the defense called 41 witnesses, including several Vietnam 
veterans and prominent figures in the antiwar movement, in an effort to put the war on 
trial and provide a context for Armstrong's acts. See RON CHRISTENSON, POLITICAL 
TRIALS: GORDIAN· KNOTS IN THE LAW 147-63 (1986) ("The Wisconsin Bomber: Trial 
of a Frustrated Dissenter"). 
That judicial evasion was not always the equivalent of judicial neutrality is perhaps 
most clearly demonstrated in the first Mitchell decision. Judge Timbers, in rejecting as 
irrelevant Mitchell's challenges to the war, remarked on "the sickening spectacle of a 22 
year old citizen of the United States sei1.ing the sanctuary of a nation dedicated to freedom 
of speech to assert such tommyrot and . . .  the transparency of his motives for doing so." 
United States v. Mitchell, 246 F. Supp. 874, 899 (D. Conn. 1965); see also id. at 907-08 
("Remarks of District Court at Time of Sentencing Mitchell on September 15,  1965," 
noting with satisfaction that "[t]he so-called 'cause' which Mr. Mitchell espouses 
apparently has fallen on deaf ears" and has instead "galvanized determination on the part 
of upright Joyal citizens of this country to rally to the support of their government in a 
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the war prompted Robert Cover to write "A Polemic Against the 
American Judiciary. "493 Cover compared the contemporary judiciary 
to judges who enforced the fugitive slave law during the 1 850s. He 
concluded that by enforcing the selective service law against resisters and 
by refusing to hear, and to help craft, innovative challenges to the war, 
the judiciary had become an "accompliceO in that which the Executive 
perpetrates. "494 
This pattern of evasion makes the willingness of the Levy court­
martial to permit ventilation of issues related to the war all the more 
striking, irrespective of the restrictions, both legal and practical, that were 
placed on the discussion. Yet the restrictions were real. Levy's price for 
litigating the war at his court-martial was a significant loss of control over 
his own arguments. 
Good legal explanations lay behind the Levy case's narrowing on 
appeal and on habeas review. The transformation of the Nuremberg 
question into a factual issue and the limits on the courts' jurisdiction in 
the habeas proceeding meant that tools were available to end the 
discussion of the war begun at the court-martial. Moreover, the defense 
played an active role in refocusing the case. While never abandoning its 
arguments about the war itself, the defense shifted its emphasis to 
questions of servicemen's rights and to the argument that the court-martial 
had been instigated to punish Levy for his political views and civil rights 
activities .495 Yet the tools were also available for a court that was 
time of need"). In response to this tone, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, which vacated the conviction and ordered a new trial, suggested that Mitchell's 
retrial be assigned to a different judge. United States v. Mitchell, 354 F.2d 767, 769 (2d 
Cir. 1966). For a discussion of the Mitchell case, see BANNAN & BANNAN, supra note 
439, at 23-39. 
493. Robert M. Cover, Book Review, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1003 (1968) 
(reviewing RICHARD HILDRETH, ATROCIOUS JUDGES: LIVES OP JUDGES INFAMOUS As 
TOOLS OP TYRANTS AND INSTRUMENTS OP OPPRESSION (1856)). Cover returned to this 
theme in a 1984 lecture. See ROBERT COVER, The FolkJales of Justice: Tales of 
Jurisdiction, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE EssAYS OP ROBERT COVER 
173, 195-201 (Martha Minow et al. eds . ,  1993). In his article Cover described the 
Supreme Court's decision in the Levy case as "the final and most grotesque instance of 
this averting of the eyes." ld. at 198 n. 74. 
494. Cover, supra note 493, at 1008 n.31.  But cf BASKIR & STRAUSS, supra note 
43, at 73-82 (describing pockets of resistance by federal judges, along with their clerks 
and some prosecutors and jurors, to strict enforcement of the selective service laws in the 
mid-1960s and growing resistance as the war continued). 
495. The shift in emphasis is manifest in the District Court Habeas Brief and 
accompanying affidavits ("Exhibit C"). The bulk of the 272-page brief, including, but 
not restricted to, the first 158 pages, was dedicated to arguing that the prosecution was 
politically and racially motivated, and all of Exhibit C's 148 pages were intended to set 
the factual foundation for that argument. See District Court Habeas Brief, supra note 68. 
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willing to hear argument, especially regarding the medical ethics 
defense. 496 Instead, the evasion continued. 
That the courts once again failed to engage the legality of the war 
raises, in turn, a number of questions for anyone interested in the recent 
history of American law and legal institutions. First, could the courts 
have been adequate fora for the resolution of these issues, or was their 
evasion inevitable given political, institutional, or constitutional 
constraints? 
Second, how did lawyers and non-lawyers perceive the courts' 
repeated unwillingness to confront the central legal issues posed by the 
war? Did the growing number of the war's opponents view these 
decisions as a failure of law and the legal system? Did they regard the 
oft-repeated litany of rationales for nondecision-sovereign immunity, the 
political question doctrine, and lack of standing-in the face of the tragic 
choices confronting part of a generation of young men and the horrors 
unleashed on the Vietnamese as an unacceptable elevation of law over 
justice, or, worse still, as a cowardly or result-oriented deformation of the 
law?497 Or did they see these decisions in terms of institutional 
competence and the separation of powers? How widely shared was 
Cover's vision of a crisis of judicial morality and of legal legitimacy? 
We know that during the lifetime of the Levy case, critics from both the 
left498 and the righ�99 bitterly challenged the authority and fairness of 
496. Rather than drawing arguments from Orloff v. Willoughby, see supra text 
accompanying notes 455-59, Levy's lawyers invoked Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), to emphasize the Supreme Court's 
recognition of the sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship. They also invoked Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971), Gillette v.  
United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), Stanley v.  Georgia, 394 US. 557 (1969), and 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), for the proposition that the Constitution protects 
the privacy and conscience of individuals and should therefore protect Levy's ethical 
beliefs from sanction. See Brief of Appellee at 55-62, Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 
(1974) (No. 73-206). 
497. E.P. Thompson has noted that: 
Most men have· a strong sense of justice, at least with regard to their own 
interest. If l�w is evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, 
legitimize nothing, contribute nothing to any class's hegemony. The essential 
precondition for the effectiveness of law, in its function as ideology, is that 
it shall display an independence from gross manipulation and shall seem to be 
just. It cannot seem to be so without upholding its own logic and criteria of 
equity; indeed, on occasion, by actually being just. . 
E.P. THOMPSON, WHJGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE 8U.CK Acr 263 (1975). 
498. See, e.g., LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE: EssAYS TO DEMYSTIFY LAW, ORDER 
AND THE COURTS (Robert Lefcourt ed., 1971); Edgar Z. Friedenberg, The Side Effects 
of Legal Process, in THE RULE OF LAW 37, 37-53 (Robert Paul Wolff ed., 1971); Robert 
Paul Wolff, Introduction to THE RULE OF LAW, supra, at 7, 7-12; Howard Zinn, The 
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the courts. To what extent did the courts' refusal to confront the 
questions posed by the war contribute to a crisis of legal legitimacy, and 
how extensive was that crisis? 
Further, while Levy was unwillingly dragooned by the Army's legal 
system, others, like the Catonsville Nine and the other participants in the 
"Ultra Resistance" willingly invited prosecution in order to challenge the 
legality of the war.500 Given the courts' rather consistent rejection of 
defenses grounded in the illegality of the war, what expectations led some 
people to choose law and the courts as the forum in which to debate the 
war? More generally, what hold did law talk and legal form have on the 
war's opponents? Why did other opponents of the war embrace legal 
form and language to challenge the war, as did at least two groups of GI 
dissenters who staged war crime trials of the military "brass"'(i01 
Finally, if for many people, the failure of courts to confront the 
central legal issues raised by the war eroded the legitimacy of legal 
institutions, what were the sources of those institutions' resilience? How 
did the courts weather the crisis, and what has become of their scars? 
Conspiracy of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW, supra, at 1 5 ,  15-36. 
499. See, e.g., Fred E. lnbau, "Playing God": 5 to 4, 57 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 377 (1966). The 1968 Richard Nixon presidential campaign's invocation 
of "law and order" and attack on the purported pennissiveness of the Warren Court 
represented a similar attack from the right. 
500. For discussions of the largely Catholic "Ultra Resistance," see generally 
BANNAN & BANNAN, supra note 439, at 124-50; STEVEN E. BARKAN, PROTESTERS ON 
TRIAL: CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE SOUTHERN CiVIL RIGHTS AND VIETNAM ANTIWAR 
MOVEMENTS 1 19-31 (1985); FERBER & LYND, supra note 199, at 201-21; Francine Du 
Plessix Gray, The UIJra-Resisrance, in TRIALS OF THE RESISTANCE 1 25-61 (1970). Other 
instances of litigants choosing the courts as a forum for challenges to the war include the 
Massachusells and Ho/Jzman cases cited supra note 471. 
501. Union Gls Pur Military on Trial: Seallle-1he Verdier Is Gui/Jy, the Sentence: 
Death, THE BOND, Feb. 18,  1970, at 1 ,  reprinted in ABOVEGROUND, Mar. 1970, at 19 
("Gls from Fort Lewis and McChord Air Force Base held a trial of the Brass and its war 
in Vietnam before an audience of 1 ,500 at the University of Washington tonight. A jury 
of twelve active-duty soldiers found the military 'guilty' on charges of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and violations of soldiers' rights. ");  Gls and Supporters Turn Armed 
Forces Day Around: GI Jury Tries Brass-Union Chairman Prosecures, THE BoND, June 
17, 1970, at 1 (describing May 16 trial at the University of Illinois before a jury of 13 
active-duty servicemen); see also Georgia Group Plnns War Crimes Tribunal, THE BoND, 
Apr. 22, 1970, at 6 (describing a joint Gl/civilian plan to hold a war crime tribunal in 
Columbus, Georgia (Fort Benning) in May); Copy of photograph captioned "Dr. Howard 
Levy testifying at People's Tribunal, Columbus, GA," (May 17, 1970), in Levy Army 
Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 19. For a discussion of this impulse toward a utopian 
exercise of jurisdiction, see COVER , supra note 493, at 195-201 (discussing the 
Stockholm/Copenhagen "International War Crimes Tribunal" organized by Bertrand 
Russell and Jean Paul Sartre). 
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APPENDIX I 
Specification to Charge I 
In that Captain Howard B. Levy, U.S. Army, Headquarters & 
Headquarters Company, United States Army Hospital, Fort Jackson, 
South Carolina, having received a lawful command from Colonel Henry 
F. Fancy, his superior officer, to establish and operate a Phase II Training 
Program for Special Forces AidMen in dermatology in accordance with 
Special Forces AidMen (Airborne), 8-R-Fl6, Dermatology Training, did, 
at the United States Army Hospital, Fort Jackson, South Carolina, on or 
about 1 1  October 1966 to 25 November 1966, willfully disobey the same. 
Specification to Charge II 
In that Captain Howard B. Levy, U.S. Army, Headquarters & 
Headquarters Company, United States Army Hospital, Fort Jackson, 
South Carolina, did, at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, on or about the 
period February 1966 to December 1966, with design to promote 
disloyalty and disaffection among the troops, publicly utter the following 
statements to divers enlisted personnel at divers times: "The United 
States is wrong in being involved in the Viet Nam War. I would refuse 
to go to Viet Nam if ordered to do so. I don't see why any colored 
soldier would go to Viet Nam; they should refuse to go to Viet Nam and 
if sent should refuse to fight because they are discriminated against and 
denied their freedom in the United States, and they are sacrificed and 
discriminated against in Viet Nam by being given all the hazardous duty 
and they are suffering the majority of casualties. If I were a colored 
soldier I would refuse to go to Viet Nam and if I were a colored soldier 
and were sent I would refuse to fight. Special forces personnel are liars 
and thieves and killers of peasants and murderers of women and 
children", or words to that effect, which statements were disloyal to the 
United States, to the,.prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed 
forces . 
Specification to Additional Charge I 
In that Captain Howard B. Levy, United States Army, Headquarters 
and Headquarters Company, United States Army Hospital, Fort Jackson, 
South Carolina, did, at the United States Army Hospital, Fort Jackson, 
South Carolina, at divers times during the period from on or about 
February 1966 to on or about December 1966 while in the performance 
of his duties at the United States Army Hospital, Fort Jackson, South 
Carolina, wrongfully and dishonorably make the following statements of 
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the nature and to and in the presence and hearing of the persons as 
hereinafter more particularly described, to wit: (1) Intemperate, 
defamatory, provoking, and disloyal statements to special forces enlisted 
personnel present for training in the United States Army Hospital, Fort 
Jackson, South Carolina, and in the presence and hearing of other enlisted 
personnel, both patients and those performing duty under his immediate 
supervision and control and dependent patients as follows: "I will not 
train special forces personnel because they are 'liars and thieves, '  'killers 
of peasants,'  and 'murderers of women and children,'"  or words to that 
effect; (2) Intemperate and disloyal statements to enlisted personnel, both 
patients and those performing duty under his immediate supervision and 
control as follows: "I would refuse to go to Vietnam if ordered to do so. 
I do not see why any colored soldier would go to Vietnam. They should 
refuse to go to Vietnam; and, if sent, they should refuse to fight because 
they are discriminated against and denied their freedom in the United 
States and they are sacrificed and discriminated against in Vietnam by 
being given all the hazardous duty, and they are suffering the majority of 
casualties. If I were a colored soldier I would refuse to go to Vietnam; 
and, if I were a colored soldier and if I were sent to Vietnam, I would 
refuse to fight," or words to that effect; (3) Intemperate, contemptuous, 
and disrespectful statements to enlisted personnel performing duty under 
his immediate supervision and control , as follows: "The Hospital 
Commander had given me an order to train special forces personnel, 
which order I have refused and will not obey,"  or words to that effect; (4) 
Intemperate, defamatory, provoking, and disloyal statements to special 
forces personnel in the presence and hearing of enlisted personnel 
performing duty under his immediate supervision and control, as follows: 
"I hope when you get to Vietnam something happens to you and you are 
injured, "  or words to that effect; all of which statements were made to 
persons who knew that the said Howard B. Levy was a commissioned 
officer in the active service of the United States Army. 
Specification to Additional Charge II 
In that Captain Howard B. Levy, United States Army, Headquarters 
and Headquarters Company, United States Army Hospital, Fort Jackson, 
South Carolina, with intent to impair and interfere with the performance 
of duty of a member of the military forces of the United States, did, at or 
near Columbia, South Carolina, on or about September 1965, conduct 
himself in a manner unbecoming an officer and gentleman by wrongfully 
and dishonorably communicating by mailing to Sergeant First Class 
Geoffrey Hancock, Jr., a member of the United States Army then 
stationed in Viet Nam, and known by the said Captain Howard B. Levy 
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to be so stationed, but not personally known to him, a letter written by 
his (Levy's) own hand containing the following statements: 
Dear Geoffrey: 
Let me begin by introducing myself. My name is Howard 
Levy. I am an Army Dermatologist at Fort Jackson, S.C. 
. . . . I would not attempt to contest your views on the military 
situation there although I would suggest that you read (if you 
have not already done so) Jules Roy's book, "The Battle of 
DienBienPhu. "  I am, however, deeply distressed at your 
reasons for fighting in Viet Nam. I am one of those "people 
back in the States" who actively opposes our efforts there & 
would refuse to serve there if I were so assigned . . . .  
The only question that remains, is essentially 1 )  were we 
merely naive and therefore did we make unintentional mistakes 
or 2) does the U .  S.  foreign policy represent a diabolical evil .  
As you would guess, � opt for the second proposition . . . .  
Communism worse than a U.S.  oriented government? . . .  
Are the North Viet Namese worse off than the South Viet 
Namese? I doubt it . . . .  
Geoffrey who are you fighting for? Do you know? Have 
you thought about it? You're [sic] real battle is back here in the 
U .  S.  but why must I fight it for you? The same people who 
suppress Negroes and poor whites here are doing it all over 
again all over the world and your [sic] helping them. Why? 
You, no doubt, know about the terror the whites have inflicted 
upon Negroes in our country. Aren't you guilty of the same 
thing with regard the Viet Namese? A dead woman is a dead 
woman in Alabama and in Viet Nam. To destroy a child's life 
in Viet Nam,_:'equals a destroyed life in Harlem. For what 
cause? Democracy, Diem, Trujillo, Batista, Chang Kai Shek, 
Franco, Tshombe - Bullshit? . . .  
I would hasten to remind you that despite your obvious courage 
and enthusiasm Viet Nam is not our country and you are not 
VietNamese. At least the Viet Cong have that on their side . .  
. . Geoffrey these people may not be sophisticated (American 
Style) but their [sic] grown men and women who have a right 
to live and choose their own government. You know they're 
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even allowed to make a mistake-at least let them make 
it-don't make it for them . . . .  , 
or words to that effect. 
Specification to Additional Charge m 
In that Captain Howard B. Levy, United States Army, Headquarters 
and Headquarters Company, United States Army Hospital, Fort Jackson, 
South Carolina, with intent to interfere with, impair, and influence the 
loyalty, morale, and discipline of the military forces of the United States, 
did at or near Columbia, South Carolina, on or about September 1965, 
advise, counsel , urge and attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty and 
refusal of duty by a member of the military forces of the United States by 
communicating by mailing to Sergeant First Class Geoffrey Hancock, Jr., 
a member of the United States military forces then stationed in Viet Nam, 
and known by the said Captain Howard B. Levy to be so stationed, but 
not personally known to him, a letter written by his (Levy's) own hand 
containing statements to the following effect: ( 1)  advocating opposition to 
the United States involvement in the Viet Nam war; (2) describing United 
States foreign policy as a "diabolical evil" designed more to protect 
selfish American business interests than to contain the threat and 
aggression of world Communism; (3) characterizing the United States 
position and policy in Viet Nam as a suppression of Negroes and poor 
whites; (4) praising Communists, and Communist countries, including 
North Viet Nam and the Viet Cong as being better than the United States 
and United States oriented countries; (5) declaring that he (Levy) would 
refuse to serve in Viet Nam, and that he has actively opposed the United 
States involvement in Viet Nam; (6) encouraging Sergeant First Class 
Geoffrey Hancock, Jr., to give up his involvement and commitment as a 
United States serviceman fighting in Viet Nam, and to return to the 
United States to fight for the cause of the suppressed Negroes and poor 
whites; (7) ridiculing and criticizing Sergeant First Class Geoffrey 
Hancock, Jr. ,  for fighting with the United States Army in Viet Nam; (8) 
ridiculing and criticizing Sergeant First Class Geoffrey Hancock, Jr.'s 
motive for being in Viet Nam, stating that Sergeant Hancock does not 
have the best interests of the Viet Namese people at heart, in violation of 
Title 1 8 ,  Section 2387 United States Code, June 25, 1948, Chapter 645, 
62 Statutes 8 1 1 ,  amended May 24, 1949, Chapter 139, Section 46, 63 
Statutes 96, a Statute of the United States of America. 
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APPENDIX II 
The Geoffrey Hancock Letter 
1041 Marion Street 




Let me begin by introducing myself. My name is Howard Levy. 
I'm an Army Dermatologist at Fort Jackson, S.C. I'm a friend of Bill 
Treanor with whom I've worked during this summer on the SCLC civil 
rights drive in my spare time. 
I've read your letters to Bill and have been especially interested in 
your views on Viet Nam since I too have had a deep seated interest in the 
situation there. I would not attempt to contest your views on the military 
situation there although I would suggest that you read (if you have not 
already done so) Jules Roy's book "The Battle of Dienbienphu." I am, 
however, deeply distressed at your reasons for fighting in Viet Nam. I 
am one of those "people back in the states" who actually opposes our 
efforts there and would refuse to serve there if I were so assigned. I 
would like to outline some of the -reasons for my stance. 
Bill has informed me that you are well acquainted with the history 
of Viet Nam so that I will not cover old ground. I think you would agree 
that from the time we backed Diem that we have politically not been very 
astute. The only question that remains, is essentially 1) were we merely 
naive and therefore did we make unintentional mistakes or 2) does the 
U.S. foreign policy represent a diabolical evil. As you would guess I opt 
for the second proposition. 
I do not believe that you can realistically judge the Viet Nam war as 
an isolated incident. .. It must be viewed in the context of the recent 
history of our foreign policy-at least from the start of the Cold War. 
Basically there are two aims to our foreign policy-one stated by our 
State Department and the other unstated . 1) The stated part-to contain 
"Communism" and 2) the unstated part-to support "stable" governments 
so that our foreign investors may profit. It should be noted that our 
definition of "Communism" is very, very broad. So broad in fact as to 
become practically worthless. The record is clear-the U .S .  has helped 
suppress every left liberal revolt that you could name if there was 
available in the country a "more acceptable" right wing figure who could 
be more easily manipulated. You see, unfortunately for our government, 
left liberal governments often have the interests of their countrymen at 
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heart and this runs counter to our interests. For example the Alliance for 
Progress has been almost a total failure-largely because every time a 
Latin American government tried to implement a true land reform 
program (part of the Alliance for Progress program) we have found some 
reason to balk and not approve the project. This isn't surprising since 
either U.S.  companies own or control much of the land in these countries. 
Yet without land reform nothing will work in Latin America. 
Of course our propaganda mills, the newspapers and the mass media, 
cover up our sins. Invariably Communists are found to take the blame. 
Do you really believe that the Dominican Republic was in danger of a 
Communist overthrow. Responsible noncommunist critics in Latin 
America don't. Juan Bosch said "those 56 communists couldn't run a 
first class hotel let alone a country." He was being generous to the U.S.  
because later events prove that there weren't even 56 Communists in the 
country at the time. The same is true in the Congo. Is Tshombe a great 
patriot? Few in the Congo think so. Yet we support him. Could it be 
because he can be "counted on"? I think so. 
Let's attack it from another, more radical, approach . What if the 
majority of a people decide that Communism is good for them? Do we, 
does anybody, have a right to deny them this choice. We might disagree 
emotionally and might try to prove that our way is better but by any 
stretch of any moral principal can we deny them the choice. Is 
Communism worse than a U.S .  oriented government? The fastest 
growing economy in Latin America is Cuba. Everybody reads and writes 
in Cuba. Everybody has medical care. Was this true with the previously 
American backed governments? Not on your life. Is it true in other 
American backed governments in Latin America? Far East? Near East? 
Where? The only true examples are Europe and Japan and here only 
because it served as a bulwark against the Communists. To get closer to 
home (your home and I hope it's temporary) are the North Vietnamese 
worse off than the South Vietnamese? I doubt it. If they are why do so 
many back the Viet Cong? Guerrilla terrorism? Unlikely. The truth is 
that the North has instituted land reform, schools and medical facilities (as 
best as they could in a still very poor country). Why hasn't it happened 
in the South and why do you insist that it will happen. It hasn't in any 
of our other colonies. It didn't even happen in the U.S.  until the Negro 
got off his ass and has made it happen. Do you really think that the big 
business-military complex in the U.S.  are big-hearted. They never have 
been. In the early 1900's labor men and women fought and died for what 
they obviously deserved-enough food to live. And it's still happening. 
Ask Bill about unions and labor conditions in the South. Well these same 
companies have vastly more influence on our foreign policy and their 
effective. 
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Geoffrey, who are you fighting for? Do you know? Have you 
thought about it? You're real battle is back here in the U.S.  but why 
must I fight it for you? The same people who suppress Negroes and poor 
whites here are doing it all over again all over the world and your helping 
them. Why? You, no doubt, know about the terror the whites have 
inflicted upon Negroes in our country. Aren't you guilty of the same 
thing with regard the Vietnamese? A dead woman is a dead woman in 
Alabama and in Viet Nam. To destroy a child's life in Viet Nam equals 
a destroyed life in Harlem. For what cause? Democracy? Diem, 
Trujillo, Batista, Chiang Kai-Shek, Franco, Tshombe-Bullshit? 
As I mentioned earlier I don't contest your position that we can win. 
The question is win what. If we must destroy a whole people to win than 
I don't understand the true context of the word. Who are we winning 
for? The government in Saigon? Which one? It may change before you 
receive this letter. I would hasten to remind you that despite your 
obvious courage and enthusiasm Viet Nam is not our country and you are 
not a Vietnamese. At least the Viet Cong have that on their side. Or do 
you take the position that you are the noble white father helping these 
poor ignorant people? How uplifting it must seem to you. Unhappily it's 
an illusion. These people know more about America and her generosity 
than you or !-thanks to American puppets in Saigon. You're no 
different than the governor of Alabama telling the Negroes that he has 
their best interests at heart. Even if it were true, and it's not, it would 
be a contemptible argument because it's so damn condescending. 
Geoffrey these people may not be sophisticated (American style), but their 
grown men and women who have a right to live and choose their own 
government. You know-they're even allowed to make a mistake-at 
least let them make it-don't make it for them. 
I've enclosed an article you might find interesting-maybe it will 
help explain some of the "morale back home. " 
I would appreciate your views on some of the points I have raised. 
In any event, let me wish you good luck and saf� conduct in your present 
situation. 
Yours truly, 
Howard Levy 
